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Zusammenfassung 
Mit dem Erscheinen mobiler Multimediadienste, wie z. B. Unified Messaging, Click-to-Dial-
Applikationen, netzwerkübergeifende Multimedia-Konferenzen und nahtlose Multimedia-Streming-
Dienste, begann die Konvergenz von mobilen Kommunikationsetzen und Festnetzen, begleitet von der 
Integration von Sprach- und Datenkommunikations-Übertragungstechnik Diese Entwicklungen bilden 
die Voraussetzung für die Verschmelzung des modernen Internet auf der einen Seite mit der 
Telekommunikation im klassischen Sinne auf der anderen. Das IP Multimedia-Subsystem (IMS) darf 
hierbei als die entscheidende Next-Generation-Service-Delivery-Plattform in einer vereinheitlichten 
Kommunikationswelt angesehen werden. Seine Architektur basiert auf einem modularen Design mit 
offenen Schnittstellen und bietet dedizierte Voraussetzungen zur Unterstützung von Multimedia-
Diensten auf der Grundlage der Internet-Protokolle. Einhergehend mit dieser aufkommenden offenen 
Technologie stellen sich neue Sicherheits-Herausforderungen in einer vielschichtigen 
Kommunikationsinfrastruktur, im Wesentlichen bestehend aus dem Internet Protokoll (IP), dem SIP-
Protokoll (Session Initiation Protocol) und dem Real-time Transport Protokoll (RTP). 
Die Zielsetzung des Secure Service Provisioning-Systems (SSP) ist, mögliche Angriffsszenarien und 
Sicherheitslücken in Verbindung mit dem IP Multimedia Subsystem zu erforschen und 
Sicherheitslösungen, wie sie von IETF, 3GPP und TISPAN vorgeschlagen werden, zu evaluieren. Im 
Rahmen dieser Forschungsarbeit werden die Lösungen als Teil des SSP-Systems berücksichtigt, mit 
dem Ziel, dem IMS und der Next-Generation-SDP einen hinreichenden Schutz zu garantieren. Dieser 
Teil, der als Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 bezeichnet wird, beinhaltet unter anderem Maßnahmen zur 
Nutzer- und Netzwerk-Authentifizierung, die Autorisierung der Nutzung von Multimediadiensten und 
Vorkehrungen zur Gewährleistung der Geheimhaltung und Integrität von Daten im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Schutz vor Lauschangriffen, Session-Hijacking- und Man-in-the-Middle-Angriffen. Im nächsten 
Schritt werden die Beschränkungen untersucht, die für die Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 charakteristisch 
sind und Maßnahmen zu Verbesserung des Sicherheitsschutzes entwickelt. Die entsprechenden 
Erweiterungen der Sicherheitsschutzstufe 1 führen zu einem Intrusion Detection and Prevention-
System (IDP), das Schutz vor Denial-of-Service- (DoS) / Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS)-
Angriffen, missbräuchlicher Nutzung und Täuschungsversuchen in IMS-basierten Netzwerken bietet. 
Weder 3GPP noch TISPAN haben bisher Lösungen für diesen Bereich spezifiziert. In diesem 
Zusammenhang können die beschriebenen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten einen Beitrag zur 
Standardisierung von Lösungen zum Schutz vor DoS- und DDoS-Angriffen in IMS-Netzwerken leisten. 
Der hier beschriebene Ansatz basiert auf der Entwicklung eines (stateful / stateless) Systems zur 
Erkennung und Verhinderung von Einbruchsversuchen (Intrusion Detection and Prevention System). 
Aus Entwicklungssicht wurde das IDP in zwei Module aufgeteilt: Das erste Modul beinhaltet die 
Basisfunktionen des IDP, die sich auf Flooding-Angriffe auf das IMS und ihre Kompensation richten. 
Ihr Ziel ist es, das IMS-Core-Netzwerk und die IMS-Ressourcen vor DoS- und DDoS-Angriffen zu 
schützen. Das entsprechende Modul basiert auf einer Online Stateless-Detection-Methodologie und 
wird aktiv, sobald die CPU-Auslastung der P-CSCF (Proxy-Call State Control Function) einen 
vordefinierten Grenzwert erreicht oder überschreitet. Das zweite Modul (IDP-AS) hat die Aufgabe, 
Angriffe, die sich gegen IMS Application Server (AS) richten abzufangen. Hierbei konzentrieren sich 
die Maßnahmen auf den Schutz des ISC-Interfaces zwischen IMS Core und Application Servern. Das 
betreffende Modul realisiert eine Stateful Detection Methodologie zur Erkennung missbräuchlicher 
Nutzungsaktivitäten. Während der Nutzer mit dem Application Server kommuniziert, werden dabei 
nutzerspezifische Zustandsdaten aufgezeichnet, die zur Prüfung der Legitimität herangezogen werden. 
Das IDP-AS prüft alle eingehenden Requests und alle abgehenden Responses, die von IMS Application 
Servern stammen oder die an IMS Application Server gerichtet sind, auf ihre Zulässigkeit im Hinblick 
auf die definierten Attack Rules. 
Mit Hilfe der Kriterien Fehlerfreiheit und Processing Delay bei der Identifikation potenzieller Angriffe 
wird die Leistungsfähigkeit der IDP-Module bewertet. Für die entsprechenden Referenzwerte werden 
hierbei die Zustände Nomallast und Überlast verglichen. Falls die Leistungsfähigkeit des IDP nicht 
unter den Erwartungen zurückbleibt, wird ein IDP-Prototyp zur Evaluation im Open IMS Playground 
des Fokus Fraunhofer 3Gb-Testbeds eingesetzt, um unter realen Einsatzbedingungen z. B. in VoIP-, 
Videokonferenz- , IPTV-, Presence- und Push-to-Talk-Szenarien getestet werden zu können. 
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Abstract 
With the emergence of mobile multimedia services, such as unified messaging, click to dial, 
cross network multiparty conferencing and seamless multimedia streaming services, the  
fixed–mobile convergence and voice–data integration has started, leading to an overall 
Internet–Telecommunications merger. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is considered as 
the next generation service delivery platform in the converged communication world. It 
consists of modular design with open interfaces and enables the flexibility for providing 
multimedia services over IP technology. In parallel this open based emerging technology has 
security challenges from multiple communication platforms and protocols like IP, Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP).  
The objective of Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework is to cram the potential 
attacks and security threats to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and to explore security 
solutions developed by IETF, 3GPP and TISPAN. This research work incorporates these 
solutions into SSP Framework to secure IMS and next generation Service Delivery Platform 
(SDP). We define this part as level 1 security protection which includes user and network 
authentication, authorization to access multimedia services, providing confidentiality and 
integrity protection etc. against eavesdropping, session hijacking and man-in-the middle 
attacks etc.  In the next step, we have investigated the limitations and improvements to level 1 
security and proposed the enhancement and extension as level 2 security by developing 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system against Denial-of-Service (DoS)/Distributed 
DoS (DDoS) flooding attacks, misuses and frauds in IMS-based networks. These security 
threats recently have been identified by 3GPP and TISPAN but no solution is recommended 
and developed. Therefore our solution may be considered as recommendation in future.  
Our approach based on developing both stateless and stateful intrusion detection and 
prevention system. From development point of view, we have divided the work into two 
modules: the first module is IDP-Core; addressing and mitigating the flooding attacks in IMS 
core. Its objective is to protect the IMS resources and IMS-core entities from DoS/DDoS 
flooding attacks. This module based on online stateless detection methodology and activates 
when CPU processing load of P-CSCF (Proxy-Call State Control Function) reaches or crosses 
the defined threshold limit. The second module is IDP-AS; addressing and mitigating the 
misuse attacks facing to IMS Application Servers (AS). Its focus is to secure the ISC interface 
between IMS Core and Application Servers. This module is based on stateful misuse 
detection methodology by creating and comparing user state (partner) when he/she is 
communicating with application server to check whether user is performing legitimate or 
illegitimate action with attacks rules. The IDP-AS also compared the incoming request and 
outgoing response to and from IMS Application Servers with the defined attacks rules. 
In the performance analysis, the processing delay and attacks detection accuracy of both 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) modules have been measured at Fraunhofer FOKUS 
IMS Testbed which is developed for research purpose. The performance evaluation based on 
normal and overload conditions scenarios. The results showed that the processing delay 
introduced by both IDP modules satisfied the standard requirements and did not cause 
retransmission of SIP REGISTER and INVITE requests. The developed prototype is under 
testing phase at Fraunhofer FOKUS 3Gb Testbed for evaluation in real world communication 
scenarios like VoIP, video conferencing, IPTV, presence, push-to-talk etc.    
Key Words: IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), Security Threats, Flooding Attacks, Denial-of-
Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), Fraud and Misuses of NGN Service, 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA), Confidentiality and Integrity, Inter-Domains 
Security, Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) System.  
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Chapter  1  Introduction  
1.1 Motivation    
The foundation for this thesis stems from the future trends of Fixed-Mobile 
Convergence (FMC), All-IP Networks and next generation Service Delivery Platform 
(SDP) as a result of merger of Internet and mobile communication, computer 
networks and Information Technology (IT). In the vision of All-IP Networks, the IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [1] has been developed by Third Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP) [2] and 3GPP2 [3]. The IMS is overlay architecture for the 
provision of multimedia services such as Voice over IP (VoIP), video conferencing, 
presence, push-to-talk etc. on top of all IP networks and the future technology for the 
convergence of data, speech and mobile networks. The IMS provides easy and 
efficient ways to integrate different value added services and seamless integration of 
legacy services. It enables consistent interactions with packet switched, circuit 
switched, and IP domains. The IMS manages event oriented quality of service policies 
e.g. use of VoIP and HTTP in a single session; VoIP has quality of service (QoS) 
while HTTP provides best effort delivery. These emerging systems based on event 
oriented charging policies; i.e. to change specific events on the appropriate level. If 
two events have the same IP resources, the system may charge them differently for the 
same user in the single session. These characteristics make the IMS as the future 
technology in a comprehensive service delivery and application oriented network 
environment. 
The IMS is based on the principles and protocols of the Internet defined by the IETF, 
which have been adapted by 3GPP and TISPAN for their use within a secure and 
scalable fixed-mobile communication. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [4] is 
used as the standard signalling protocol that establishes, controls, modifies and 
terminates voice, video and messaging sessions between two or more participants. 
The Call State Control Functions (CSCF) servers implement and manage the SIP 
functionalities. The Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) related 
functionality provision within the IMS is based on the Diameter protocol [5] and is 
implemented in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). Media Gateways and Media 
Server support potentially required adaptation of multimedia information for specific 
QoS requirements. The top level view of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) as Next 
Generation Service Delivery Platform (SDP) [6] is depicted in figure 1.1.  
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) specifies a comprehensive and service oriented 
architecture providing value added services and standardized interfaces for application 
service integration. With this technical revolution, the promising value added services 
suppose to change the entire communication environment and the IMS Application 
Server (AS) [7] is one of the proposed and developed service containers. 
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Figure 1.1 IMS Top Level View  
The IMS is overlay architecture on top of TCP/IP protocol stack [8] providing value 
added services.  It is like other IP-based network is open and distributed architecture 
that can enable easy access to services, information, and resources. But on the other 
side the hackers can access open architecture to launch attacks on IMS networks. 
Therefore strong and complex security solution and mechanisms such as secure data 
transmission, confidentiality, authentication, data integrity, anti-replay protection and 
intrusion detection system are essential to implement independent and robust security 
framework for IMS. In the following section we explore the potential security threats 
challenges to IMS. 
1.2  IMS Security Challenges  
Security and information protection is the core of all computer networks and 
communication systems. The convergence of fixed-mobile and voice-data networks 
has opened the door for the innovative and fancy next generation services and 
applications like integrated multimedia services, combining web browsing, email, 
instant messaging, presence, VoIP, video conferencing, application sharing, telephony, 
unified messaging, multimedia content delivery, etc. on top of different network 
technologies including IPv6, 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) IMS (IP 
Multimedia Subsystem) [1], 3GPP2 Multimedia Domain (MMD) [3], TISPAN 
(Telecoms & Internet converged Services & Protocols for Advanced Networks) NGN 
(Next Generation Network) [9], UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication 
Systems) [10] and DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) [11] etc. In the context of converged 
communication world, network security is a big challenge to protect multi-
dimensional and hybrid technology networks resources and to provide confidentiality 
and integrity protection to users. 
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The introduction of IP in telecommunication domain signifies not only a shift towards 
packet switching communication, but also a step towards completely open and easily 
accessible protocols. In terms of security, this implies an array of new threats and 
risks that have to be counter. The IMS is vulnerable to different types of other attacks 
because users are always being connected, online and the network structure based on 
new SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [5] technology which is open architecture and 
vulnerable to different types of Denial-of-Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial-of-
Service (DDoS) attacks.. 
 
Figure 1.2 IMS Security Challenges 
The IMS potential threats are from multiple communication domains and protocols 
including Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Media Streaming (RTP) and Internet (IP) 
as depicted in figure 1.2. These security challenges are summarized as follows: 
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on IMS Core and NGN Services. 
• Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks on IMS. 
• Misuses of IMS Services and Applications. 
• Threats from open-based IP infrastructure. 
• SIP signalling attacks like REGISTER and INVITE flooding. 
• Media flow attacks like drop and modify session. 
• Vulnerability threats on access links. 
In order to minimize the risk of theft of information and data form hackers and 
protection of network and services, there is strapping requirement to develop an 
independent security framework for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS).  
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1.3 Research Domain and Proposed Solution 
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) provides seamless Service Delivery Platform 
(SDP) [6] for next generation fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) applications and 
services [12]. From security prospective, it is very important to protect IMS network 
resources and SDP to provide security and confidentiality to costumers and users from 
intelligent hackers and criminal attackers.   
The security and privacy in IMS is standardized by 3GPP in release 5 and onward 
releases [13], [14]. We define this level 1 security and are achieved during registration 
and session management to authenticate and authorize users before accessing the 
applications and services.  Level 1 security is not sufficient to protect the IMS 
resources from DoS flooding attacks, message tempering like SQL-injection [15] and 
misuse of resources etc. Similarly if the hacker is able to penetrate into the network 
and break this security level, then the network is corrupted and multiple active attacks 
could be launched. In this situation there should be additional level 2 security to 
protect the network resources and users confidential information. The extended Level 
2 security focuses on Open IMS Core and Application Servers from Denial-of-Service 
(DoS)/Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, misuse of services and fraud detection from 
both legitimate and illegitimate users. The research domain and scope is depicted in 
figure 1.3, focusing on securing two platforms i.e. IMS core and IMS Service 
Delivery Platform (SDP). 
 
Figure 1.3 Research Scope  
The development of Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework incorporates both 
security levels and providing security protection shield to IMS. The IMS security 
shield is depicted in figure 1.4 consisting of two parts each has two modules. 
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IMS Level 1 Security protection focuses on: 
 Developing IMS security architecture. 
 Based on IETF, 3GPP and TISPAN Standards Mechanism and Specifications. 
 Providing AKA, Encryption and Integrity, and Inter-Domains Security. 
Extended Level 2 Security protection focuses on: 
 DoS/DDoS flooding attacks on Open IMS Core. 
 Misuse of services and fraud control for IMS Application Server (AS). 
 Developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) system for Open 
IMS Core. 
 Developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-AS) system for IMS 
Application Servers. 
 
Figure 1.4 Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework Overview   
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The thesis consists of six parts labelled A-F and further each part consists of multiple 
chapters as depicted in figure 1.5. The brief description of each part and is as follows:  
 
Figure 1.5 Thesis Outlines and Division   
Part-A focuses on the problem domain and state-of-the-art review. It consists of two 
chapters. The first chapter “Introduction” highlights the motivation, problem domain 
and scope of the thesis. The security challenges to IP Multimedia are presented. 
Chapter 2 “IP Multimedia Subsystem” is the state of art review, explaining the IMS 
architecture and important interfaces where security is considered very critical. The 
user’s registration in IMS and session establishment scenarios are presented. These 
scenarios are important to understand the attacks possibilities on the IMS signalling 
flow and communication.  
Part-B defines the requirement analysis and consists of chapter 3 “IMS Vulnerability 
and Attacks”. The main focus is on the SIP signalling and media flow attacks. These 
attacks are grouped into two categories i.e. time dependent like flooding attacks and 
time independent attacks like message tampering and SIP message flow attacks. This 
categorization helps to develop the proper solution for mitigating these attacks.  
Part-C explains the level 1 IMS security solutions based on standards protocols and 
mechanisms recommended by Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and 
TISPAN. It consists of five chapters (from 4 to 8) developing IMS security 
architecture providing level 1 security measures. Chapter 4 “IMS Security Solutions” 
draws the outline of “Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) Framework”. IMS security 
attacks verses existing and extended solutions are presented. Chapter 5 “IMS Key 
Management and Privacy” explains keys generation and secure exchange of keys 
between client and network during the authentication procedure. The used of these 
keys for securing the session signalling are also presented in this chapter. Chapter 6 
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“Inter-Domains Security” provides secure communication when user is roaming. The 
architecture of Security Gateways (SEGs) and PKI-based Authentication Framework 
(AF) are discussed to implement the IMS inter-domains security. Chapter 7 “Services 
Security” is protecting the HTTP-based IMS services. The Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) are presented to 
authenticate user before accessing the 3G services. Chapter 8 “Access Security” 
explains to establish security mode setup during connection establishment, and access 
link data integrity and confidentiality between mobile user and Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System (UMTS). 
Part-D presents level 2 extended security solutions. Level 2 extended security works 
has two sections; (1) design and development of Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
(IDP) system for IMS core against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and (2) design 
and development of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system for IMS 
Application Server (AS) against fraud and misuses of services. The first component is 
described in part-D which consists of three chapters (from 9 to 11) focusing on the 
design, development, implementation, testing and performance evaluation of Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) system for IMS core.   
Part-E explains second section of level 2 extended IMS security. It consists of three 
chapters (from 12 to 14) focusing of the design and development, implementation, 
testing and performance evaluation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for 
IMS Application Server (IDP-AS).  
Part-F is the last part consisting of two chapters. Chapter 15 describes the existing 
approaches of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) systems developed for IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and Voice over IP (VoIP) technology. The comparison 
with our approach is also presented in this chapter. Chapter 16 summarizes the 
research work. The limitations and future improvements for developed prototype are 
presented. 
  
Chapter  2  IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
2.1 Introduction  
Today telecommunication world is passing through the evolutionary phase i.e. the 
merger of two of the most successful paradigms: the Internet and the cellular networks. 
The Internet is based on packet switching communication to provide fancy services 
like www, emails, instant messaging, presence, VoIP, Video Conferencing and shared 
whiteboard etc. with best effort quality services where as the cellular networks 
provides call and multimedia services i.e. SMS, MMS based on circuit switching and 
modem based  techniques to transmit IP packet over circuits. As we know that the 
deployment and maintenance of data networks is much easier than the voice networks, 
so it is straight forward to think about relaying all communications on the data 
networks rather than maintaining in parallel two network technologies [16]. On the 
other hand we see today the increasing demand for integrated multimedia services, 
bringing together internet applications with telecommunications.  
 
Figure 2.1 Towards Fixed-Mobile-Internet Convergence 
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With the emergence of mobile multimedia services, such as unified messaging, click 
to dial, across network multiparty conferencing and seamless multimedia streaming 
services, the convergence of networks is started, leading to an overall Internet–
Telecommunications convergence as shown in figure 2.1. In face of such convergence, 
the need for universal SDPs supporting integrated services emerged. This means that 
SDP should in principle enable the rapid and uniform programming and provision of 
seamless multimedia services on top of any network environment. There is no doubt, 
however, that today two main trends are of pivotal importance for SDPs design, 
namely the support of mobile users and the support of (mobile) multi media data 
services. 
The IMS is an approach to provide overlay Service Delivery Platform (SDP) [6]  
architecture for IP networks, entirely build on Internet protocols defined by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which have been extended on request of 
3GPP to support telecommunications requirements. Mobile operator face today the 
problems that mobile users can gain access to the Internet and make use of Internet 
services and define a minimum SDP architecture for providing QoS, security and 
charging for IP based services, while providing maximum flexibility for the 
realisation of value added and content services. 
IP domainCircuit-Switched domain
Traditional
CS
Co-existence All IP
World
Uniform
Service Delivery Platform
Seamless Services Data ServicesVoice Services
 
Figure 2.2 Networks & Services Convergence 
2.2 IMS Standardization  
The IMS has been standardized by 3GPP [2] and 3GPP2 [3] since the beginning of 
this century in release 5 and will be extended in higher releases as a part of UMTS 
and fixed network. The release 5 standard has been driven by the vision to define the 
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IMS for providing multi media services including VoIP on top of GPRS networks. 
The IMS is supposed to be standardized access-independent IP-based architecture that 
interiors with existing voice and data networks for both fixed, Internet and mobile 
users etc. The IMS architecture makes it possible to establish peer-to-peer IP 
communications with all types of clients with quality of services and complete service 
delivery functionalities.  
The release 6 IMS has fixed the short comings of previous releases and also contains 
novel features like presence, messaging, conferencing, group managements and local 
services. The release 6 has optimized the IMS to provide the envisaged IMS killer 
application e.g. push to talk over cellular. The release 7 IMS is looking at unified IMS 
for all IP access networks.  In addition, since 2004, ETSI TISPAN [9] is looking at 
service infrastructures for fixed-mobile convergence and next generation networks 
which extends the IMS to make it applicable on top of various access networks, i.e. 
WLANs and particular fixed Internet (i.e. DSL). The recent IMS Release 7 is joint 
cooperation work of 3GPP and TISPAN addressing All IP Networks.  
2.3  IMS Architecture and Key Protocols 
The IMS defines service provision architecture, and it can be considered as the next 
generation service delivery platform framework. It consists of modular design with 
open interfaces and enables the flexibility for providing multimedia services over IP 
technology. The IMS does not standardize specific services but uses standard service 
enablers e.g. presence, and supports inherently multimedia over IP, VoIP, IM and 
presence [16]. In the IMS architecture, the SIP protocol is used to establishes, controls, 
modifies and terminates voice, video and messaging sessions. The related signalling 
servers in the architecture are referred to as Call State Control Functions (CSCFs) and 
distinguished by their specific functionalities.  
IMS layered architecture consists of three planes as shown in figure 2.3: the user, 
control, and application planes. In spite of the fact that IMS was initially designed (in 
release 5) for cellular IP networks (GPRS and UMTS), all access-specific issues have 
been separated in release 6 from the IMS core. This means that transport and bearer 
services (user plane) are separated from signalling network and session handling 
services (control plane). 
It is important to note that an IMS compliant end user system has to provide the 
necessary IMS protocol support, namely SIP, and the service related media codecs for 
the multimedia applications in addition to the basic connectivity support, e.g. GPRS, 
WLAN, etc.  
The important IMS components, protocols and interfaces are follows: 
2.3.1  IMS Components and Entities  
The IMS entities and key functionalities can be classified in six categories [7] i.e. 
session management and routing family (CSCFs), databases (HSS, SLF), 
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interworking elements (BGCF, MGCF etc.), services (application server, MRCF, 
MRFP), support entities (THIG, SEG, PDF) and charging.  
Proxy Call State Control Function (P-CSCF):- It is the first contact point within the 
IP Multimedia Core Network subsystem. Its address is discovered by UEs following 
Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context activation. The P-CSCF behaves like a proxy 
accepting requests and services them internally or forwards them. It performs 
functions like authorize the bearer resources for the appropriate QoS level, emergency 
calls, monitoring, header (de)compression and identification of I-CSCF. 
Interrogating Call State Control Function (I-CSCF):- It is the contact point within 
an operator's network for all connections destined to a subscriber of that network 
operator, or a roaming subscriber currently located within that network operator's 
service area. There may be multiple I-CSCFs within an operator's network. I-CSCF 
performs functions like assigning an S-CSCF to a user performing SIP 
registration/charging and resource utilisation i.e. generation of Charging Data Records 
(CDRs)/acting as a Topology Hiding Inter-working Gateway (THIG). 
Serving Call State Control Function (S-CSCF):- It performs the session control 
services for the endpoint and maintains session state as needed by the network 
operator for support of the services. The important functions performed by S-CSCF 
include user registration/interaction with services platforms for the support of services. 
The S-CSCF decides whether an AS is required to receive information related to an 
incoming SIP session request to ensure appropriate service handling. The decision at 
the S-CSCF is based on filter information received from the HSS. This filter 
information is stored and conveyed on a per application server basis for each user.  
Home Subscriber Server: - The HSS is equivalent of the HLR (Home Location 
Register) in 2G systems; however, extended with two Diameter based reference points. 
It is the master database of IMS that stores IMS user profiles including individual 
filtering information, user status information and application server profiles. 
Application Servers: - It provides service platform in IMS environment. It does not 
address how multimedia/value added applications are programmed but only well 
defined signalling and administration interfaces (ISC and Sh) and SIP and Diameter 
protocols are supported. The SIP AS is triggered by the S-CSCF which redirects 
certain sessions to the SIP AS based on the downloaded filter criteria or by requesting 
filter information from the HSS in a user based paradigm. The SIP AS itself 
comprises filter rules to decide which of the applications deployed on the server 
should be selected for handling the session.  
Media Processing: - The Media Resource Function (MRF) can be split up into Media 
Resource Function Controller (MRFC) and Media Resource Function Processor 
(MRFP). It provides media stream processing resources like media mixing, 
announcements, analysis and media transcoding as well speech [7]. The other three 
components are Border Gateway Control Function (BGCF), Media Gate Control 
Function (MGCF) and Media Gate (MG) which perform the bearer interworking 
between RTP/IP and the bearers used in the legacy networks. 
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Figure 2.3 IMS Layered Architecture 
IMS End User System: - It is important to note that an IMS compliant end user 
system has to provide the necessary IMS protocol support, namely SIP, and the 
service related media codecs for the multimedia applications in addition to the basic 
connectivity support, e.g. GPRS, WLAN, etc. 
2.3.2  IMS Key Protocols  
The IMS is based on Internet protocols defined by IETF, basically Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP) [4] is used for session control, the Diameter [5] is for Authentication, 
Authorisation, and Accounting (AAA) and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [17] 
is for media transport.  
2.3.2.1 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application layer protocol for establishment, 
modification and termination of multimedia sessions. It has support for registration 
and modification of multiple user location information, caller and callee 
authentication/call authorization, and privacy for call signalling and media streams 
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and media path with ensured QoS. The SIP was created with the design goals to 
provide transport protocol neutrality, request routing direct or through proxy, 
separation of signalling and media description, extensibility and roaming. SIP as part 
of IETF process, is based on the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [18] and the 
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [19]. SIP has some inbuilt service 
capabilities, allowing SIP elements to implement some intelligent network services 
like call forwarding, call screening, etc. 
2.3.2.2  Diameter Protocol 
Based on requirements of standardization bodies (such as IETF groups or 3GPP) and 
the industry, the IETF AAA Working Group [20] designed Diameter [5] which 
includes major improvements to existing AAA protocol RADIUS [21]. The Diameter 
is defined in terms of base protocol and set of applications. The base protocol 
provides an extensible framework for the use of AAA services. Each application relies 
on services of the base protocol to support a specific type of AAA requests. While 
applications may reuse the Diameter base protocol accounting commands, the base 
protocol is always used in combination with a particular application which 
implements the actual authentication and authorization. This design allows the 
protocol to be extended to new access technologies by specifying a new diameter 
application. All Diameter clients and servers must use the base protocol in 
conjunction with at least one diameter application e.g. diameter relay agents only 
needs to implement the base protocol since it does not need authentication or 
authorization functionality.  
The Diameter is a peer-to-peer protocol and any diameter node can initiate a request. 
Diameter has three kinds of network nodes: servers, clients and agents. A diameter 
server handles the authentication, accounting and authorization requests from the 
clients. Diameter clients are usually the end devices of the network that perform 
access control and originate AAA requests. The agent provides relay, proxy, redirect 
or translation services. Diameter messages are routed according to the network access 
identifier of a particular user. The flexibility to define new Diameter applications and 
vendor-specific attributes allows customization without threatening interoperability. 
This feature of Diameter is recognized by standardization bodies worldwide and 
3GPP chose it as the AAA protocol in IMS [22].  
2.3.2.3  Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) 
The other protocol which is important for multimedia contents is Real-time Transport 
Protocol (RTP) [17]. It provides end-to-end delivery for real-time data. It also 
contains end-to-end delivery services like payload-type (codec) identification, 
sequence numbering, time stamping and delivering monitoring for real-time data. 
RTP provides QoS monitoring (but does not address resource reservation or QoS 
guarantees) using the Real Time Transfer Control Protocol (RTCP) [23].  This 
monitoring of data delivery provides minimal control and identification functionality, 
such as provision of information about reception quality which the application can use 
to make local adjustments (e.g. when congestion is forming, the application could 
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decide to lower the data rate. RTCP also conveys information about media session 
participants. 
2.3.3 IMS Reference Points and Interfaces  
To connect different IMS entities with each other and carrying signal and information, 
interfaces and reference points are defined by 3GPP. We will discuss only those 
interfaces where signalling information is necessary to protect because we are 
proposing security solution for IMS signalling. In this context, the terms interfaces 
and reference points are used synonymously.  
Gm Interface: It connects user equipment (UE) to the IMS Core Network. It is used to 
transport all SIP signalling messages between the UE and the P-CSCF. Procedures in 
the Gm reference point can be divided into three main categories: registration, session 
control and transactions. 
Cx: This reference point is located between HSS and I- or S-CSCF. Subscriber and 
service data are permanently stored in the HSS. This centralized data is utilized by the 
I-CSCF and the S-CSCF when the user registers or receives sessions using Cx 
reference point and the selected protocol is Diameter. The procedure can be divided 
into three main categories: location management, user data handling and user 
authentication.  
ISC: The IMS Service Control (ISC) interface is located between an S-CSCF and an 
application server. The AS could behave as an SIP UA or SIP Proxy on this interface. 
The S-CSCF process the received SIP messages based on the filter criteria stored in 
the user profile obtained from the HSS. 
Sh: It connects Application Server with the HSS and the used protocol is Diameter. It 
enables the AS to obtain user data or to get to know the S-CSCF to send SIP request. 
Ut Interface: It is located between a UE and an AS. HTTP is the chosen data protocol 
and any further communication protocol needed between user and application has to 
rely on HTTP. 
Mw: It is the reference point between different CSCFs i.e. between P-CSCF and I-
CSCF & S-CSCF. The procedures in the Mw reference point can also be divided into 
three main categories: registration, session control and transactions. 
2.4  IMS Core Functionality & Features  
The IMS is designed to provide number of key capabilities required to enable new IP 
services via mobile and fixed networks. The important key functionalities which 
enable new mobile IP services are: 
 Multimedia session negotiation and management 
 Quality of service management 
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 Mobility management 
 Service execution, control and interaction 
Now we discuss the important features of IMS like addressing, registration, charging 
and quality of services etc.  
2.4.1  Addressing and Registration 
The 3GPP specifies SIP as the signalling protocol in the packet-switched domain of 
UMTS. The addressing in IMS is called SIP URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) and 
looks like an email address. The SIP URI follows the guidelines defined in [24]. In 
order to use IMS services, the UE must perform IMS registration. First the UE must 
obtain an IP connectivity bearer and discover an IMS entry point i.e. P-CSCF [23]. 
After the P-CSCF discovery, the UE sends a SIP REGISTER request to this Proxy. 
The P-CSCF processes the REGISTER request and uses the provided home domain 
name to resolve IP address of the I-CSCF then contact the HSS to fetch the required 
capabilities for S-CSCF selection. After S-CSCF selection the I-CSCF forwards the 
REGISTER request to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF checks the response and if it is 
correct downloads a user profile from the HSS and accepts the registration with a 200 
OK response as shown in the figure 2.4. Once the UE is successfully authorized, the 
UE is able to initiate and receive sessions. The UE must keep its registration active by 
periodically refreshing its registration.  
The registration procedure [7] in step wise is explained as follows: 
• First, the dedicated signalling Packet Data Protocol (PDP) context is 
established between User Equipment (UE) and the Gateway GPRS Support 
Node (GGSN). 
• The UE discovers the address of the Proxy Call Session Control Function 
(PCSCF).   
• The UE sends a REGISTER message to  home network to perform SIP 
registration. 
• The Interrogating-CSCF (I-CSCF) selects the Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF). 
• The S-CSCF downloads the authentication data of the user from the Home 
Subscriber Server (HSS). 
• The UE and the P-CSCF agree on a security mechanism. 
• The UE and the network (S-CSCF) authenticate each other. 
• IP security (IP-sec) associations between the UE and the P-CSCF are 
established. 
• SIP compression starts between the UE and the P-CSCF. 
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Figure 2.4 User Registration Process 
• The UE learns the route to the S-CSCF. 
• The S-CSCF learns the route to the UE. 
• The S-CSCF downloads the user profile from the HSS. 
• The S-CSCF registers the public user identity of the user. 
• The UE becomes aware of public user identity and user current registration 
state.  
• The P-CSCF becomes aware of public user identity and user current 
registration state. 
2.4.2 IMS Session Management 
After the registration, the user is able to access the services and starts session 
establishment process [7]. This process is briefly explained as follows and depicted in 
figure 2.5: 
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Figure 2.5 Session Establishment Scenario 
• The Caller’s UE (UE-A) constructs an INVITE request that includes a 
registered public user identity of called user (UE-B).   
• All SIP messages must traverse the Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-
CSCFs) and the Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF) of both users.  
• All SIP messages are sent via the established IP Security (IPsec) security 
associations (ASs) between the UE and their P-CSCFs.  
• All SIP messages are sent compressed between the UE and their P-CSCFs 
• The UE-A and UE-B agree on the media streams that they will exchange.   
• The UE-A and UE-B agree on a single codec for every media stream that they 
will exchange. 
• The networks will authorize the media for the session, so that the users can 
reserve the related resources.  
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• The UE-A and UE-B perform resource reservation i.e. they set up the necessary 
media PDP contexts over which the media streams to and from the network 
will be transported. 
• The network elements will exchange charging information. 
• The S-CSCFs may initiate advanced services for their served users.  
• Finally UE-B starts ringing and the called user accepts the session. This 
completes the session establishment phase 
2.4.3  IMS Charging 
Accounting is the process of collecting information about resource consumption. 
While accounting data can be used for multiple purposes such as capacity and trend 
analysis or cost allocation, it particularly forms the basis for the charging and latter 
billing of a user. The IMS defines two charging modes: online and offline. Online 
charging is a process in which the charging information can affect in real time the 
service rendered and therefore directly interacts with session/service control. Prepaid 
services are applications that need online charging capabilities.  Offline charging is a 
process in which the charging information does not affect in real time the service 
rendered. This is the traditional model in which the charging information is collected 
over a particular period [7]. Both modes result in generated Charging Detail Records 
(CDRs) that are necessary for the purpose of billing a subscriber for the provided 
service. Offline charging is used over the Diameter-based Rf reference point which is 
specified between a Charging Collection Function (CCF) and either a CSCF, an AS, a 
MRFC, a BGCF or a MGCF. In the roaming case it is verified during authentication 
phase that roaming to the visited network is allowed. IMS provides a means for 
charging per media component, as IMS sessions may include multiple media 
components. This would allow a possibility to charge the called party, when a new 
media component is added in a session. 
2.4.4  Quality of Service (QoS) 
The policy-based QoS (Quality of Service) control architecture in the IMS is the key 
part to provide IP-based multimedia applications and services with end-to-end QoS 
guarantees. The IMS session setup is based on a clear separation between the IMS 
session signalling and the allocation of resources. This means the IMS session setup is 
started but afterwards set on hold. At this time, both endpoints are responsible for 
requesting the required resources at least in their access network, where the IMS 
session setup is only successfully completed if both endpoints received sufficient 
resources.  
The IMS Release 5 specifications specifies the policy architecture only to GPRS 
networks [25] and Release 6 describes improvements, e.g. the specification of the 
PDF as a stand alone element to allow not only IMS compliant technologies but also 
to control of the bearer traffic to other access technologies. ETSI TISPAN is 
extending the IMS interconnection with fixed networks in order to have better QoS 
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management. The approach of resource monitoring can help to perform resource 
management in order to get mobility and roaming QoS functionalities [26].  
2.4.5  Privacy and Security 
To secure the IMS resources, 3GPP has defined IMS security architecture to 
authenticate users and network. It protects user confidential information on radio 
interface and IP based infrastructure. The IMS also utilizes UMTS security features 
along with its own independent security framework. We shall explore all the IMS 
security features and services in chapter 4 describing IMS security architecture.   
2.5  Provisioning of Value Added Services in IMS 
IMS is designed as a platform providing service enablers and IMS-based services are 
not standardised. The standards bodies want to provide as much as possible freedom 
for service ideas and service implementations. Only the necessary and core 
functionality like QoS, security, charging capabilities have been standardised to 
enable better value added IP-based services, compared to the classic internet services. 
However, IMS services are important for the introduction of IMS as service delivery 
platform.  
 
Figure 2.6 IMS Service Architecture Options 
The value added services can be provided in all IP environments in principle on all 
involved SIP systems which are interacting via SIP. Unfortunately today there does 
not available any common programming paradigm for SIP value added services. Most 
often there is the notion of service scripts, namely, SIP servlets, call programming 
language (CPL) and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts. All of them have 
compared to Intelligent Network (IN)/CAMEL and OSA/Parlay platforms that faced 
severe limitations in functionality and developers support [27]. However, as SIP has 
been selected as the universal signalling protocol in the 3GPP IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) domain, the notion of SIP application servers, which offer often 
combinations of CGI and servlets approaches, is emerging. However, also 
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OSA/Parlay [28] can be used on top of SIP as well as IN/CAMEL [29] as displayed in 
figure 2.6. 
 IMS services on SIP-Application Server: - The SIP-AS is intended for new 
services. A multitude of widely known APIs (CGI, CPL, SIP Servlets) is 
available. 
 IMS services directly on the CSCF: - It is similar to SIP AS and co-located 
on the CSCF. It seems to be useful for simple services and may be beneficial 
for the service availability and the service performance. 
 OSA Services via Open Service Access Service Capability Server: The 
OSA SCS is intended for the support of third party application providers. The 
OSA SCS provides access and resource control. 
 CAMEL Services via Camel Support Environment (CSE):- The CSE can 
be used for the support of existing intelligent services to service continuation. 
The IMS services are assumed to be addressed by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) 
[30] which is created by WAP Forum in June 2002 with open mobile architecture 
objective and consists of about ten mobile industries. The OMA SIP-based service 
enablers are specified on top of IMS as common platform e.g. presence and group 
management [31] etc. as shown in figure 2.7. Now we discuss some valuable services 
in IMS domain.  
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Figure 2.7 IMS as Multimedia Service Enabler  
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2.5.1 Push-To-Talk (PTT) over Cellular (PoC)  
The PoC [32] is 1-to-n half-duplex communication, including two-way radio, using a 
button to switch from voice transmission mode to voice reception mode (similar to 
Walkie-talkie functionality) using the mobile phones. 
The key PTT functions include presence, group list management, PTT media 
processing and the PTT application logic (including floor control handling). These are 
bundled tightly together in the vendor-specific PoC deployments, but from 2006 
onwards IMS-based PTT implementation will be deployed. The idea is to enable the 
reuse of the PTT core ingredients for other service offers, such as presence based 
services. PoC content are short, instructional and immediate. The PoC is standardised 
in the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Release 1 in 2005, and OMA does not consider 
access network issues. Figure 2.8 shows the OMA service enablers architecture and 
PoC scenario is shown in figure 2.9.  
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Figure 2.8 OMA Service Enabler Architecture 
2.5.2 Multimedia Conferencing and Group Chat 
It is a real time service that enables multiple users communicates through audio, video 
or text. In IMS conferences, there is always a central point of control where each 
conference participant has a connection. This central point provides a variety of 
conference services including media mixing, transcoding and participant list 
notifications. IMS provides functions to enable policies rules, including directives on 
the lifespan of the conference, definitions of roles available in the conference and 
policies for allowed roles [33].   
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Figure 2.9 IMS Application Server options 
2.5.3 Click to Dial 
Click-to-dial allows a user to click on a web page when he wishes to speak to a 
customer or other party. The web server then creates a call between the user and this 
other party. When a user clicks on the screen button, IMS will negotiate and 
eventually set up automatically a voice session with one or more other users [34]. The 
end users can have this call between two phones, a phone and an IP host, or two IP 
hosts. 
2.5.4 Presence 
Presence is the capability to make the status of a user be available to others and vice-
versa. The presence information may include person and terminal availability, 
communication preferences, terminal capabilities, current activity and location [34]. 
The research field actually is considering presence information to facilitate all mobile 
communication, not only instant messaging, as well as it will also be used as an 
indicator of the ability to engage in any session, including voice calls, video and 
gaming, and providing information to management functions like handover and QoS. 
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2.6  Open Issues and Summary  
The new multimedia services are demanding combination of service capability 
features. Most likely upcoming services will also relay on features like presence, 
group-list management, additional logic and other features on operator network e.g. 
location, SMS, MMS. It is obvious that service capability features must be reused for 
scalability and capital expenses reasons. The open issues are: 
 How to manage and orchestrate services?  
 How to create stringent services that bundle service capability features? 
 How to operate the network for services in a secure way? 
As mentioned in the 3GPP specifications the adoption of OSA/Parlay concepts and 
technologies can contribute a lot. OSA/Parlay already provides an industry standard 
that enables unified access with gateway character to service capability features of 
operators’ network. Even secure access by third parties can be handled by the 
OSA/Parlay framework. This framework may control resources by assuming there is 
secure access for third parties network.  
Recently, there are many IMS pre-products originating from the VoIP and wireless 
telecommunications market. But, there is not yet any commercial IMS deployment 
within operator networks. However, first Push to Talk (PTT) service implementations 
mushrooming around the globe can be regarded as the first big trials for IMS 
technologies.  However, there are still many open issues within the IMS architecture 
and the 3GPP and TISPAN IMS standardization is ongoing, particular in the field of 
applying the IMS on top of different wireless (WLAN, WIMAX) and wireline (DSL) 
networks and the IMS evolution towards All-IP Networks. 
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Requirements Analysis 
This part deals with the requirement analysis and investigates the potential threats and 
attacks facing to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The 3GPP has done a lot of efforts 
for developing IMS authentication, access control and confidentiality against 
registration and session hijacking, man-in-the-middle, and eavesdropping and 
password guessing attacks. But the problems of denial-of-service, flooding and 
message tampering attacks are not addressed by 3GPP. The objective of this Part-B is 
to focus on these attacks and vulnerabilities in IMS and it consists of chapter 3. These 
IMS attacks are classified into two categories: 
a) IMS Time Dependent (TD) Attacks 
Those attacks which require time interval to produce their harmful results are 
called time dependent attacks. For example SIP flooding is time dependent and 
ultimate result of this attack is Denial-of-Service (DoS) threats. The potential IMS 
TD-attacks are the following: 
• SIP REGISTER and SIP REGISTER Response Flooding  
• SIP INVITE and INVITE Response Flooding 
b) IMS Time Independent (TI) Attacks 
In these attacks, even a single message or command is sufficient to launch the 
attack. The potential IMS TI-attacks are: 
• SIP message tampering and fuzzing (e.g. SQL-injection)  
• SIP message flows (BYE, CANCEL and Re-INVITE etc.) attacks. 
 
Figure B: Requirement Analysis 
Chapter  3  IMS Vulnerabilities and Attacks  
3.1 Introduction  
The security and data privacy is a big challenge especially due to integration of 
different networks and technologies. The Fixed-Mobile Convergence (FMC) based on 
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is considered one of the most important and open 
technology of this decade. This all IP based network architecture provides open and 
flexible interfaces to deploy innovative services. In parallel, this open IP based 
technology has security threats from Internet world.  
The IMS is also vulnerable to different peer-to-peer attacks because users are always 
connected and online.  The possible reasons for passive and active attacks in IMS are 
being an attacker could easily access wireless link, launch false based station and 
redirection attacks to intercept and redirect user’s confidential information somewhere 
else.    
The IMS core threats include flooding attacks which ultimately busy the network 
resources and as a result these sources are not available to legitimate users.  The IMS 
Application Servers are also valuable target for intruders because they provide value-
added services. Due to text-based nature of SIP, the IMS and AS are vulnerable to 
attacks like spoofing, hijacking and message tampering. Moreover, the AS may suffer 
of HTTP-based threats. Finally, intruders may launch Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
against applications installed on the AS.  
The potential attacks and vulnerabilities suffering to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) 
include [7]: 
 Denial of Service - the consequence of a DOS is that the entity attacked 
becomes unavailable. 
 SQL Injection – is a type of message tampering attacks and database 
modification or deletion.  
 Eavesdropping - if messages are sent in clear text, any malicious user could 
eavesdrop and get session information to launch a variety of hijacking-style 
attacks. 
 Tearing down sessions - an attacker could insert messages like a CANCEL 
request to stop a caller or send a BYE request to terminate the session. 
 Registration hijacking - an attacker could register on user's behalf and could 
re-direct all traffic toward the attacker's machine. 
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 Session hijacking - an attacker could send an INVITE request within dialog 
request to modify requests en route to change session descriptions and re-
direct media elsewhere. 
 Impersonating a server - someone else pretends to be the server and forges a 
response. The original message could be misrouted. 
 Man in the middle - this attack is where attacker intercepts, modifies, or 
fabricates the flow of messages.  
3.2 IMS Security Attacks and Threats  
In this part we explore potential attacks on the IMS which are classified under time-
dependent and time-independent attacks. The classification is shown in figure 3.1. 
The time-dependent attack means that a time interval is required to effect or damage 
the victim e.g. flooding attack, but time-independent attack means that it effect 
instantly on the target as a data packet arrives e.g. a SQL-injection attack. 
 
Figure 3.1 Attack Categories 
3.2.1 Time Dependent (TD) Attacks  
From Intrusion Detection point of view, all attacks that can be detected after the 
particular duration of attack instead of being detected immediately belong to Time-
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dependent attack. The primary feature of this category is that an attack is composed of 
a large amount of data packets. We describe only the SIP flooding attacks because 
they are the most serious threat for IMS. In flooding the attacker sends lot of fake 
messages to victim machine or network to produce traffic workload. In case of IMS 
core, the P-CSCF can be overwhelmed by SIP REGISTER flooding attacks. As a 
result, the resources could become congested and produce bottleneck. In case of AS, 
the SIP Servlet [34] server can be overwhelmed by the flooding attacks. There will be 
no available resources to handle the legitimate SIP- and HTTP-messages. The attacker 
could use a range of protocols, including Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
[35], User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [36], TCP, and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
for launching flooding attacks. 
3.2.1.1 REGISTER Flooding Attack 
In the REGISTER flooding attack, the attacker sends a lot of REGISTER requests to 
the P-CSCF with fake or spoofed source address e.g. SIP URI (Uniform Resource 
Identifier). In case of distributed REGISTER flooding, the attacker generates multiple 
REGISTER requests with different spoofed and faked source addresses to overwhelm 
the IMS resources. It causes downfall of IMS resources and the legitimate users could 
not get the services.  The attack is depicted in figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 REGISTER Flooding Attack 
3.2.1.2 INVITE Flooding Attack 
The INVITE flooding attack is similar to the REGISTER flooding. In this attack, the 
attacker sends lot of INVITE SIP requests to hijack the session. The attack is depicted 
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in figure 3.3. If user is able to break the IMS authentication process as mentioned in 
[38], then the network is under attack. In this corrupted network, the authentication 
process can not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate users; therefore the 
extended security solution is capable of detecting solving this problem.    
 
Figure 3.3 INVITE Flooding Attack 
3.2.1.3 INVITE Response and REGISTER Response Flooding 
The INVITE response flooding and REGISTER response flooding somewhat differ 
from the flooding attacks described above which always intend to overwhelm the 
victim. The goal of the INVITE response flooding is to gain valid authentication 
credentials using exhausted search. A lot of INVITE messages are sent in order to 
crack the password for the authentication. In case of the REGISTER Response 
Flooding the attacker sends lot of REGISTER messages to a SIP Proxy trying to 
acquire the authorization credentials.  
3.2.1.4 Password Guessing Attack 
It is like session hijacking attack with objective to get user session information. If an 
intruder is not capable to break the IMS authentication process, even than he can 
launch password-guessing attack in order to misuse the legitimate accounts of users. 
The intruder launches this attack by sending lot of REGISTER requests to P-CSCF 
and receives 401-Unauthorized messages [7] from IMS core. At last the attacker could 
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get the 200 OK responses in the result of success of attack. The attack is describes in 
figure 2: the left side shows the successful authentication process from legitimate user 
and the right side shows the attack scenario. This attack could be launched by 
distributed nature with different SIP URI (Uniform Resource Identifier).  
 
Figure 3.4 Password Guessing Attack 
3.2.1.5 TCP SYN Flooding Attack 
The TCP/SYN flooding attack is a common example for the flooding attack. It works 
by creating a quantity of half-open connections. To open a connection the client sends 
a SYN message to the server, which in turn answers with a SYN-ACK message. The 
client has to acknowledge the SYN-ACK message with an ACK. A connection is 
half-open as long as the server waits for the final ACK message from the client. This 
is achieved when the attacking system sends SYN messages to a target server with a 
spoofed return address. The server then sends a SYN-ACK message to the spoofed 
address specified in the SYN message, which is, of course, not the IP address of the 
attacking machine. Thus, the server never receives the final ACK because the system 
receiving the SYN-ACK message cannot respond to it and the connection is never 
fully established. These uncompleted connections are called pending connections. 
Eventually, as the attacking machine creates an ever increasing number of pending 
connections, the buffer will fill up and overflow. Just like the example given in figure 
3.5 at first the attacker sends a manipulated SYN packet whose return/source IP-
address is unreachable. Then the victim will respond with a SYN-ACK message. The 
network does not know how to route this SYN-ACK message because of its 
unreachable receptor. At last the victim shall never receive an ACK message 
responding to the SYN-ACK message [39]. The memory occupied by the connection 
can be released only after the TCP connection has timed out. 
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Figure 3.5 TCP/SYN Flood Attack 
A similar attack is the TCP/ACKs flood attack. It is launched in the reverser direction 
by exploiting the answer packets. Using this technique an attacker sends packets to 
randomly chosen destination IP addresses and forges the source address of the packets 
to the victim's address. To amplify the attack the attacker can make use of the joint 
power of multiple systems when launching TCP/SYN flood attack called Distributed 
TCP/SYN flood attack. 
3.2.1.6 Smurf Attack 
In the smurf attack scenario, which is shown in figure 3.6, attackers use ICMP echo 
request packets [39] directed to IP broadcast addresses from remote locations to 
generate denial-of-service attacks.  
 
Figure 3.6 Smurf Attack 
There are three parties in this attack: the attacker, the intermediary, and the victim. 
The intermediary receives an ICMP echo request packet directed to IP broadcast 
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address of his network. If the intermediary does not filter ICMP traffic directed to IP 
broadcast addresses, many of the machines on the network receive this ICMP echo 
request packet and answer with an ICMP echo reply packet. When (potentially) all the 
machines on a network respond to this ICMP echo request, the result can be severe 
network congestion. When an attacker creates an ICMP echo request packet, he does 
not use the IP address of their own machine as the source address [39]. Instead, he 
creates forged packets that contain the victim’s IP address as source address. The 
result is that when all the machines at the intermediary's site respond to the ICMP 
echo requests, they send replies to the victim's machine. If there are a lot of servers at 
the intermediary's site, the victim is overwhelmed by the reply datagrams. 
3.2.2 Time Independent (TA) Attacks 
Time-independent attacks are serious threat to IMS like VoIP networks. The fake 
message cloud that is on behalf of an attack can immediately cause damage on the 
victim’s node if it is not detected and blocked immediately. 
3.2.2.1 SQL injection 
The SQL injection is a type of message tampering attack and the text based nature of 
SIP messages provides opportunity for message tampering attacks in IMS. This attack 
is not only targeting data modification, but causing denial-of-service by collapse of 
database services. The utilization of web interface for the provision of value-added 
services makes IMS more vulnerable to this kind of attacks.  
The SQL injection could be launched simply by inserting SQL statement when UE 
and P-CSCF starts authentication procedure. The UE’s initial REGISTER request 
utilizes the HTTP Digest [40] Authorization header to transport user’s identities. This 
REGISTER request looks like:  
REGISTER SIP: home1.de SIP/2.0 
Authorization: Digest Username=”user_private@home1.de”,  
realm=”home1.de”, nonce=” “, uri=”SIP: home1.de”, 
response=” “  
When malicious user tries to launch SQL injection in IMS, he spoofs the SIP message 
and inserts the malicious SQL code in its authorization header. The malicious code 
infected with SQL injection looks like: 
REGISTER SIP: home1.de SIP/2.0 
Authorization: Digest 
Username=”user_private@home1.de;delete table subscriber”,  
realm=”home1.de”, nonce=” “, uri=”SIP: home1.de”, 
response=” “  
When P-CSCF receives a SIP message with an infected authorization header, it 
generates and executes the illegitimate SQL statement which may delete data in the 
database [41]. The existing solutions do not provide mitigation against this attack. The 
IMS also integrates HTTP Servlet container, therefore attacker can also utilize the 
HTTP message to launch the SQL injection attacks. 
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3.2.2.2 The BYE Attack 
The BYE request is used to terminate an established session. An attacker could utilize 
the BYE request to tear down a session. The attacker sends a faked BYE message, 
which is forwarded from P-CSCF to UE1 and it assumes that it is from UE2 that 
wants to tear down the connection by sending the BYE message. As a result UE1 
stops the RTP flow immediately, while UE2 continues to send RTP packets to UE1 
because UE2 has no notion that the connection should be terminated [42]. To launch 
this kind of attack, the attacker needs to learn all necessary session parameters. This 
can be accomplished either by sniffing the network or performing a man-in-the-
middle attack to insert a BYE request into the session. This attack is depicted in figure 
3.7.  
 
Figure 3.7 Session Tear-Down Attack 
3.2.2.3 The CANCEL Attack 
The CANCEL terminates a pending request. The attacker could utilize the CANCEL 
method to cancel an INVITE request generated by a legitimate user as illustrated in 
figure 3.8. Before the final response is generated for an INVITE request, the attacker 
sends a faked CANCEL message to the P-CSCF that assume that it is from legitimate 
user. The IMS Core acknowledges the CANCEL message and ceases the processing 
of INVITE request. A CANCEL request can only be used to cancel an INVITE 
request. 
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Figure 3.8 CANCEL Attack 
3.2.2.4 The Re-INVITE Attack 
The INVITE request establishes session or dialog between two user devices (UE). The 
objective of the Re-INVITE message is used to modify the actual session information, 
for example changing the addresses or ports, adding a media stream, deleting a media 
stream, and so on. Therefore the attacker could launch a DoS attack by sending a 
forged Re-INVITE message to modify the session.  
 
Figure 3.9 Re-INVITE Attacks 
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3.2.2.5 The REFER Attack 
The REFER method indicates that the recipient (identified by the Request-URI) 
should contact a third party using the contact information provided in the request. 
RFC 3892 [43] extends this method by allowing the referrer to provide information to 
the refer target using the referee as an intermediary. The refer target can use this 
information to decide whether to accept the referenced request from the referee or not. 
This scheme enables the referee to act as an eavesdropper, giving him the ability to 
launch man-in-the-middle attacks. For example, as shown in figure 3.10 the referee 
can forge the Referred-By header or/and eavesdrop on the referred-by information. 
The referee may also copy all the related information into future unrelated requests. 
 
Figure 3.10 REFER Attack 
3.3 Summary  
This chapter explored different IMS SIP signalling attacks. These attacks are 
categorized into time depends and time independent attacks. The time dependent (TD) 
attacks includes SIP REGISTER and INVITE flooding, SIP REGISTER Response 
and INVITE Response flooding, TCP/SYN flooding and smurf attacks. The time 
independent (TA) attacks are SQL injection and SIP message flow attacks e.g. BYE, 
CANCEL and Re-INVITE attacks. This categorization helps us to develop optimum 
and effective security solution for IMS. 
 
  
 
 
Part-C  
 
IMS Security Architecture 
(Level 1 Security) 
  
Level 1 IMS Security Architecture 
The Part-C deals with level 1 IMS security solutions based on standards protocols and 
mechanisms recommended by Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and 
TISPAN. It consists of five chapters (from 4 to 8) developing IMS security 
architecture providing level 1 security measures. The functionalities of these chapters 
are briefly explained in the following: 
Chapter 4 “IMS Security Solutions” draws the outline of “Secure Service 
Provisioning (SSP) Framework”. IMS security attacks verses overviews of existing 
and extended solutions are presented.  
Chapter 5 “IMS Key Management and Privacy” explains keys generation and secure 
exchange of keys between client and network during the authentication procedure. 
The uses of these keys for securing the session signalling are also presented in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 6 “Inter-Domains Security” provides secure communication when user is 
roaming. The architecture of Security Gateways (SEGs) and PKI-based 
Authentication Framework (AF) are discussed to implement the IMS inter-domains 
security.  
Chapter 7 “Services Security” is protecting the HTTP-based IMS services. The 
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) and Generic Authentication Architecture 
(GAA) are presented to authenticate user before accessing the 3G services.  
Chapter 8 “Access Security” explains to establish security mode setup during 
connection establishment, and access link data integrity and confidentiality between 
mobile user and Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS). 
 
Figure C: Overview of Part-C (IMS Level 1 Security Architecture) 
 Chapter  4  IMS Security Solutions   
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of the IMS security solutions is to develop IMS security architecture to 
ensure user privacy and network protection against misuses. The important security 
features and security services provided by these solutions includes: 
User Confidentiality: This entity provides user identity confidentiality, user location 
confidentiality and user un-traceability. To achieve these characteristics the user is 
assigned by a temporary identity so that the user’s permanent identity to which 
services are delivered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access link and in addition 
user data and signalling that might reveal the user’s identity is ciphered on the radio 
access link.   
Entity Authentication: Authentication entity is based on user authentication and 
network authentication, and should apply at connection setup between the user and the 
network. It involves authentication mechanism using an authentication vector 
delivered by the user’s HE to the serving network and a local authentication 
mechanism using the integrity key establishment between the user and the serving 
network.   
Data Confidentiality: It provides confidentiality of user data and signalling data. It is 
achieved by using cipher algorithm and key agreement.   
Data Integrity: It provides data integrity and origin authentication of signalling data. 
Data integrity is achieved by integrity algorithms and integrity key agreement.   
Network and Services Availability: Its objective is to make sure that network 
resources and services should be available all the time to the users. To ensure the 
availability of services and resources, the network should be protected from Denial-
of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. 
Fraud Control: Its objective is to protect the precious assets and value added services 
from the illegitimate users and hackers.  In IMS, these services could be protected by 
securing Application Servers (ASs).    
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4.2 IMS Attacks and Corresponding Security Solutions  
The attacks in IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and the corresponding existing and 
extended solutions are highlighted in mapping diagram in figure 4.1. The existing 
solutions include IMS AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) [44], Digest 
Authentication [40] and TLS (Transport Layer Security) [45] or IPsec (Internet 
Protocol Security) [46] to provide authentication, integrity and confidentiality by 
securing SIP messages. These solutions could not prevent application layer attacks, 
e.g. SIP message flooding, SIP message flow, fuzzing and SQL injection [15]. The 
proposed solution focuses on developing intrusion detection and prevention system 
along with these existing solutions to enhance IMS security by detecting and 
preventing such application layer attacks. 
 
Figure 4.1 IMS Attacks vs. Solutions 
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The 3GPP standards specify two security solutions for IMS i.e. early IMS security and 
complete IMS security solutions.  
Early IMS Security Solution: standardized in 3GPP Release 5 [13] which provides 
limited security functionality and aiming to protect early IMS deployment and offer 
less security. It provides authentication of subscribers for services access and identity 
confidentiality on the radio interface. It also provides radio interface encryption. 
Complete IMS Security Solution: standardized in 3GPP Release 6 [14] with full 
security functionality and it builds on the early security solutions with objective to 
improve it. It offers new security features and secures new services to protect network 
and terminals with data protection. It consists of network domain security and access 
security that defines SIP security with hop-by-hop fashion. The end-to-end security is 
not supported.  
The overall security for IP Multimedia System (IMS) consists of following 
mechanisms and is depicted in figure 4.2:  
 
Figure 4.2 IMS Existing Security Solutions 
• Authentication & Key Agreement between IM subscriber and home network 
• Security Mechanism Agreement between IM client and visited network 
• Integrity Protection and Confidentiality 
• Network Domain Security between different Domains 
• Existing GPRS/UMTS Access Security 
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4.3 IMS Security Associations   
The architecture of IMS security management framework for Open IMS Fraunhofer 
FOKUS Testbed consists of following seven security associations and agreements [47] 
(presented in figure 4.3) that are mandatory to protect IMS environment for secure 
and safe communication over wireless and wireline networks including both circuit 
switched (CS) and packet switched (PS) domains.  
4.3.1 Security Association 1 (SA1) 
It provides mutual authentication of user and network. The HSS is responsible for 
generating keys and challenges and then delegate’s subscriber authentication to 
Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF). The long-term key in ISIM and HSS is associated with the 
IMPI. The detailed process will be explained in chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 IMS Security Associations 
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4.3.2 Security Association 2 (SA2) 
It provides a secure link and a security association between UE and Proxy-CSCF 
(P-CSCF) for protecting of Gm reference point (air contact). In IMS, NDS/IP is used 
to protect SIP signalling, but SIP communication at Gm interface between UE and P-
CSCF is outside the scope of NDS/IP and needs additional measures for security. It 
will be explained in chapter 5. 
4.3.3 Security Association 3 (SA3) 
It provides security within network domain internally for Cx-interface. Home 
Subscriber Server (HSS) stores subscriber and service data permanently and this 
centralized data is utilized by I-CSCF and S-CSCF when the user registers or receives 
sessions through Cx interface and the selected management protocol is Diameter. 
Diameter messages over Cx and Dx interfaces make use of Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [23] with IPsec for secure communication. 
4.3.4 Security Association 4 (SA4) 
It provides security between different networks for SIP capable nodes and only 
applicable when P-CSCF resides in visited network i.e. user is roaming.  When P-
CSCF resides in visited network than by virtue of AKA protocol, the shared secret is 
only accessible in home network, which means that while authentication needs to take 
place in visited network, certain delegation of responsibility needs to be assigned to P-
CSCF, as IPsec SAs exist between P-CSCF and UE. 
4.3.5 Security Association 5 (SA5) 
It provides security within network internally between SIP capable nodes and also 
applies when P-CSCF resides in home network. The IMS protects all IP traffic in core 
network using Network Domain Security/IP (NDS/IP) [48] which provides 
confidentially, data integrity, authentication and anti-replay protection for traffic using 
combination of cryptographic security mechanisms and protocol security mechanisms 
applied is IP Security (IPsec). The security procedure for SA4 and SA5 will be 
explained in chapter 6.  
4.3.6 Security Association 6 (SA6) 
The protocols working across Ut interface performs functionality to manage data 
traffic for HTTP based applications. Thus securing Ut interface means to achieve 
confidentiality and data integrity protection of HTTP-based traffic. The authentication 
and key agreement for Ut interface is also based on AKA which generates session 
keys. The IMS defines Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [49] which utilizes 
Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [50] that performs mutual authentication 
before accessing services. The authentication in the Ut interface is performed by 
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authentication proxy. Traffic in the Ut interface goes through the authentication proxy 
and is secured using the bootstrapped session key. The Ut interface employs the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) for both confidentiality and integrity protection.  We 
shall discuss the detail procedure in chapter 7.  
4.3.7 Security Association 7 (SA7) 
It manages to protect user and user’s information on access networks e.g. UMTS, 
GPRS, WLAN and xDSL. The security association takes place independently either in 
CS service domain or PS service domain. For UMTS access network, security 
management architecture consists of User Service Identity Module (USIM), Mobile 
Equipment (ME), Access Network (AN), Service Network (SN) and Home 
Environment (HE) [44]. The USIM is required for accessing Packet Switched (PS) 
domain in General Packet Radio System (GPRS) and identifies particular subscriber. 
USIM contains security parameters for accessing PS-domain, International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI), list of allowed access points, MMS-related information. In 
serving network, the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) links Radio Access 
Network (RAN) to packet core network in the PS-service domain. It is responsible for 
performing both control and traffic handling functions for PS domain. The control 
parts deal with mobility management and session management.  The SGSN also 
ensures appropriate QoS and generates charging information. In CS-service domain, 
the related part is Visitor Location Register (VLR). The authentication and key 
agreement procedure involves Authentication Centre (AUC) within HE, SGSN or 
VLR and Mobile Station (MS) networks entities [7]. The detailed architecture is 
explained in chapter 8. 
4.4 Extended IMS Security Solution    
In this section, we present the overview of additional security measures and solutions 
in the form of developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system for IMS. 
The functionalities and types of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) are briefly 
explained as follows:  
The IDSs are divided functionality wise into two types, i.e. anomaly detection or 
misuse detection. Anomaly detection depends upon models of the normal behaviour 
of a computer system. The focus of the models could be users, applications, or the 
network. An anomaly detection system compares actual usage profiles or patterns 
against established profiles to identify abnormal of activity on the system.  
The misuse detection systems depend upon the attacks descriptions or defined attacks 
rules. The input data is compared with these attacks descriptions to find an evidence 
that particular attack is occurring.  The advantage of anomaly detection systems is 
being able to detect unknown attacks but the disadvantage are generating large 
number of false positives and difficult to train the security system for new 
environment.  The advantage of misuse detection system is to generate less false 
positive but its scope is to detect only known attacks. Most of the practical intrusion 
detection systems are misuses detection systems. The misuse detection analysis based 
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on stateless or stateful. The stateless analysis examines each event in the input stream 
independently, while stateful analysis considers the relationships between events and 
is able to detect event histories that represent attacks. This stateful approach is more 
powerful and more expensive in terms of CPU and memory requirements [51].   
 
Figure 4.4 Proposed Extended IMS Security Solution  
The developed prototype based on both stateless and stateful detection methodologies 
and applies additionally attacks preventions to protect the IMS core and Application 
Servers. The definition and scope of each module is as follows: 
4.4.1 IDP-Core  
The Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) system is deployed within P-
CSCF as depicted in figure 4.4. The IDP-Core performs detection and prevention 
function in two modes i.e. normal and overload. In normal mode, IDP-core performs 
detection and prevention for SIP message tampering and SIP message flow attacks. In 
overload mode (when P-CSCF’s CPU is overloaded), it detects and prevents SIP 
flooding attacks causing denial-of-services. The detail design, detection algorithm, 
architecture, implementation and performance evaluation of IDP-Core is presented in 
Part-D. 
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4.4.2 IDP-AS 
The second module, Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-AS) system is deployed 
within IMS Application Server to monitor the state of partner as well as SIP 
request/response from and to application server to verify that it is from legitimate user. 
This module is based on SIP Servlet Exection Environment (SIPSEE), an IMS 
Application Server prototype developed by Fraunhofer FOKUS [52] for research 
purpose to develop next generation services. The SIPSEE is based on Jetty [53], an 
open source, standard-based web server. The IPD-AS analysis is based on stateful 
misuse detection. The outline of IDP-AS is depicted in figure 4.4. The detail design, 
architecture, attacks detection methodology, implementation, testing and performance 
evaluation is presented in Part-E. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the mapping of IMS security threats and the 
corresponding IMS security solutions. The existing IMS security solutions and 
security associations are outlined. The type and functionality of extended solution is 
discussed. The definition and scope of proposed two modules i.e. IDP-Core and IDP-
AS are presented.    
 
 
 
Chapter  5  Key Management and Secrecy   
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the generation and management of session keys for securing 
IP multimedia signalling and data. These keys (confidentiality key and integrity key)  
are derived from the secret key (K) and shared secret stored in SIM/USIM. In order to 
get IP Multimedia Services, user’s one public identity which is called IP Multimedia 
Public Identity (IMPU) needs to be registered and user’s private identity which is 
called IP Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI) has to be authenticated by the IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS).  
The IMS authentication procedure is based on the Authentication and Key Agreement 
(AKA) protocol. The secret key (K) and AKA algorithms are stored in IP Multimedia 
Services Identity Module (ISIM) which is normally embedded on Universal 
Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) like a smart card based device. The IMS security is 
based on a long-term secret key (K) shared between ISIM and Home Network (HN) 
Authentication Centre (AUC). The AKA performs mutual authentication of ISIM and 
AUC, and generates Cipher Key (CK) and Integrity Key (IK) [7]. Section 5.2 
describes the key generation and distribution process during authentication process. 
Section 5.3 explains the confidentiality and integrity protection procedures. 
5.2 IMS Key Management Procedure 
In this section we shall explain IMS AKA procedure for unregistered IP Multimedia 
client and successful mutual authentication with no synchronization error case. For 
authentication purpose, the client sends SIP REGISTER request to S-CSCF via P-
CSCF and I-CSCF. This request contains User Private Identity (IMPI) and User 
Public Identity (IMPU). After receiving this request, the S-CSCF sends 
Authentication Vector Request (AV-Req (IMPI, m)) to Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 
for getting authentication vector (AV) vector and the HSS generates and sends an n-
ordered array of AVs to S-CSCF and sequence number in AV-Req-Response. Each 
AV consists of CK, IK, RAND, XRES and AUTHN as given in equation 5.1.  
AV = RAND||AUTN||XRES||CK||IK     (5.1) 
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Figure 5.1 IMS Authentication Process 
Each AV is required for one authentication process and is selected on first-in/first-out 
basis. The S-CSCF sends SIP authentication challenge (Auth-Challenge) to P-CSCF 
via I-CSCF and the P-CSCF stores the keys (IK, CK) and forward the remaining 
message (Auth-Challenge (IMPI, RAND, AUTN)) to the client. The network starts 
authentication procedure by using authentication request that contains a random 
challenge (RAND) and authentication token (AUTN).  
The AUTN is calculated as:  
AUTN = SQN + AK ⊕ AMF ⊕ MAC      (5.2) 
Where SQN is sequence number, ⊕ is XOR addition & AMP is an authentication and key 
management field. AK = F5K (RAND); F5 is a key generating function. 
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Upon receiving challenge, the client takes AUTN which includes MAC and SQN. The 
client calculates XMAC as given in equation 5.3, and verify that XMAC = MAC and 
SQN in correct range.  
XMAC = F1K (SQN ⊕ RAN ⊕ AMF)       (5.3) 
If both are ok, the client calculates Auth-Response including RES and some other 
parameters and sends back to P-CSCF in REG (IMPI, Auth-Response) message. The 
client also calculates the CK and IK keys at this stage as given in equation 5.4.  
CK = F3K(RAND) &  IK = F4K (RAND)       (5.4) 
Where F3, F4 are key generating functions and RAND is a random value.  
The P-CSCF forwards this response to I-CSCF which quires the HSS to find the 
address of S-CSCF and the I-CSCF forwards this response to the S-CSCF. The S-
CSCF retrieves RES from the Response and compare with XRES [40]. If verification 
is successful the client has been authenticated and user’s public identity (IMPU) is 
registered in the S-CSCF. The complete procedure is explained in figure 5.1.  
The ISIM verifies the AUTN for network authenticity. The ISIM and the HSS keep 
track of sequence numbers SQNISIM and SQNHSS respectively for each round of 
authentication procedures. If the ISIM detects an authentication whose sequence 
number is out of range, then it aborts the authentication and reports back to network 
with a synchronization failure message, including with correct sequence number [54]. 
This technique is used to provide for anti-replay protection. The ISIM produce 
authentication response (RES) as in equation 5.5 from secret key and random 
challenge (RAND) in respond to network’s authentication request.  
RES = F2K (RAND)             (5.5) 
Where F2 is a message authentication function.  
By this process the UE and home network have successfully authenticated and have 
established a secure communication channel. The device on which ISIM resides is a 
temper-resistant and only physical access to it is not sufficient to result in exposing 
the secret key. It is further protected by the PIN code from unauthorized access. Thus 
combination of ownership of physical device USIM/ISIM and knowledge of secret 
pin code makes the security architecture of IMS more robust [7].  
5.3 Protection of Air Interface    
The Gm reference point connects user to IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) netwrok. It 
is used to transport all Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [4] signalling messages 
between UE and P-CSCF. The protection of this interface is very essential and 
therefore its security is considered very important. In IMS, NDS/IP is used to protect 
SIP signalling, but SIP communication at Gm interface between UE and P-CSCF is 
outside the scope of NDS/IP and needs additional measures for security. The IMS in 
3GPP Releases 5 and 6 makes use of IPsec as the security mechanism between P-
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CSCF and the UE. The Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) [55] is only one of several 
possible security mechanisms. The IMS was designed to allow alternative security 
mechanisms over the Gm interface as well. Allowing such openness usually creates 
backward compatibility problems because, for example, a Release 6-compliant UE 
would not be able to understand any alternative security mechanism, while it could be 
attached to P-CSCF of higher release that would already support alternatives to IPsec 
[7]. Therefore, the SIP Security Mechanism Agreement (Sip-Sec-Agree) [56] was 
introduced to allow UE and P-CSCF to negotiate a common security mechanism for 
use between them. For current releases the only security mechanism is IPsec; however, 
it might be that some entities already support alternative mechanisms on proprietary 
basis.  
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Register
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Auth OK
Unsecured Authentication
UE P-CSCF
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Figure 5.2 Unsecured and Secured Authentication Scenarios  
During authentication of user, UE and IMS also negotiate security mechanisms for 
securing subsequent SIP traffic in Gm interface. SIP protocol is used for this security 
agreement and the UE and P-CSCF exchange their respective lists of supported 
security mechanisms and the highest commonly supported one is selected to provide 
data integrity protection. Once the security mechanism has been selected and its use 
started, previously exchanged list is replayed back to network in a secure fashion. 
This helps network to verify that the security mechanism selection was correct and the 
security agreement was not tampered with. An example of an attack that would be 
possible without this feature is bidding-down attack, where an attacker forces peers 
into selecting a known weak security mechanism. The IPsec ESP [57] provides both 
confidentially as well as data integrity and authentication which are mandatory in IMS 
access security. AKA session keys are used as keys for the ESP SAs i.e. IK is used as 
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authentication key, and CK as encryption key. The AKA Protocol cannot run directly 
over IP and requires a vehicle to carry protocol messages between the UE and the 
home network. The SIP acts as vehicle for AKA protocol and it is tunnelled inside 
SIP and therefore IMS access is obviously to authenticate it. 
5.3.1 Use of IPsec ESP for SIP Confidentiality and Integrity 
Protection 
In order to provide the SIP Integrity protection between UE and P-CSCF, the 
recommended protocol is IPsec ESP (IP Security Encapsulated Security Payload) [7] 
which protect all SIP signalling messages at IP layer. The use of ESP for integrity 
protection will be applied in transport mode as shown in figure 5.3. In this mode TCP 
header, payload and padding fields are encrypted in IP packet and new ESP header 
which contains information like Security Parameter Index (SPI), is added between IP 
header and encrypted data. Finally MAC is calculated on all the data except IP header. 
The receiver checks integrity protection by calculating MAC and comparing with 
received MAC. The integrity algorithm is either Hash Message Authentication Code – 
Message Digest (HMAC-MD5-96) [58] or Secure Hash Algorithm (HMAC-SHA-1-
96) [59]. If the selected algorithm is HMAC-MD5-96 then integrity key (IKESP) is 
calculated as follows which is 128 bits.  
IKESP = IKIM          (5.6) 
But for other algorithm (HMAC-SHA-1-96), integrity key (IKESP) is calculated as 
follows to create a 160 bits key.  
IKESP = IKIM ║ 32 bits zeros string     (5.7) 
In order to provide confidentiality to SIP signalling on air interface, UE and P-CSCF 
agree on the specific encryption algorithm, mechanism and encryption key. The IPsec 
ESP [60] in transport is recommended by 3GPP to provide confidentially protection 
of SIP signalling at Gm interface between IMS core and IMS client. The encryption 
algorithm is either Data Encryption Standard- Triple DES used in Cipher Block Code 
(DES-EDE3-CBC) [61] or Advance Encryption Standard in Cipher Block Code 
(AES-CBC) [62] with 128 bit key. The encryption key (CKESP) for DES-EDE3-CBC 
is calculated as:  
CKESP = CK IM1 ║ CKIM2 ║ CKIM1      (5.8) 
Where CKIM1 (64 bits) and CKIM2 (64 bits) are derived from CKIM (128 bits) as  
CKIM = CKIM1 ║ CKIM2        (5.9) 
If the selected algorithm is AES-CBC, then encryption key (CKESP) is as:   
KESP = CKIM   
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Figure 5.3 ESP Header Format 
5.3.2 SIP Integrity and Confidentiality Procedure 
Now we discuss the procedure to set-up security associations between client (UE) and 
P-CSCF for the protection of Gm interface. The client sends security-setup message in 
the REG (Sec-Setup = SPI-U, Port-U, UE I & E Algorithms List) message as shown 
in figure 5.4.  
Where SPI-U = (SPI-UC, SPI-US); pair of Security Parameter Index values that client 
selects. 
Port-U = (Port-UC, Port-US); pair of protected ports numbers of clients and server. 
UE I & E Algorithms List = List of Integrity and Encryption Algorithms Identifiers 
that client supports.   
Upon receipt of this message, P-CSCF stores security parameters along with client’s 
IMPI, IMPU and IP address and adds keys IKIM and CKIM received from S-CSCF. 
Next the P-CSCF sends Auth-Challenge (Sec-Setup = SPI-P, Port-P,P-CSCF I & E 
Algorithms List) to client.  
Where SPI-P = (SPI-PC, SPI-PS); pair of Security Parameter Index values that P-
CSCF selects. 
Port-P = (Port-PC, Port-PS); pair of protected ports numbers of clients and server. 
P-CSCF I & E Algorithms List = List of Integrity and Encryption Algorithms 
Identifiers that P-CSCF supports.   
The client then sends final security setup message as REG (Sec-Setup = SPI-U, Port-
U, SPI-P, Port-P, P-CSCF I & E Algorithms List) to P-CSCF and it checks whether 
these parameters are same. If they match registration is successful. Finally P-CSCF 
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sends REG (Integrity-Protection=Successful, Confidentiality-Protection=Successful, 
IMPI) to S-CSCF to inform that client messages are integrity and confidentiality 
protected [54].  
 
Figure 5.4 Authentication with Integrity and Confidentiality Protection 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter presented IMS authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure for 
user and network authentication, the generation and secure transfer of confidentiality 
and integrity keys.  The used of these key and related protocols to provide 
confidentiality and data integrity on Gm interface is discussed in detail.  
Chapter  6  IMS Inter-Domains Security  
6.1 Introduction  
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) supports communication between home network 
and visited network, creating two scenarios weather IMS terminal is in home network 
or roaming. In first scenario UE’s first point of contact to IMS, called P-CSCF is 
located in home network and in the second scenario the P-CSCF is located in visited 
network (roaming) as depicted in figure 6.1. The traffic between the visited and home 
network are protected using Network Domain Security/Internet Protocol (NDS/IP) at 
IP layer [63]. The NDS/IP only protects traffic between network elements in IP layer.  
 
Figure 6.1 IMS Roaming User 
A security domain is a network operated by a single administrative authority that 
implements a uniform security policy within that domain.  As a result the level of 
security will be the same within a security domain. Mostly the security domain is 
related directly to an operator’s core network but it is however possible to run several 
security domains making subset of operator’s entire core network. IMS protects all IP 
traffic in the core network using NDS/IP which provides confidentially, data integrity, 
authentication and anti-replay protection for traffic using combination of 
cryptographic security mechanisms and protocol security mechanisms applied in IP 
security (IPsec). In NDS/IP platform the interfaces between elements inside security 
domain are denoted by Zb and interfaces between different security domains are 
denoted by Za as shown in figure 6.2. Use of Za interface is always mandatory 
between different security domains while use of Zb interface is optional and up to the 
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security domain’s administrator. Data authentication and integrity is mandatory for 
both interfaces, while use of encryption is recommended for Za and optional for Zb.  
The NDS/IP is used to protect operators IMS Core Network as well as traffic between 
visited and home network. The fundamental idea of NDS/IP architecture is to provide 
hop-by-hop security, according to the chained-tunnels or hub-and-spoke models of 
operation. And utilizing hop-by-hop security also makes it easy to maintain separate 
security policies internally, and towards other external security domains. The Network 
Entities (NEs) establish and maintain ESP (Encapsulated Security Payload) Security 
Associations (SAs) as needed towards a SEG (Security Gateway) or other NEs within 
the same security domain. All NDS/IP traffic from NE in one security domain 
towards NE in other security domain is routed via SEG, and will receive hop-by-hop 
security protection towards the final destination [63].  
The operators may decide to establish only one ESP Security Association between 
two communicating security domains, which will lead to coarse-grained security 
granularity. This has a benefit that a certain measure of protection against traffic flow 
analysis is given. But the disadvantage is that it is not possible to differentiate the 
security protection provided between the communicating entities. This does not 
preclude negotiation of finer grained security granularity at the discretion of the 
communicating entities. 
 
Figure 6.2 Visited and Home Network Scenarios 
6.2 Network Domain Security (NDS) Architecture 
Network domain is a network controlled by single operator or administrator authority 
to implement uniform security policy within the domain. Hence, the level of security 
and the available security services will be the same within security domain. The 
domain security is applied on the border of operator’s network and protected by 
Security Gateways (SEGs) [63] which are responsible to enforce security policy of 
security domain towards other security domain’s SEGs.   
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The NDS/IP is used to protect the operators IMS core network as well as the traffic 
between the visited and home network. The fundamental idea of the NDS/IP 
architecture is to provide hop-by-hop security, according to the chained-tunnels or 
hub-and-spoke models of operation. By utilizing hop-by-hop security helps to 
maintain separate security policies internally and towards other external security 
domains [64]. In NDS/IP, Security Gateways maintain IPsec secure ESP 
(Encapsulated Security Payload) Security Associations in tunnel mode between 
security domains. All NDS/IP traffic from network entities of security domain is 
routed via SEG to other security domain using hop-by-hop security protection to the 
end destination. 
Different entities and interfaces of network domain security architecture are given 
below: 
6.2.1 NDS Interfaces 
As we know that security between different domains is implemented by NDS/IP 
protocol through Security Gateways (SEGs). The interfaces between security domains 
are represented as Za while the interfaces within the security domain are represented 
as Zb as shown in figure 6.3. Za-interface covers all NDS/IP traffic between security 
domains.  
For Za-interface, authentication and data integrity protection is required and data 
encryption is recommended. These three security features are implemented by using 
ESP (Encapsulated Security Payload) protocol [57] and SEGs use IKE (Internet Key 
Exchange) to negotiate, establish and maintain secure ESP tunnel between them for 
forwarding NDS/IP traffic between security domains. The security policy over Xa-
interface depends upon the roaming agreement.  
For Zb-interface, authentication and data integrity protection is required and 
implemented by using ESP protocol. Data encryption is optional on this interface and 
depends upon the decision of security domain operator.       
6.2.2 Security Gateways (SEGs) 
Security Gateways (SEGs) are network entities on the borders of IP security domains, 
providing security to IP based protocols and establish the communication over the Za-
interface. All NDS/IP traffic goes through SEG before entering or leaving the security 
domain. A security domain can have more than one SEG and it depends upon number 
of destinations, avoid single point failure and traffic load balancing etc. Each SEG is 
defined to handle NDS/IP traffic by well-defined rules to reach IP security domain.    
When protecting inter-domain IMS traffic it is mandatory to provide confidentiality, 
data integrity, and authentication in the NDS/IP. The security gateways enforce the 
security policies for the interworking between networks. The security may include 
filtering policies as well as firewall functionality. The SEGs are responsible for 
security sensitive operations and need to be physically secured.  
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As we have discussed the SEGs establish and maintain an IPsec secured ESP Security 
Association in tunnel mode between security domains. The SEG will normally 
provide at least one IPsec tunnel at all times to a particular peer SEG. Each SEG is 
responsible for setting up and maintaining IPsec security associations (SAs) with its 
peer SEGs. These SAs are negotiated using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [65] 
protocol, where authentication is done using long term keys stored in the SEGs. Each 
SEG maintains two SAs per connection: one for inbound traffic and other for 
outbound traffic. In addition, it maintains a single Internet Security Association and 
Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) SA [66] for key management. The prerequisite 
for the ISAKMP SA is that the peers should be authenticated. In the NDS/IP, 
authentication is based on pre-shared secrets. The architecture for SEGs is presented 
in figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3 Security Gateways Architecture 
The SEG will maintain logically separate Security Associations Database (SAD) and 
Security Policy Database (SPD) for each interface [63]. Their functionalities are given 
below: 
6.2.2.1 Security Policy Database (SPD) 
It contains the policies by which all inbound and outbound traffic is categorized by 
security gateways. In general, packets are selected for one of three processing modes 
based on IP and transport layer header information matched against entries in the 
database (SPD). A packet is either afforded IPsec security services, discarded, or 
allowed to bypass IPsec, based on the applicable database policies identified by the 
selectors. 
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6.2.2.2 Security Associations Database (SAD) 
It is a container for all active SAs, and related parameters. A set of selectors—IP layer 
and upper layer (e.g., TCP and UDP) protocol field values—is used by the SPD to 
map traffic to a specific SA. This relationship is represented by a set of information 
that can be considered as a contract between the SEGs. The information must be 
agreed upon and shared between all the SEGs. All SEGs must adhere to the SA for 
secure communications to be possible. When accessing SA attributes, SEGs use a 
pointer or identifier referred to as the Security Parameter Index (SPI) [63]. 
6.3 Use of IPsec in NDS/IP Environment 
This section provides an overview of the features of IPsec that are used by NDS/IP 
and defines a minimum set of features that must be supported. The security services 
provided by NDS/IP are data integrity, data origin authentication, anti-replay 
protection and limited protection against traffic flow analysis and confidentiality. 
IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select the 
required security protocols, determine the algorithms to be use for the service, and to 
provide the cryptographic keys required for the requested services. It can be used to 
protect one or more links between a pair of SEGs, or between a SEG and a host. The 
set of security services that IPsec can provide includes access control, connectionless 
integrity, data origin authentication, rejection of replayed packets and confidentiality. 
Because these services are provided at the IP layer, they can be used by any higher 
layer protocol. The components of the IPsec security architecture are: 
6.3.1 Security Protocols 
The IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security i.e. Authentication Header 
(AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). These protocols may be applied 
alone or in combination with each other to provide a desired set of security services in 
Ipv4 and Ipv6.  Each protocol supports two modes of use i.e. transport mode and 
tunnel mode.  
In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarily for upper layer protocols. 
Tunnel mode is typically used to tunnel IP traffic between two SEGs. The difference 
is that in transport mode IPsec offers limited protection to IP headers, whereas in 
tunnel mode the full IP datagram is protected.  
The security protocol used in the NDS/IP for encryption, data integrity protection and 
authentication is the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [57] in tunnel mode 
i.e. the full IP datagram, including the IP header, is encapsulated in the ESP packet. 
The ESP provides confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, 
an anti-replay service, and limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services 
provided depends on options selected at the time of security association establishment 
and on the placement of the implementation. The anti-replay service may be selected 
only if data origin authentication is selected, and its selection is solely at the discretion 
of the receiver [57]. 
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The ESP is used to provide security services in IPv4 and IPv6. To process outbound 
traffic, a host or security gateway first uses a set of selectors in the SPD to determine 
the outbound SA used. It then follows a set of steps to process the outbound packet: 
• The entire original outbound IP datagram is encapsulated in an ESP payload field 
in tunnel mode. 
• Appropriate padding is added to the payload data. 
• The results are encrypted using an encryption key and an algorithm. 
• The sequence number is incremented as appropriate. 
• If authentication is enabled, then the ICV is calculated. 
• Possible fragmentation of the IP datagram is performed 
On receiving an IP datagram the recipient follows the following steps to process the 
packet: 
• Possible reassembly of the IP datagram is performed. 
• Using the SPI, security protocol and destination IP address, an appropriate SA is 
looked up from the SAD. 
• If anti-replay protection is enabled, the sequence number is inspected. 
• If authentication is enabled, then the ICV is verified. 
The packet is decrypted, padding is removed and the original IP datagram is 
reconstructed. The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header is designed to 
provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. The ESP header is inserted before 
an encapsulated IP header in tunnel mode. Thus the format of ESP packets for a given 
SA is fixed, for the duration of the SA. The tunnel mode ESP is employed by the 
SEGs to protect transit traffic. The inner IP header carries the ultimate source and 
destination addresses, while an outer IP header may contain distinct IP addresses 
usually addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, ESP protects the entire inner 
IP packet, including the entire inner IP header [66]. 
If authentication is selected, encryption is performed first, before the authentication, 
and the encryption does not encompass the Authentication Data field. This order of 
processing facilitates rapid detection and rejection of replayed or counterfeit packets 
by the receiver, prior to decrypting the packet, hence potentially reducing the impact 
of denial of service attacks. It also allows for the possibility of parallel processing of 
packets at the receiver, hence decryption can take place in parallel with authentication.  
6.3.2 Security Associations  
The concept of a security association is germane to IPsec. A security association (SA) 
is a set of policy and key(s) used to protect information and is defined as the 
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relationship between two SEGs that allows the protection of information 
communicated between them and that defines how they are going to use security 
services to secure their communications. It includes information on authentication 
and/or encryption algorithms, cryptographic keys and key lengths as well as the 
initialization vectors (IV) that are shared between the entities. A SA is unidirectional; 
so typically two SAs are needed for a bidirectional flow of traffic—one for inbound 
(read) traffic and one for outbound (write) traffic. Security protocols make use of 
security associations (SAs) as they provide security services. This relationship 
includes a shared symmetric key and security attributes describing the relationship. It 
is uniquely identified by security parameter index (SPI) [57] and destination IP 
address.  
With regard to the use of IPsec security associations in the network domain of 
NDS/IP-networks, the NDS/IP requires support for tunnel mode IPsec SAs and 
support for ESP SAs. The specification of IPsec SAs is available in RFC-2401 [55]. 
With regard to the use of ISAKMP security associations in the network domain of 
NDS/IP-networks, the NDS/IP only requires support for ISAKMP SAs with pre-
shared keys. The specification of ISAKMP SAs is available in RFC-2408 [66]. 
6.3.3 Key Management 
The process for the distribution of cryptographic keys to be used with the security 
protocols (namely, the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)) is called key management. In 
the IMS/UMTS network domain security architecture, the key distribution between 
SEGs is handled by IKE protocol [66]. The main purpose of IKE is to negotiate, 
establish and maintain Security Associations between network entities that are used to 
establish secure communications. The IKE automatically negotiates IPsec security 
associations (SAs) and enables IPsec secure communications [65].  
There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key exchange i.e. 
Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each mode generates authenticated keying material 
from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode must be implemented but 
Aggressive Mode should be implemented. In addition, Quick Mode must be 
implemented as a mechanism to generate fresh keying material and negotiate non-
ISAKMP security services and New Group Mode should be implemented as a 
mechanism to define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges [60].  
Specifically, IKE provides the following benefits: 
• It eliminates the need to manually specify all the IPsec security parameters in the 
crypto maps at both peers. 
• IKE allows specifying a lifetime for the IPsec security association. 
• It allows encryption keys to change during IPsec sessions. 
• IKE allows IPsec to provide anti-replay services. 
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• It permits Certification Authority (CA) support for a manageable, scalable IPsec 
implementation. 
• IKE allows dynamic authentication of peers. 
The Internet Key Exchange protocol is used for negotiation of IPsec SAs with the 
following additional requirement for inter-security domain SA negotiations over the 
Za-interface [67]. 
6.3.3.1 IKE phase-1 (ISAKMP SA) 
• The use of pre-shared secrets for authentication will be supported [68]; 
• Only ISAKMP Main Mode will be used; 
• IP addresses and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) shall be supported for 
identification; 
• Support of 3DES in CBC mode [69] shall be mandatory for confidentiality; 
• Support of AES in CBC mode [62] shall be mandatory for confidentiality; 
• Support of SHA-1 [59] shall be mandatory for integrity/message authentication; 
• Support of Diffie-Hellman group 2 shall be mandatory for Diffie-Hellman 
exchange [70]. 
Phase-1 IKE SAs shall be persistent with respect to the IPsec SAs i.e. IKE SAs shall 
have a lifetime for at least the same duration, as does the derived IPsec SAs. The 
IPsec SAs should be re-keyed proactively, i.e. a new SA should be established before 
the old SA expires [68].  
6.3.3.2 IKE phase-2 (IPsec SA) 
• Perfect Forward Secrecy is optional; 
• Only IP addresses or subnet identity types shall be mandatory address types; 
• Support of Notifications shall be mandatory; 
• Support of Diffie-Hellman group 2 shall be mandatory for Diffie-Hellman 
exchange. 
6.3.4 Encryption and Authentication Algorithms 
To implement the IMS inter-domain security, 3GPP recommends for encryption, the 
Triple DES (3DES) [69] algorithm is mandatory, while for data integrity and 
authentication both MD5 [71] and SHA-1 [59] can be used. IPsec offers set of 
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confidentiality transforms supports including ESP_NULL and ESP_DES transforms. 
However, Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm is no longer considered 
sufficiently strong in terms of cryptographic strength. It is mentioned by IESG in RFC 
2407 [72] that the ESP_DES transform is likely to be deprecated in the near future. It 
is therefore explicitly recommended in NDS/IP that ESP_3DES algorithm is 
mandatory instead of ESP_DES. Also the support for AES-CBC cipher algorithm [62] 
is mandatory with key length of 128 bits. 
IPsec offers data integrity transforms that compliant IPsec implementation is required 
to support are the ESP_NULL, the ESP_HMAC_MD5 and the ESP_HMAC_SHA-1 
transforms. For NDS/IP traffic ESP shall always be used to provide integrity, data 
origin authentication, and anti-replay services, thus the ESP_NULL authentication 
algorithm is explicitly not allowed for use. ESP shall support ESP_HMAC_SHA-1 
algorithm in NDS/IP. 
6.4 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
 Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, utilizes a pair of 
keys, one is private and other is public which are mathematically related. Information 
is encrypted with the public key, and can only be decrypted with the corresponding 
private key. In this system, the public keys of all users are published in an open 
directory, facilitating communications between all parties. The private key is not 
shared, only the public key is made public. Public key cryptography can also be used 
to create and verify digital signatures by changing the key order by encryption and 
decryption [70]. These can be appended to messages to provide proof of 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. The PKI Forum has provided PKI 
Technical Perspective [73] to use PKI technology in specific vendor environment, 
addressing the following issues [64]: 
• Security policies that define the rules under which the cryptographic systems 
should operate; 
• Procedures to generate, store and manage the keys; and 
• Procedures how the keys and certificates are generated, distributed and used. 
A Public Key Infrastructure is a combination of policies and procedures, hardware 
and software. PKI is based on digital IDs known as ‘digital certificates’ that bind the 
user’s digital signature to his or her public key. PKI consists of the following 
components. 
6.4.1 Security Policy 
A security policy sets out and defines the top-level direction on information security, 
as well as the processes and principles for the use of cryptography. Typically it will 
include statements on how to handle keys and valuable information, and will set the 
level of control required to match the levels of risk. 
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6.4.2 Certification Authority (CA) 
The CA system is the trust basis of a PKI, since it manages public key certificates for 
their whole life cycle. The CA performs the following tasks: 
• It issues certificates by binding the identity of a user or SEG to a public key with a 
digital signature; 
• CA schedules expiry dates for certificates;  
• It ensures publishing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) revoke certificates when 
necessary. 
The PKI must ensure that the CA’s private key is held in a tamper-resistant security 
module, and provision must be made for back-up copies for disaster recovery 
purposes. Access to the CA and RA should be tightly controlled. All certificate 
requests should be digitally signed to detect and prevent hackers from deliberately 
generating counterfeit certificates. All significant events performed by the CA system 
should be recorded in a secure audit trail, where each entry is time/date stamped and 
signed, to ensure that entries cannot be falsified.  
The trust relationship between two authorities is establishes by cross-certification. 
When Certification Authority A is cross-certified with Certification Authority B, this 
implies that A has chosen to trust certificates issued by B. The cross-certification 
process enables the users under both authorities to trust the other authority's 
certificates. Trust in this context equals being able to authenticate. There are two types 
of cross-certification processes: 
6.4.2.1 Manual Cross-certification  
In manual cross-certification, mutual cross-certifications are established directly 
between the Certification Authorities. The authority makes decisions about trust 
locally. When a Certification Authority A chooses to trust a Certification Authority B, 
then authority A signs the certificate of the authority B and distributes the new 
certificate (B's certificate signed by A) locally. The disadvantage of this approach is 
that it often results in scenarios where there need to be a large number of certificates 
available for the entities doing the trust decisions: There needs to be a certificate 
signed by the local Certification Authority for each security domain with which the 
local authority wishes to trust. However, all the certificates can be configured locally 
and are locally signed, so their management is often flexible. 
6.4.2.2 Bridge Cross-certification  
The Bridge CA is a concept that reduces the number of certificates that need to be 
configured for the entity that does the certificate checking. When two authorities are 
mutually cross-certified with the bridge, the authorities do not need to know about 
each other. Authorities can still trust each other because the trust in this model is 
transitive i.e. A trusts bridge, bridge trusts B, thus A trusts B and vice versa. The 
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bridge CA acts like a bridge between the authorities and the two authorities shall also 
trust that the bridge CA is trusted and secure. Bridge CA style cross-certifications are 
useful in scenarios where all entities communicate a common Trusted Third Party. If 
an authority needs to restrict the trust or access control derived from the Bridge CA, it 
additionally needs to implement those restrictions [68]. 
 
Figure 6.4 Security Gateways Architecture 
6.5  PKI Based NDS Authentication Framework 
This section explain the implementation of PKI based  Network Domain 
Security/Authentication Framework which uses a simple access control method, i.e. 
each element that is authenticated also provides a service. The architecture uses direct 
cross-certifications between the security domains, which enables easy policy 
configurations in the SEGs [68]. Each security domain has at least one Local 
Certificate Authority (LCA) and one Domain Certificate Authority (DCA) as shown 
in figure 6.4. Their functionality is given as: 
 The LCA of the domain issues certificates to the SEGs in the domain that have 
interconnection with SEGs in other domains.  
 The DCA of the domain issues certificates to the LCAs of other domains with 
which the operator’s SEGs have interconnection.  
 All the certificates are based on the Internet X.509 certificate profile [74]. 
The LCA issues certificates for SEGs that implement the Za interface. When SEG of 
the security domain A establishes a secure connection with the SEG of the domain B, 
they are able to authenticate each other. The mutual authentication is checked using 
the certificates the LCAs issued for the SEGs. When a roaming agreement is 
established between the domains, the DCA cross-certify the LCA of the peer operator. 
The created cross-certificates need only to be configured locally to each domain.  
The cross-certificates issue by DCA-A of security domain A for the LCA of security 
domain B, will be available for SEG of domain A which implements the Za interface 
towards domain B. Similarly, the cross-certificates issue by DCA-B of security 
domain B for the LCA of security domain A will be available for SEG of domain B 
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which implements the Za interface towards domain A. After cross-certification, the 
SEG-A is able to verify the following path (figure 6.5): 
SEG-B → LCA-B → DCA-A 
Similarly, the SEG-B is able to verify the path:  
SEG-A → LCA-A → DCA-B 
If the verification process is satisfied then both domains A and B can trust 
each other and use the certificates for each others.   
 
Figure 6.5 Distribution of Certificates 
The public key of the DCA is stored securely in each SEG within the 
operator's domain. This allows the SEG to verify cross certificates issued by its 
operator's DCA. It is assumed that each operator domain could include 2 to 10 SEGs. 
An operator may decide to set up both LCA and DCA as a single CA, i.e. separation 
of CAs is not required. The NDS/AF is initially based on a simple trust model that 
avoids the introduction of transitive trust and/or additional authorisation information. 
The simple trust model implies manual cross-certification [68]. Now we discuss the 
design use cases of NDS/AF. 
6.5.1 Creating/Terminating Roaming Agreement 
When a roaming agreement is required, the SEGs of two different domains establish 
the secure tunnel using cross-certificates issued by DCA of two domains. The creation 
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of a roaming agreement only involves use of the private keys of the DCAs. There is 
no need for the operators to use the private keys of their respective LCAs in forming a 
roaming agreement.  
When creating the new cross-certificate, the DCA set the path length to zero to initiate 
that the new cross-certificate to be used in signing new CA certificates. When the new 
cross-certificate is available to the SEG, its information are configured in the SEG. 
The authentication can be done based on the created cross-certificates.  
When a roaming agreement is terminated or due to an urgent service termination need, 
all concerned SEG peers will remove the IPsec SAs using device-specific 
management methods. Each concerned operator will also list the cross-certificate 
created for the DCA of the terminated operator in his local Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) [68]. 
6.5.2 Creating VPN Tunnel 
After establishing a roaming agreement and finishing the required certificate 
management operations, the operators configure their SEGs for SEG-SEG connection, 
and the SAs are established as specified by NDS/IP. In each connection configuration, 
the remote SEG DNS name or IP address is specified. Only the local DCA and LCA 
are configured as trusted CAs [68]. Because of the cross-certification, any operator 
who’s LCA has been cross-certified can get access using this VPN connection 
configuration. 
Now we discuss the flow of connection negotiation as mentioned in [68] from SEG-A 
which is initiator. The SEG-B, which is responder, will perform the same function. 
 During connection initiation, the initiating SEG-A provides its own SEG 
certificate and the corresponding digital signature in IKE Main Mode message 
3; 
 SEG-A receives the remote SEG-B certificate and signature; 
 SEG-A validates the remote SEG-B signature; 
 SEG-A verifies the validity of SEG-B certificate by a CRL check to both the 
Operator A and Operator B CRL databases. If a SEG cannot successfully 
perform both CRL checks, it assumes as an error and abort tunnel 
establishment; 
 SEG-A validates SEG-B certificate using the cross-certificate for LCA-B by 
executing the following actions: 
1. SEG-A verifies the validity of the cross-certificate for LCA-B by a CRL 
check to the DCA-A CRL database. If a SEG cannot successfully perform 
the CRL check, it will assume as an error and abort tunnel establishment; 
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2. SEG-A validates the cross-certificate for LCA-B using its DCA certificate 
if DCA is not a top-level CA, otherwise DCA public key is implicitly 
trusted. 
In this way, the IKE Phase 1 SA is established and the Phase-2 SA negotiation 
proceeds as described in NDS/IP with PSK authentication. 
6.5.3 Certificate Profiles 
Before fulfilling any signing certificate request, the LCA and DCA will make sure 
that the request meets the following certificates profiles criteria: 
 Certificates of version 3 are in use according to RFC 3280 [75]; 
 Support of SHA-1 has algorithm; 
 For DCA and LCA certificates, the RSA key length will be at least 2048-bits 
 For SEG certificate, the RSA key length will be at least 1024-bits 
6.5.4 SEG Certificates Validation 
During VPN tunnel establishment, each SEG has to verify the validity of its peer SEG 
certificate. SEG-A verify the validity of cross-certificate of LCA-B and certificate of 
SEG-B and it will be able to fetch the cross-certificate of LCA-B. SEG-B performs 
the same process for the validity of SEG-A certificates. At this point, the VPN tunnel 
is not yet available; therefore, the CRL of the peering LCA will be accessible for SEG 
without utilizing the Za-interface. Figure 6.5 shows the repositories in which local CR 
contains cross-certificates for LCA, the local CRL contains LCA cross-certificate 
revocation and the public CRL contains of SEG and LCA certificates and can be 
accessed by other domains. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed the protocols, architecture and the design of Network Domain 
Security (NDS) model for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The architecture of IMS-
NDS is based on Network Domain Security/Internet Protocol (NDS/IP) which is 
deployed by Domain Security Gateways (SEGs). NDS/IP utilizes IP Security (IPSec) 
to implement security domain services.  The 3GPP Authentication Framework (AF) is 
introduced to authenticate the Security Gateways using NDS/IP that utilizes 
cryptographic security mechanisms and security protocols provided by the IP Security 
(IPSec) protocol. PKI is used to generate, manage and distribute digital certificates 
and keys in NDS/IP environment. 
Chapter  7  Security Management for 
HTTP-Based Services   
7.1 Introduction  
The Ut interface is reference point between the User Equipment (UE) and Application 
Server (AS) that enables users to securely manage and configure their network 
services-related information hosted on an AS. Users can use Ut reference point to 
create public service identities, such as a resource list, and manage authorization 
policies that are used by the service. Examples of services that utilize the Ut reference 
point are presence and conferencing. The AS may need to provide security for the Ut 
reference point. HTTP is chosen data protocol for the Ut reference point that performs 
the functionality to manage data traffic for HTTP based applications. Thus securing 
the Ut interface means to achieve confidentiality and data integrity protection of 
HTTP-based traffic.  
The authentication and key agreement for Ut interface is also based on AKA. The 
IMS defines Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [49] as a part of Generic 
Authentication Architecture (GAA) that performs mutual authentication between 
Bootstrapping Server Functions (BSF) and the UE. AKA generates session keys and 
enable further applications provided by the Network Application Function (NAF) that 
issues subscriber certificates using an applications protocol secured by bootstrapped 
session keys. The authentication in Ut interface is performed by authentication proxy. 
In terms of GBA, the authentication proxy is another type of NAF. Traffic in Ut 
interface goes through authentication proxy and is secured using the bootstrapped 
session key.  
The Ut interface employs Transport Layer Security (TLS) [50] for both confidentiality 
and integrity protection. It utilized generic bootstrapping architecture to assure that 
the request is coming from an authorized subscriber of mobile network operator. 
When HTTPS request is sent to AS through Authentication Proxy (AP) that performs 
UE authentication. The AP may insert the user identity when it forwards the request to 
application server. Figure 7.4 presents the architectural view of using AP for different 
IMS SIP services e.g. presence, messaging, conferencing etc.   
7.2 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)  
Different 3G Multimedia Services including video conferencing, presence, push-to-
talk and messaging etc. has potential usage of Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
(GBA) to distribute subscriber certificates. These certificates are used by mobile 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                  Access Security 
 
76 
operators to authenticate the subscriber before accessing the multimedia services and 
applications. Now we discuss components, entities and interfaces of GBA. 
7.2.1 GBA Components and Entities 
The GBA consists of five entities: UE (User Equipment), NAF (Network 
Authentication Function), BSF (Bootstrapping Server Function) and HSS (Home 
Subscriber Server) which are briefly explained below and shown in figure 7.1. 
7.2.1.1 User Equipment (UE) 
The UE is UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) containing USIM or ISIM 
related information that supports HTTP Digest AKA (Authentication & Key 
Agreement) and NAF (Network Authentication Function) specific protocols. A USIM 
(Universal Subscriber Identity Module) is an application for UMTS mobile telephony 
running on a UICC smartcard which is inserted in a 3G mobile phone. It stores user 
subscriber information, authentication information and provides with storage space 
for text messages. An IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) is an 
application running on a UICC smartcard in a 3G telephone in the IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS). It contains parameters for identifying and authenticating the user to 
the IMS. The ISIM application can co-exist with SIM and USIM on the same UICC 
making it possible to use the same smartcard in both GSM networks and earlier 
releases of UMTS.  
7.2.1.2 Network Authentication Function (NAF) 
The NAF has the functionality to locate and communicate securely with the 
subscriber’s BSF (Bootstrapping Server Function). It should be able to acquire a 
shared key material established between the UE and the BSF during the run of the 
application specific protocol. 
7.2.1.3 Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) 
The BSF is hosted in a network element under the control of mobile network operator. 
The BSF, HSS, and UEs participate in GBA in which a shared secret is established 
between the network and a UE by running the bootstrapping procedure. The shared 
secret can be used between NAFs and UEs, for example, for authentication purposes. 
A generic Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF) and the UE shall mutually 
authenticate using the AKA protocol, and agree on session keys that are afterwards 
applied between UE and a Network Application Function (NAF). The BSF shall 
restrict the applicability of the key material to a specific NAF by using the key 
derivation procedure. The key derivation procedure may be used with multiple NAFs 
during the lifetime of the key material. The lifetime of the key material is set 
according to the local policy of the BSF. The BSF shall be able to acquire the GBA 
User security Settings (GUSS) from the HSS [49].  
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Figure 7.1 Network Entities of GBA   
7.2.1.4 Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 
The HSS stores GBA user security settings (GUSSs). The GUSS shall be defined in 
such a way that interworking of different operators for standardized application 
profiles is possible and also that profiles for operator specific applications and 
extensions to existing application profiles are supported without need for 
standardization of these elements. The GUSS shall be able to contain application-
specific USSs that contain parameters that are related to key selection indication, 
identification or authorization information of one or more applications hosted by one 
ore more NAFs. Any other types of parameters are not allowed in the application-
specific USS [49]. 
7.2.1.5 Diameter-Proxy 
In the case where UE has contacted NAF that is visited operated in another network 
than home network, this visited NAF shall use a diameter proxy (D-Proxy) of the 
NAFs network to communicate with subscriber’s BSF (i.e. home BSF). General 
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requirements for the functionality of D-Proxy are: D-Proxy shall be able to function as 
a proxy between the visited NAF, and the subscriber’s home BSF and it will be able 
to locate subscriber’s home BSF and communicate with it over secure channel. The 
D-Proxy will be able to validate that the visited NAF is authorized to participate in 
GBA and shall be able to assert to subscriber’s home BSF the visited NAFs DNS 
name. The D-Proxy shall also be able to assert to the BSF that the visited NAF is 
authorized to request the GBA specific user profiles contained in the NAF request 
[49].  
7.2.2 GBA Reference Points  
Ub: The reference point Ub is between the UE and the BSF and provides mutual 
authentication between them. It allows the UE to bootstrap the session keys based on 
3GPP AKA infrastructure. The HTTP Digest AKA protocol is used on the reference 
point Ub. It is based on the 3GPP AKA [44] protocol.  
Ua: The reference point Ua carries the application protocol, which is secured using 
the keys material agreed between UE and BSF as a result of the run of HTTP Digest 
AKA over reference point Ub. For instance, in the case of support for subscriber 
certificates, it is a protocol which allows the user to request certificates from the NAF. 
In this case the NAF would be the PKI portal. 
Zh: The reference point Zh used between the BSF and the HSS allows the BSF to 
fetch the required authentication information and all GBA user security settings from 
the HSS. The interface to the 3G Authentication Centre is HSS-internal, and it need 
not be standardized as part of this architecture. 
Zn: The reference point Zn is used by the NAF to fetch the key material agreed during 
a previous HTTP Digest AKA protocol run over the reference point Ub from the UE 
to the BSF. It is also used to fetch application-specific user security settings from the 
BSF, if requested by the NAF. 
7.3 Bootstrapping Authentication Procedure  
The UE and Network Authentication Function (NAF) have to decide whether to use 
GBA before the start of communication between them. When UE wants to interact 
with NAF, it starts communication with NAF over Ua interface without GBA 
parameters. If the NAF requires the use of shared keys obtained by means of the GBA, 
but the request from UE does not include GBA-related parameters, the NAF replies 
with a bootstrapping initiation message [51]. When UE wants to interact with a NAF, 
and it knows that the bootstrapping procedure is needed, it shall first perform a 
bootstrapping authentication as shown in figure 7.2. Otherwise, the UE shall perform 
a bootstrapping authentication only when it has received bootstrapping initiation 
required message or a bootstrapping negotiation indication from the NAF, or when the 
lifetime of the key in UE has expired. The UE sends an HTTP request to the BSF and 
the BSF retrieves the complete set of GBA user security settings and one 
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Authentication Vector (AV) [54] as given in equation 5.1 over the reference point Zh 
from the HSS. 
 
Figure 7.2 Bootstrapping Authentication Procedure  
After that BSF forwards the RAND and AUTN to the UE in the 401 message without 
the CK, IK and XRES. This is to demand the UE to authenticate itself. The UE checks 
AUTN to verify that the challenge is from an authorized network; the UE also 
calculates CK, IK and RES [54]. This will result in session keys IK and CK in both 
BSF and UE. The UE sends another HTTP request to the BSF, containing the Digest 
AKA response which is calculated using RES.  
The BSF authenticates the UE by verifying the Digest AKA response. The BSF 
generates key material Ks by concatenating CK and IK and it also generates B-TID 
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(Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier) which is used to bind the subscriber identity to 
the keying material in reference points Ua, Ub and Zn. The BSF shall send a 200 OK 
message, including a B-TID to the UE to indicate the success of the authentication 
and the lifetime of the key Ks. The key material Ks is generated in UE by 
concatenating CK and IK. Both the UE and the BSF shall use the Ks to derive the key 
material Ks-NAF which will be used for securing the reference point Ua. The Ks-
NAF is computed as equation 7.2. 
Ks-NAF = fKD(Ks, "gba-me", RAND, IMPI, NAF-ID)   (7.1) 
Where fKD is the key derivation function and will be implemented in the ME, and the 
key derivation parameters consist of the user's IMPI, the NAF-ID and RAND. The 
NAF-ID consists of the full DNS name of the NAF, concatenated with the Ua security 
protocol identifier. The UE and the BSF shall store the key Ks with the associated B-
TID for further use, until the lifetime of Ks has expired, or until the key Ks is updated 
[49]. 
7.4 Bootstrapping Usage Procedure  
Before the start of communication between the UE and the NAF, the UE and the NAF 
first have to agree whether to use shared keys obtained by means of the GBA. If UE 
does not know whether to use GBA with this NAF, it uses the initiation of 
bootstrapping procedure. Once the UE and the NAF have decided that they want to 
use GBA then every time the UE wants to interact with NAF. The UE starts 
communication over reference point Ua with the NAF by supplying the B-TID to the 
NAF to allow the NAF to retrieve the corresponding keys from the BSF. The NAF 
starts communication over reference point Zn with BSF.  The NAF requests key 
material corresponding to the B-TID supplied by the UE to the NAF over reference 
point Ua. With the key material request, the NAF shall supply NAF’s public hostname 
that UE has used to access NAF to BSF, and BSF shall be able verify that NAF is 
authorized to use that hostname. The NAF may also request one or more application-
specific USSs for the applications, which the request received over Ua from UE may 
access. 
The BSF derives the keys required to protect the protocol used over reference point 
Ua from the key Ks and the key derivation parameters, and supplies to NAF the 
requested key Ks-NAF, as well as the bootstrapping time and the lifetime of that key, 
and the requested application-specific and potentially NAF group specific USSs if 
they are available in subscriber's GUSS and if the NAF is authorized to receive the 
requested USSs. If the key identified by the B-TID supplied by the NAF is not 
available at the BSF, the BSF shall indicate this in the reply to the NAF. The NAF 
then indicates a bootstrapping renegotiation request to the UE. The BSF may also 
send the private user identity (IMPI) and requested USSs to NAF according to the 
BSF's policy. The NAF continues with the protocol used over the reference point Ua 
with the UE. Once the run of the protocol used over reference point Ua is completed 
the purpose of bootstrapping is fulfilled as it enabled UE and NAF to use reference 
point Ua in a secure way. 
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Figure 7.3 Bootstrapping Application   
7.5 Authentication Proxy Usage for Multimedia Services  
The Authentication Proxy (AP) is like a Network Authentication Function (NAF) and 
performs the function of HTTP proxy for the UE. It is responsible to handle the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and implement the secure HTTP channel between AP 
and UE as shown in figure 7.4. It utilized the generic bootstrapping architecture to 
assure the application servers (ASs) that the request is coming from an authorized 
subscriber of mobile network operator. When the HTTPS request is sent to AS 
through AP, the AP performs UE authentication. The AP may insert the user identity 
when it forwards the request to application server. Figure 5b presents the architecture 
view of using AP for different IMS SIP services e.g. presence, messaging, 
conferencing etc.   
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                  Access Security 
 
82 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Authentication Proxy 
The UE shall manipulate own data such as groups, through the Ua/Ut reference point 
[50]. The reference point Ut will be applicable to data manipulation of IMS based SIP 
services, such as Presence, Messaging and Conferencing services. When the HTTPS 
client starts communication via Ua reference point with the NAF, it shall establish a 
TLS tunnel with the NAF. The NAF is authenticated to the HTTPS client by means of 
a public key certificate. The HTTPS client will verify that the server certificate 
corresponds to the FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of the AP it established the 
tunnel with. We explain the procedure briefly as: the HTTPS client sends an HTTP 
request to NAF inside the TLS tunnel. In response to HTTP request over Ua interface, 
the AP will invoke HTTP digest with HTTPs client in order to perform client 
authentication using the shared keys. On the receipt of HTTPS digest from AP, the 
client will verify that the FDQN corresponds the AP it established the TLS connection 
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with, if not the client will terminate the TLS connection with the AP.  In this way the 
UE and AP are mutually authenticated as the TLS tunnel endpoints.  
Now we discuss an example that application residing on UICC (Universal Integrated 
Circuit Card) may use TLS over HTTP in Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) 
mechanism to secure its communication with Authentication Proxy (AP). The GBA 
security association between a UICC-based application and AP can be established as: 
The ME (Mobile Equipment) executes the bootstrapping procedure with the BSF 
supporting the Ub reference point. The UICC, which hosts the HTTPS client, runs the 
bootstrapping usage procedure with AP supporting the Ua reference point [76]. 
Figure 7.5 shows the use of BIP (Bearer Independent Protocol) to establish the 
HTTPS connection between UICC and AP. When the UICC opens channel with AP 
as described in [77] than an active TCP/IP connection is established between the 
UICC and the AP.  
 
Figure 7.5 HTTPS and BIP (Bearer Independent Protocol) Procedure 
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7.6 Summary 
This chapter focused to manage secure access to multimedia services and applications 
based on SIP and HTTP on top of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The solution 
utilized Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) to authenticate users before 
accessing the multimedia services offered by IMS operators. The chapter introduced 
the GBA-based Authentication Proxy (AP) performing mutual authentication of UE 
and Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), and responsible to implement Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) to secure HTTP application. 
Chapter  8  Access Network Security 
Management   
8.1 Introduction  
The network access security management architecture consists of User Service 
Identity Module (USIM), Mobile Equipment (ME), Access Network (AN), Service 
Network (SN) and Home Environment (HE) as shown in figure 8.1. The USIM is 
required for accessing the Packet Switched (PS) domain in General Packet Radio 
System (GPRS) and identifies the particular subscriber. The USIM contains the 
security parameters for accessing the PS-domain, International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI), list of allowed access points, MMS-related information. In serving 
network, the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) links the Radio Access Network 
(RAN) to the packet core network in the PS-service domain. It is responsible for 
performing both control and traffic handling functions for the PS domain. The control 
parts deal with mobility management and session management.  The SGSN also 
ensures appropriate QoS and generates charging information [7]. In the CS-service 
domain, the related part is Visitor Location Register (VLR). In HE, the Authentication 
Centre (AUC) generates the AV vector as we have discussed in equation 5.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 Overview of Network Access Security Model  
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The following security methodologies and mechanisms are required to implement the 
network access security architecture to protect the user and user’s sensitive 
information on Radio Access network (RAN). 
8.2 Assigning Temporary and Permanent Identities 
In order to hide the identity of user on the radio access link, the user is assigned 
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) to identify the user on the radio link, 
for instance in paging, location update, attach, service, connection re-establishment 
and detach requests. The temporary identity has importance only in the location area 
or routing area in which the user is registered. Outside that area it should be 
accompanied by Location Area Identification (LAI) or Routing Area Identification 
(RAI) in order to avoid ambiguities. The association between the permanent and 
temporary user identities is kept by the Visited Location Register (VLR) for CS 
domain and by SGSN for PS domain depending in which domain the user is 
registered. 
When the user could not be identified by IMSI, the serving network identifies the user 
by the permanent identity which is called the International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(IMSI). In particular, it should be used when the user registers for the first time in a 
serving network, or when the serving network cannot retrieve the IMSI from the 
TMSI by which the user identifies itself on the radio path. The procedure is initiated 
by the visited SGSN/VLR that requests the user to send its permanent identity as 
shown in figure 8.2. The user's response contains the IMSI in clear text. This 
represents a breach in the provision of user identity confidentiality and in section 8.5 
we will discuss the protection of user’s temporary identities.  
 
Figure 8.2 Identification by the permanent identity 
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8.3  Security Mode Setup during Connection Establishment  
The security mode setup is achieved by the integrity protection functionality. When 
the SGSN is known the identity of mobile subscriber, the cipher and integrity keys 
setting could occurred. These keys are stored in the VLR and transferred to Radio 
Network Controller (RNC) as required. These keys are also stored on USIM and 
updated from CS domain or PS domain independently. During ME registration and 
connection establishment within UMTS with a CS service domain and a PS service 
domain, user identification, authentication and key agreement will take place 
independently in each service domain. The connection establishment includes the ME 
security capability i.e. the ciphering association and the integrity association of the 
MS.    
8.4 Access Link Data Integrity  
Most of the control signalling elements like RRC, MM, CC, GMM and SM messages 
between the mobile station and the RNC are considered sensitive and must be 
integrity protected by the message authentication function. The access link data 
integrity procedure is given in figures 8.3 & 8.4.  The input parameters to the 
algorithm are IK, integrity sequence number (COUNT-J), the signalling data (S-Data), 
the direction (DIRECT) and the random value generated by the network side (R-
Value). From these four parameters the user equipment or RNC computes message 
authentication code MAC-J for data integrity using the integrity algorithm f9 as given 
in equation 8.1. The use of Kasumi for the integrity protection function f9 is specified 
in [78]. The MAC-J is then appended to the message when sent over the radio access 
link. The receiver computes XMAC-J as given in equation 8.2, on the message 
received in the same way as the sender computed MAC-J on the message sent and 
verifies the data integrity of the message by comparing it to the received MAC-J. 
There may be one IK for CS connections (IKCS), established between the CS service 
domain and the user and one IK for PS connections (IKPS) established between the PS 
service domain and the user. 
  
Figure 8.3 Sender’s Message Authentication Function 
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MAC-J = f9IK (COUNT-J, S-Data, DIRECT, R-Value) (8.1) 
XMAC-J = f9IK (COUNT-J, S-Data, DIRECT, R-Value) (8.2) 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Receiver’s Message Authentication Function 
8.5 Access Link Data Confidentiality 
User data and some signalling elements between user and network are considered 
sensitive and should be confidentiality protected. To ensure identity confidentiality, 
the temporary user identity (TMSI) should be transferred in a protected mode at 
allocation time and at other times when the signalling procedures permit it. This 
protected mode of transmission is applied on dedicated channels between the ME and 
the RNC by a confidentiality function. Figures 8.5 & 8.6 illustrate that the sender 
produces key-stream (Kst) by using the Ciphering Algorithm f8 [78] and gets the 
Cipher-text (C(x)), from bit by bit binary addition of the Plaintext (P(x)) and the key-
stream as given in equation 8.3. At the receiver, the P(X) may be produced by 
generating the same key-stream using the same input parameters and bit by bit binary 
addition of the C(X) and key-stream as given in equation 8.4. The input parameters to 
the algorithm are the Cipher Key (CK), a time counter input (COUNT-T), the bearer 
identity (B-ID), the direction of transmission (DIRECT) and the length of the key-
stream required (LEN).  
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Figure 8.5 Cipher-text Production by Sender  
 
Figure 8.6 Plaintext Retrieval by Receiver   
C(X) = P(X) ⊕ f8CK (COUNT-T, B-ID, DIRECT, LEN) (8.3) 
P(X) = C(X) ⊕ f8CK (COUNT-T, B-ID, DIRECT, LEN) (8.4) 
 
 
  f8 
COUNT-T 
B-ID 
DIRECT 
LEN 
 
Kst 
C(X) 
Receiver (UE or RNC) 
⊕ 
P(X)  
 
CK 
 
 
  f8 
COUNT-T 
B-ID 
DIRECT 
LEN 
 
Kst 
P(X)  
Sender (UE or RNC) 
⊕ C(X) 
CK 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                  Access Security 
 
90 
8.6 Summary  
In this chapter we have discussed methodologies and mechanisms to provide access 
security including security mode setup during connection establishment, and access 
link data integrity and confidentiality between mobile user and universal mobile 
telecommunication systems. It protects the user confidential information against 
attacks on the radio access link of Universal Mobile Telecommunication System 
(UMTS). 
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IMS Core (IDP-Core) 
 
(Level 2 Security – Section-1) 
 
 
Design and Implementation of IDP-Core 
The Part-D presents first section of level 2 IMS extended security solution. It 
describes development and deployment of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-
Core) system for IMS core against Denial-of-Service (DoS)/Distributed DoS (DDoS) 
flooding and SIP message tampering/fuzzing attacks. The SIP REGISTER and SIP 
INVITE methods are utilized to lunch these flooding attacks in IMS. This part 
consists of three chapters (9 - 11) focusing on the design, detection methodology, 
implementation, and testing and performance evaluation of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention system for IMS core (IDP-Core).  
Chapter 9 “IDP-Core Design” discusses level 1 IMS security analysis, IDP-Core 
design requirements, reference architecture and attacks detection algorithms. Different 
design scenarios are explained in this chapter. 
Chapter 10 “IDP-Core Implementation” explains the procedure to modify the “Main 
Route Block” of Open IMS core, implementation of detection algorithm, object 
interaction scenarios and attacks prevention procedure. 
Chapter 11 “Testing and Performance Evaluation” describes Testbed environment, 
test scenarios, and performance evaluation at normal CPU load and overload CPU 
conditions of P-CSCF. These tests are preformed at Open IMS Playground within 
NGNI FOKUS Fraunhofer Testbed. 
 
Figure D: Design and Implementation of IDP-Core (Part-D Overview) 
 
Chapter  9  Design and Architecture of IDP-
Core 
9.1 Introduction 
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) employs SIP for registration and session 
management. The SIP protocol specification [4] describes methods to establish, end or 
terminate a session, cancel an invitation, redirect a call and update session parameters. 
But the SIP specification does not include any specific security mechanisms. It is 
possible that the attacker could exploit any security vulnerability in the SIP methods 
and cause DoS to the provided multimedia services. For example, attacker could 
launch REGISTER flooding attack to collapse the IMS resources. The attacker could 
also use a faked BYE message to tear down an established session. Moreover, the 
attacker could discover possible security flaws in the applications or protocols, similar 
to attacks launched against Internet applications and services.  
The objective and scope of developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) 
system for IMS core is to enhance the existing security level. It protects the IMS core 
components i.e. P-CSCF (Proxy-Call State Control Function), I-CSCF, S-CSCF and 
HSS (Home Subscriber Server) from different Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding attacks, unauthorized access and misuse of IMS 
resources against fraud situation, both from legitimate and illegitimate users. 
In this chapter first we discuss the IMS security and vulnerability analysis. The next 
section shows the placement of IDP-Core component in IMS core. The subsequent 
sections explain the IDP-Core architecture, design and detection algorithm etc.    
9.2 Security and Vulnerability Analysis 
We have discussed in part C (chapter 5) that in a result of successful authentication, 
the IMS client and P-CSCF establish the secure association providing data integrity 
and confidentiality [44]. The 3GPP/IMS authentication and key agreement protocol 
has been reported and claimed to be secure. But M. Zhang and Y. Fang [38] claim that 
AKA is vulnerable to different types of threats. We present here brief analysis to show 
that IMS AKA is vulnerable to a variant of false base station attack. The flaw of AKA 
could allow an attacker to redirect user traffic from one network to another. The 
attacker could also use the authentication vectors corrupted from one network to 
impersonate other networks. Thus the attacked network may make vulnerable the 
other secure networks. The redirection attack represents a real threat since the security 
levels provided by different networks are not always the same.  
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The redirection attack could also cause false billing problem as the service rates 
offered by different networks are not always the same. The following are the possible 
attacks occur due to vulnerability in the IMS AKA. 
9.2.1 Redirection Attack 
For example an attacker is using a device that has the functions of base station and 
emulation of mobile device. This device is called false base station. With this device 
the attacker could impersonate as a legitimate base station and legitimate mobile 
station on the radio link. In this way the attacker could transmit messages between the 
network and his illegitimate device.  
Consider the scenario that a legitimate user is in his home network and want to 
establish connection in foreign network. During the connection establishment, the 
attacker entices the mobile station through his false base station. Once the mobile 
station connects with the false base station, the attacker can divert the session request 
signals to any foreign network. After this the attacker relays messages between 
legitimate user’s mobile station and foreign network. The authentication process is 
successfully completed between the user and foreign network. The communication 
link is also protected through the established keys during this process [44]. Thus the 
redirection attack is successfully launched in this scenario.  
9.2.2 Active Attack in Under Attacked Networks 
In IMS AKA, the authentication vectors are traversed between networks depending 
upon the user is in home network or roaming. Every network is controlled by its own 
administrator. When a network is under attack, the attacker could access user 
authentication data without intercepting and breaking the security of the user’s home 
network. Later the attacker could use the obtained authentication vectors to 
impersonate into his network and could mount false base station attack against 
legitimate users [38]. He could also launch the flooding attack by setting the counter 
value at high. Thus the under attack network may jeopardize or vulnerable the entire 
system. There is no security mechanism available to control the attacks in corrupted 
network to protected and secure networks.  
9.2.3 Resynchronization Attack 
During the IMS AKA procedure, the home network maintains a counter for each 
subscriber. Unlike the authentication key whose value is fixed, the value of a counter 
is dynamic. If there is no problem with synchronization, the network and user are 
successfully authenticated each other. But if there is problem with synchronization 
data, the authentication process is aborted and network restarts the authentication 
procedure to resynchronize the counter.  
If the attacker is able to launch the false base station attack, he could disturb the 
synchronization counter. This situation produces two serious network faults: one 
heavy cost of authentication signalling and denial-of-service problem for legitimate 
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users [38]. This situation becomes worst when the user is roaming. For example when 
authentication process started in visited network and the sequence number is not in the 
correct range, the mobile station decides that a synchronization failure has occurred in 
the home network and consequently initiates a resynchronization request to the home 
network. 
9.3 IDP-Core Approach 
The IDP-Core is based on Open Source IMS [79] and is deployed within P-CSCF as 
depicted in figure 9.1. It is placed in-line between the IMS client and IMS core and 
processes each incoming SIP REGISTER and other messages like INVITE or 
Subscribe in real time. The operation is performed online into two modes in order to 
increase the efficiency and performance. In first mode IDP-core checks all SIP 
REGISTER messages between client and IMS core against SQL-injection in normal 
CPU load condition. The second mode checks the DoS/DDoS flooding attacks and 
triggers when P-CSCF CPU load exceeds the defined threshold limit (X). The IDP-
core monitors the CPU load and takes necessary measures if system is under flooding 
attack due to SIP REGISTER or INVITE messages.  
 
Figure 9.1 Location of IDP-Core  
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9.4 IDP-Core Design Requirements  
The security challenges facing to IMS are the flooding attacks causing to downfall or 
collapse of IMS resources and network services. These attacks could not be mitigated 
by the standards mechanisms; therefore, the primary functionality of IDP-core is to 
detect and protect the DoS/DDoS flooding attacks launched against IP Multimedia 
Subsystem (IMS) core network.  The design requirements of IDP-Core are the 
following: 
• It should not affect the P-CSCF message processing procedure at normal 
load. 
• It should detect and drop the SQL-injection messages. 
• At P-CSCF CPU overloading, the following requirements should be 
considered: 
o The continued authentication process from legitimate users should 
be carried out. 
o The REGISTER/INVITE messages from known legitimate UEs 
(previously success authenticated users) will still be accepted. 
o REGISTER messages from unknown users should be blocked. These 
messages may be the cause of overloading of IMS core. 
The IDP-Core receives SIP messages from P-CSCF and processes them to check for 
SQL-injection and DoS/DDoS flooding attacks and then forwards to P-CSCF. 
Therefore P-CSCF is only the single actor of the IDP-Core as depicted in figure 9.2. 
 
Figure 9.2 IDP-Core Use Cases  
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9.5 IDP-Reference Architecture 
After defining the functional requirements and use cases, we focus on formulating the 
architecture to meet the design requirements. The top level architecture of IDP-Core is 
shown in figure 9.3 consisting of following main modules: 
Dispatcher: It is SP message handler. All the SIP messages either from the UE or the 
P-CSCF are received by the Dispatcher and it forwards them to IDP-Centre for further 
processing. 
IDP-Centre: It is the brain of IDP-Core and performs analysis and takes decision to 
protect IMS core against flooding and fuzzing attacks. The analysis procedure detects 
the reason of overloading and decides to stop further communication from illegitimate 
user about defined time interval.  
System Monitor: This module monitors the P-CSCF CPU processing load and 
compares with the defined threshold limit (X) to indicate the critical level.  
Blacklist maintains the list of malicious users. If any attack is detected, the address 
(IP address or URI) of malicious user is inserted into the Blacklist for a defined time 
interval.  
 
Figure 9.3 IDP-Core Architecture 
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Whitelist Database: It maintains the list of reliable users which are successfully 
registered previously within one week. These legitimate users could continue their 
registration procedure even system is under flooding attacks.  
9.6 Attacks Detection Algorithm 
The attacks detection algorithm identifies the reasons of overloading of IMS resources. 
The P-CSCF CPU load monitoring curve is depicted in figure 9.4. The detection 
procedure consists of three states i.e. normal, critical and under attack as shown in 
figure 9.5. In normal state, IDP-Core detects only the QSL injection. The system 
switches to critical state if the CPU load of P-CSCF reaches or crosses the threshold 
value but IDP-Core does not apply any detection algorithm. This is attack alert state 
and it remains 500 ms which is the round trip time of SIP REGISTER massage as 
mentioned in RFC 3261 [4]. If CPU load remains or crosses the threshold limit, the 
IDP-Core declares that the IMS-core is under flooding attack. The under attack state 
describes the cause of overloading i.e. it may be due to REGISTER or INVITE 
messages or both of them. This situation may also occur due to pick processing time, 
which should be avoided by deploying multiple P-CSCFs.   
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Figure 9.4 P-CSCF CPU Load Monitoring 
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Figure 9.5 IDP-Core Attacks Detection Algorithm  
9.6.1 SQL Injection Detection Methodology  
As we have discussed that in normal state, IDP-core only detect the SQL injection 
with objective to cause minimum processing delay on the SIP REGISTER messages 
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flow. The SQL injection can be launched simply by inserting SQL statement when 
UE and P-CSCF starts authentication procedure. The UE’s initial REGISTER request 
utilizes the HTTP Digest [40] Authorization header to transport user’s identities. This 
REGISTER request looks like:  
REGISTER SIP: home1.de SIP/2.0 
Authorization: Digest Username=”user_private@home1.de”,  
realm=”home1.de”, nonce=” “, uri=”SIP: home1.de”, 
response=” “  
When malicious user tries to launch SQL injection in IMS, he spoofs the SIP message 
and inserts the malicious SQL code in its authorization header. The malicious code 
infected with SQL injection looks like: 
REGISTER SIP: home1.de SIP/2.0 
Authorization: Digest 
Username=”user_private@home1.de;delete table subscriber”,  
realm=”home1.de”, nonce=” “, uri=”SIP: home1.de”, 
response=” “  
When P-CSCF receives a SIP message with an infected authorization header, it 
generates and executes the illegitimate SQL statement which may delete data in the 
database [41]. The existing solutions do not provide mitigation against this attack. The 
IMS also integrates HTTP Servlet container, therefore attacker can also utilize the 
HTTP message to launch the SQL injection attacks. 
To detect SQL Injection, IDP-Centre parses the SIP message and checks SIP message 
containing username with semicolon in the SQL-statement. If this behavior is detected, 
the IDP-Core alerts that SQL-injection has been identified and further processing of 
SIP messages will be stopped from this user and his name is inserted in the Blacklist. 
9.6.2 REGISTER Flooding Detection Methodology  
The REGISTER flooding attack could be launched by generating multiple 
REGISTER SIP messages from single or multiple hosts to collapse the IMS resources. 
If this attack is launched from unknown and unregistered illegitimate users, there is 
initial REGISTER flooding on IMS core entities. AS a result lot of half open 
connection will be opened and IMS resources and services will not available to serve 
the legitimate users.  
The REGISTER flooding detection method starts when the SIP messages flow start.  
First the IDP-Core starts timer to perform periodical checking of CPU load and 
counting of SIP messages. The time period is set with 500ms and the threshold value 
is defined as X = 80 % CPU load. If load reaches or crosses the threshold limit, the 
IDP-Core shifts from normal state to critical state and keeps processing all SIP 
REGISTER messages. After 500ms if the load condition remains the same, the IDP-
core declares that IMS core is under flooding attacks. In under attack state, IDP-core 
rejects all unknown REGISTER requests while continues the processing of all other 
SIP messages. After the expiry of time period, the timer is reset and IDP-Core again 
verifies the P-CSCF load. This detection procedure is explained in state chart depicted 
in figure 9.6. 
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Figure 9.6 REGISTER Flooding Detection State Chart  
9.6.3 INVITE Flooding Detection Methodology 
Similar to the previous method, IDP-Core starts timer to count the INVITE or 
Subscribe SIP messages.  If flooding is detected, IDP-Core monitoring state change 
from normal to critical and it continues to process all the messages SIP messages. 
After 500 ms the timer is initialized and again it verifies the load condition. If it 
crosses the threshold, IDP-Core verifies that the flooding is due to INVITE messages 
and it stops all unknown messages. The INVITE flooding detection state chart is 
provided in figure 9.7. 
 
Figure 9.7 INVITE Flooding Detection State Chart  
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9.7  IDP-Core Design Scenarios 
After defining the attacks detection methodology, we discuss the design scenarios of 
IDP-Core with time-line diagrams for detecting SQL-Injection, REGISTER and 
INVITE DoS/DDoS flooding attacks.  
9.7.1 REGISTER Flooding Design Scenario  
When P-CSCF receives REGISTER messages from any user agent (UA) or user 
equipment (UE), the Dispatcher forwards them to IDP-Centre for secure verification. 
The System Monitor measures the CPU load monitoring and triggers the critical state 
in case of CPU overloading. The REGISTER flooding detection and prevention 
procedure is completed into four steps as explained in time line diagram provided in 
figure 9.9. 
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Figure 9.8 REGISTER Flooding Detection Time Line Diagram  
9.7.2 INVITE Flooding Design Scenario 
The INVITE flooding design scenario consists of three steps as explained in time line 
diagram in figure 9.9.  
• In first step SQL injection is verified in normal state. 
• In second step System Monitor performs the CPU load monitoring. 
• In third step IDP-Core rejects the INVITE messages causing flooding attack. 
 
Figure 9.9 INVITE Flooding Detection Time Line Diagram  
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9.7.3 Password Guessing Design Scenario 
In password guessing, the attacker gets a lot of 401-Response messages in reply to 
fake REGISTER requests to P-CSCF in order to crack the password. This attack could 
also be launched by legitimate user without breaking the authentication. The time line 
diagram is provided in figure 9.10. 
 
Figure 9.10 Password Guessing Time Line Diagram 
9.8 Summary 
This chapter covered the design and architecture of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-Core) system for IMS core. The chapter started with level 1 IMS 
security analysis which was necessary to understand the need of deploying IDP-Core. 
After that IDP-Core design requirement, reference architecture and attacks detection 
algorithms are discussed.  Different design scenarios are elaborated at the end. 
Chapter  10  IDP-Core Implementation     
10.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the implementation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
(IDP-Core) system for the Open IMS core. The Fraunhofer FOKUS Open IMS core 
[79] is developed in C/C++; therefore IDP-Core is also developed in C/C++. In the 
following section, we describe the realization of the mechanism with which the IDP-
Core can intercept the messages before the P-CSCF processes them. The 
implementation of “pids” module - kernel of the IDP-Core – and CPU load 
monitoring algorithm are explained in subsequent sections.   
10.2 Modified Main Route Block 
The components of FOKUS Open IMS Playground [80], except the Home Subscriber 
Server (HSS), are based on the SIP Express Router (SER) [81]. In this environment, 
SIP Express Router plays the roll of a SIP container that receives the SIP messages 
and enables the basic functionality of handling the SIP messages. Most of SERs 
functionality is offered through its modules. The Open IMS Playground is also based 
on modular approach. Hence, the P-CSCF is developed and deployed as a module 
within SER. An important feature of SER is to use a configuration file to manage the 
messages dispatching.   
This configuration file has following seven main logical sections: 
Global Definitions contains the IP address and listening ports, debug level, etc. Any 
change or setting in this section affects the SER daemon [81]. 
Modules Section contains a list of external libraries that are needed to expose 
functionality not provided by the core.  
Modules Configuration defines the configuration parameters for the external 
libraries specified in the Modules section for their proper functionality.  
Main Route Block is analogous to a C programs main function. This is the entry 
point of processing a SIP message and controls how each received message is handled. 
Secondary Route Blocks: In addition to the main route block, the configuration file 
may contain additional route blocks that can be called from the main route block or 
from other secondary route blocks. A secondary route block is analogous to a 
subroutine. 
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Reply Route Block: Optional reply route blocks may be utilized to handle replies to 
SIP messages.  
Failure Route Block: Optional failure route blocks may use when special processing 
is needed to handle failure conditions such as a busy or timeout; 
The IDP-Core is a part of the modified secure P-CSCF rather than a standalone 
module of IMS core. In order to intercept messages, we need to export the entry 
function of IDP-Core in the main program of module “PCSCF”.  
 
Figure 10.1 Modified Main Route Block Intercepting Approach 
Look at the following the codes fragment of main program “mod.c”: 
static cmd_export pcscf_cmds[] = { 
        {“P_add_path“, P_add_path, 0,0, REQUEST_ROUTE}, 
         ... ... 
        {“P_ids_is_secure“, P_ids_is_secure, 0, 0, 
REQUEST_ROUTE}, 
         ... ... 
}; 
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This array “pcscf_cmds” provides both name mapping of all exported function and 
message types to which these functions are applied. Then the export function should 
be included in the above “Main Route Block” corresponding to the requirement. In 
our case, all REGISTER requests should be checked by the function 
“P_ids_is_secure” before the PCSCF’s procedure. The configuration of main route 
block is changed as follows: 
          route{ 
        ... ... 
        if(method==“REGISTER“){ 
                 if(P_ids_is_secure()){ 
                    route(REGISTER);                
                } 
               break;       
        } 
       ... ...  
}     
The main route block intercepting approach is depicted in figure 10.1.  
10.3 The Implementation of “P-ids” Module 
The “pids” module consists of three subroutines. The first subroutine is for message 
processing, second for password guessing and the third subroutine for resource 
monitoring. The functionalities are explained with flow control diagram in the 
following: 
10.3.1 SIP Message Processing Subroutine 
The message processing routine accepts the SIP messages and processes them against 
message tampering and flooding attacks as illustrated in the flow control diagram in 
figure 10.2.  First P-ids accepts the message and checks the overloading condition. If 
condition is true, then checks user is legitimate. If condition is true, forward the SIP 
message to the P-CSCF, otherwise block the messages and put the source IP address 
into IPtables.  
If the overloading condition is false, then process the message against SQL-injection. 
If SQL-injection is detected, drop the messages, otherwise the messages is considered 
as secure and forwards the SIP message to P-CSCF. 
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Figure 10.2 SIP Messages Processing Flow Control   
10.3.2 Password Guessing Detection Subroutine 
The password guessing attack detection implementation procedure is explained in 
flow graph as depicted in figure 10.3.  If P-CSCF receives more than five 401 
Responses within one minute from same URI/IP Address, than we assume it is 
password guessing attack and IDP-Core inserts this URI/IP Address in the Blacklist.  
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Figure 10.3 Flow Control for Processing the 401 Response 
10.3.3 CPU Load Monitoring Subroutine 
To measure the P-CSCF CPU load, the IDP-Core has utilized operating system Linux 
resource monitoring file /proc/stat [82]. The resource monitoring function has the 
following seven parameters about CPU performance.  
• user: normal processes executing in user mode  
• nice: niced processes executing in user mode  
• system: processes executing in kernel mode  
• idle: twiddling thumbs  
• iowait: waiting for I/O to complete  
• irq: servicing interrupts  
• softirq: servicing soft interrupts  
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The parameters/columns idle and iowait represent the CPU free resources. These 
seven parameters at time T1 and at time T2 are provided in table 10.1. 
CPU Parameters Parameters at Time T1 Parameters at Time T2 
User USE1 USE2 
Nice NIC1 NIC2 
System SYS1 SYS2 
Idle IDL1 IDL2 
IOWait IOW1 IOW2 
Irq IRQ1 IRQ2 
SoftIrq SIRQ1 SIRQ2 
Table 10.1 CPU Utilization Parameters 
In light of above parameters we calculate the CPU utilization in two time frames and 
the corresponding CPU load. The total time T1 utilization is given in equation 10.1:   
11111111 SIRQIRQIOWIDLSYSNICUSET ++++++=∑  (10.1) 
In this time frame, the CPU utilization is given in equation 10.2.   
 1111 IOWIDLTBUSY −−= ∑       (10.2) 
The total time frame T2 and CPU utilization are provided in equations 10.3 and 10.4 
respectively.  
22222222 SIRQIRQIOWIDLSYSNICUSET ++++++=∑  (10.3) 
  2222 IOWIDLTBUSY −−= ∑      (10.4) 
From the above four equations, we calculate the P-CSCF CPU processing load given 
in equation 10.4. 
     
∑ ∑−
−
=
12
12
TT
BUSYBUSYL CPU       (10.5) 
The threshold limit and sampling rate are provided in equations 10.6 and 10.7 
respectively.  
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10.4 Flow Control and Object Interaction Scenarios  
The implementation of SIP messages processing and resource monitoring are 
explained in the following with flow controls and object interaction scenarios.  
10.4.1 REGISTER Message Processing 
The REGISTER processing scenario is depicted in figure 10.4. The IDP-Core receives 
SIP REGISTER messages and processes them against defined attacks. The System 
Monitor measures the P-CSCF CPU load and Repository acts as Whitelist that 
maintains the list of previously successfully registered users.    
 
Figure 10.4 REGISTER Flooding Object Interaction Scenario  
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The implementation detailed procedure of SIP REGISTER processing is explained in 
flow control in figure 10.5. 
 
Figure 10.5 REGISTER Flooding Detection Flow Control    
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10.4.2 INVITE Message Processing  
In the second scenario, the SIP INVITE flooding detection object-interaction model 
depicted in figure 10.6, where the IDP-Centre compares the user address of each 
INVITE message with the addresses stored in Blacklist. While the System Monitor 
monitors the P-CSCF CPU load.  
 
Figure 10.6 INVITE Flooding Object Interaction Model  
The detailed implementation procedure is explained in flow control as depicted in 
figure 10.7. 
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Figure 10.7 INVITE Flooding Detection Flow Control   
10.5  Mechanism for Preventing Flooding Attacks 
In the design of IDP-Core we have considered two options to block the addresses of 
illegitimate users: (1) blocking the IP address at network layer, (2) blocking the URI 
(Uniform Resource Identifier) at higher layer. If we apply second approach using URI 
to block suspicious user at application layer, there is not significant reduce of 
processing overhead and flooding. It means that higher layer blocking is not efficient 
and consumes lot of resources. Therefore, network layer blocking approach is more 
efficient and consumes less system resources. The IDP-Core has utilized IPtables [83] 
to block the address of illegitimate users causing flooding.  
Implementation of IDP-Core                                                                               SSP Framework for IMS 
 
117 
 
 
Figure 10.8 Use of IPtables to Prevent Flooding   
The IPtables could be used to setup a firewall using net-filter approach. It has three 
rules and three policies to process the data packets.  
The rules are:  
(1) Input evaluates data packets received by the system. 
(2) Forward processes data packets which are received and forwarded by the 
system. 
(3) Output evaluates date packets sent or generated by the system. 
The IPtables applies the following three policies to implement security and firewall: 
(a) The Accept Policy accepts data packets that have not matched with any three 
rules. 
(b) The Reject Policy discards the data packets matches with any three rules and 
sends an ICMP packet back to the source or originator. 
(c)  The Drop Policy simply rejects all data packets without applying any rule 
option. 
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We can apply any policy on the three types of data with the following commends:  
   iptables -P Input <Accept, Reject or Drop> 
   iptables -P Forward <Accept, Reject or Drop> 
   iptables -P Output  <Accept, Reject or Drop> 
In our case, if intrusion and flooding attack is detected, the IDP-Core inserts the 
malicious IP address in the IPtables to block further flooding from that source as 
depicted in figure 10.8. The IPtables entries are refreshed after every 30 minutes so 
that these IP addresses should not blocked permanently. 
10.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have explained the implementation of IDP-Core within P-CSCF. 
The procedure “intercept SIP messages” is explained. The subroutines include SIP 
message processing, password guessing and CPU load monitoring of P-CSCF. The 
flooding prevention method utilized IPtable to block the illegitimate users and 
attackers. 
Chapter  11  IDP-Core Testing and 
Performance Evaluation  
11.1  Introduction    
In the performance evaluation, our focus is to calculate the processing overhead and 
delay caused by IDP-Core in both when the IMS core is under normal load and when 
it is overloaded. As we know that this module is deployed in between IMS client and 
IMS core, and it performs attacks detection on-line and real time, therefore the 
processing delay of IDP-Core is very critical.  
Normally all the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) performs processing offline by 
making copy of each message, analyzing and generating reports. We have also 
claimed that it is lightweight security protocol. Both features should be tested in the 
performance matrix. In the following we shall discuss the testbed environment, test 
scenarios and performance evaluation.  
11.2 Testbed Environment 
To test IDP-Core prototype, the testing environment consists of following 
components: 
• Open IMS-Core [79] and IDP-Core integrated with P-CSCF  
• Open source UCT IMS client [84] acts as legitimate user  
• Open source SIPp [85] which acts as illegitimate user launching flooding 
attacks on IMS.  
The testbed is depicted in figure 11.1. We have explained the Open Source IMS core 
in the state-of-art review section. Here we discuss both the clients briefly. 
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Figure 11.1  Testing Environment 
11.2.1 IMS Client 
For legitimate user, we have used UCT IMS client [84] developed by Communication 
Research Group of University of Cape Town with objective to be used with Open 
IMS-Core [79] developed by NGNI Competence Center of Fokus Fraunhofer Open 
Communication Institute [87]. The client is still in active development and current 
version is 1.0.3. The UCT IMS client user interface is shown in figure 11.2.  
The main features include: 
• AKAv1 and AKAv2 registration 
• Subscribe to register event 
• Supports provisional response acknowledgements (PRACK) and preconditions 
• Signalling follows service routes 
• INVITE contains p-preferred-identity and p-access-network information 
• Supports private and public user identities 
• Pager-mode instant messaging 
• DTMF tones via SIP INFO messages 
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• It could be used as a normal SIP client 
 
Figure 11.2 UCT IMS Client Interface 
11.2.2 SIPp Client 
To launch attacks on IMS-Core, we have selected SIPp [85] which is open source SIP 
traffic generator and manages multiple calls with INVITE and BYE methods. It could 
generate one or more calls from one remote system. It can also transmit media traffic 
with RTP protocol. SIPp could be used to test SIP proxies, SIP media servers and SIP 
gateways etc. It helps developer to develop their own test scenarios written in XML. 
In our case, we have used SIPp to produce lot of SIP REGISTER requests to overload 
IMS Core specially P-CSCF. The user interface of SIPp is shown in figure 11.3. The 
important features of SIPp include: 
• User Agent Client (UAC) and User Agent Server (UAS) scenarios  
• Displays calls statistics like call rate, round trip delay etc. 
• Manages multiple sockets and dynamic call rates. 
• Supports of TCP, UDP, IPv6, TLS, SIP authentication etc. 
• Actions like log, dump, system command, call stop etc. 
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Figure 11.3 SIPp Interface  
11.3 Test Scenarios 
To verify whether IDP-Core meets the functional requirements as discussed in design 
chapter, we have created following three test scenarios.  
11.3.1 First Scenario: Successful Registration 
In the first test scenario, the user legitimate user ‘Alice’ is registered in IMS via a 
UCT IMS Client. The IDP-Core should allow this registration and forward it to 
PCSCF. This scenario is described roughly in figure 11.4. In this case only one user 
agent (UA) is active; therefore the CPU load of P-CSCF is very low. The IDP-Core is 
almost transparent to the all UAs. The successful registration of Alice is depicted in 
figure 11.5.  
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Figure 11.4 First Test Scenario 
 
Figure 11.5 Alice Successful Registrations 
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11.3.2 Second Scenario – Illegitimate User 
In the second test scenario, the attacker (SIPp) sends illegitimate REGISTER requests 
to P-CSCF with low rates. In this case the CPU loads remains under defined threshold 
limit, therefore the IDP-Core behaviour is the same as in the first scenario. It means 
all these illegitimate REGISTER messages are not processed by the flooding 
algorithm and simply passed through the IDP-Core. The I-CSCF and S-CSCF receive 
and forward these messages to the HSS. But the HSS replies with 4XX Response [86] 
as unknown user as depicted in figure 11.6. The consequences of this attack are not 
very serious and ultimately the HSS rejects these illegitimate REGISTER requests.  
 
Figure 11.6 Second Test Scenario 
11.3.3 Third Scenario: Flooding Condition 
The third and last test scenario is serious threat to IMS core causing flooding and 
ultimately to overload the P-CSCF. The IDP-core should ensure that it can protect the 
IMS core against all types of Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) 
attacks. In this case the attacker generates lot of REGISTER requests from single or 
multiple nodes and IDP-Core prevents them when CPU load crosses the threshold 
limit. Therefore IDP-Core activities and controls the REGISTER flooding attacks to 
protect the P-CSCF. This scenario is depicted in figure 11.7 showing parallel actions 
sequence.  
The SIPp client sends illegitimate random REGISTER requests at a rate of 1 million 
calls per second to overload the P-CSCF.  Before reaching the CPU load to threshold 
limit, the P-CSCF routes all these flooding messages to next hop (I/S-CSCF).  
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Figure 11.7 Third Test Scenario 
As the CPU load reaches the threshold limit (80%) as shown in figure 11.8, the IDP-
Core declares REGISTER flooding and the IP address of attacker (SIPp client) is 
inserted into Iptables. To block further REGISTER messages from attacker, the 
“Drop” rule of Iptables is utilized. Within very short time the CPU load goes to 
normal state. From the diagram, the Network History curve shows that the network 
interface or bandwidth is 100% consumed constantly by the received messages but the 
CPU History curve shows that IPD-Core has effectively controlled the flooding attack 
on IMS-Core.   
Also it is important to note that during this attack situation what happens with the 
requests coming from legitimate users. The reliable user ‘Alice’ starts the registration 
procedure at the time of attack situation (step 3 = flooding and step 3 = registration). 
As the REGISTER request from Alice arrives at P-CSCF which is suffering flooding 
attack, the IDP-Core recognizes that this request is from the legitimate user agent 
which has previously successfully registered. Therefore P-CSCF continues this 
registration procedure. Only two-steps transaction between Alice and P-CSCF is 
shown in figure 11.8 instead of complete registration process.  
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Figure 11.8 System Monitoring Interface  
11.4  Performance Evaluation  
The important design consideration of IDP-Core is that it must not cause much delay 
during online and real time processing to avoid messages retransmission. In practical 
environment IMS Core, especially P-CSCF processes lot of registration and 
authentication messages. Therefore performance is very critical when IDP-Core is 
deployed in real world scenario. The performance metric is the average delay per 
message in milliseconds which we measures in normal and heavy load scenarios.  
11.4.1 Performance Test at Normal Load 
We start the test from 10 requests per second and gradually increase the call rate 
(req/s) up to 7000 requests per second as shown in table 11.1. The duration of each 
test flow is 10 seconds. The results show that there is no significant change in the 
processing delays due to increase of calls rate in normal load condition. The IDP 
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System fetches the value of a variable for each incoming SIP message and stores the 
latest CPU load and compares it with the defined threshold limit.     
 
No of Requests/Sec Average Delay (ms) 
10 (req/s) 0.015 
100 (req/s) 0.038 
500 (req/s) 0.049 
1000 (req/s) 0.053 
2000 (req/s) 0.059 
3000 (req/s) 0.068 
4000 (req/s) 0.072 
5000 (req/s) 0.081 
6000 (req/s) 0.087 
7000 (req/s) 0.086 
Table 11.1 Average Delay under Normal CPU Load 
These test results are depicted in figure 11.9, indicating that the average delay 
introduced by the IDP System is varies from 0.015 ms to 0.096 ms. This delay is 
negligible as compared to the entire message processing delay by IMS core. 
The Average Delay at Normal Load 
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Figure 11.9 Average Message Processing Delay under Normal Load 
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11.4.2 Performance Test at CPU Overloading 
To overload CPU of P-CSCF, we have generated lot of SIP flooding traffic by using 
SIPp on multiple nodes. The flooding limit starts from 10,000 requests per second 
which increases up to 100,000 requests per second. The duration for each test is 5 
seconds. 
 No of Requests/Sec Average Delay (ms) 
10000(req/s) 0.031 
20000(req/s) 0.053 
30000(req/s) 0.055 
40000(req/s) 0.067 
50000(req/s) 0.077 
60000(req/s) 0.078 
70000(req/s) 0.083 
80000(req/s) 0.084 
90000(req/s) 0.091 
100000(req/s) 0.101 
Table 11.2 Average Delay during CPU Overloading 
The Average Delay under Flooding
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Figure 11.10 Average Delay during CPU Overloading 
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Once the IDP-Core detects SIP messages flooding attacks from any malicious user, it 
drops further requests from the attacker by inserting its IP address in the Iptable. In 
this scenario, the delay introduced by the IDP-Core is in the range of 0.031 ms to 
0.101 ms.  
These test results indicate that the IMS IDP-Core prototype performances are very 
reliable and the overhead delays are also very small in both test conditions. 
11.5  Summary 
In this chapter the performance of IDP-Core is evaluated in normal and overload 
flooding scenarios. The developed prototype met the design requirements in both 
providing safeguard against REGISTER flooding and performing real-time and online 
processing with very small overhead delay. 
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Design and Implementation of Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention System for 
IMS Applications Servers (IDP-AS) 
 
(Level 2 Security – Section 2) 
 
  
Design and Implemenation of IDP-AS 
The Part-E describes section 2 of level 2 extended IMS security solution. Its objective 
is to protect IMS Application Server from misuse of IMS services. This part consists 
of three chapters (from 12 to 14) focusing on the design and development, 
implementation, testing and performance of Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
system for IMS Application Server (IDP-AS). It is based on IMS Application Server - 
SIPSEE (SIP Servlet Execution Environment) developed by Fraunhofer FOKUS 
Open Communication Institute. The IDP-AS is developed in Java. Functionality of 
each chapter is briefly explained as follows: 
Chapter 12 “Design and Architecture of IDP-AS” discusses the objective of Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention system for IMS Application Servers, The architecture and 
components of IDP-AS, attacks detection methodology, design scenarios with time 
line diagrams and object-interaction models are presented. 
Chapter 13 “IDP-AS Implementation” presents the implementation of different 
module of IDP-AS including IDP-Centre, Partner, IDP-Filter, Rule Collection and 
Rule Parser. 
Chapter 14 “IDP-AS Testing and Performance” explains testing environment, 
different test cases, and performance evaluation at Open IMS FOKUS Testbed. 
 
Figure E: Design and Implementation of IDP-AS (Part-E Overview) 
 
Chapter  12  Design and Architecture of 
IDP-AS 
12.1 Introduction 
Application Servers (ASs) are functions on top of IMS and provide value-added 
multimedia services in the IMS. The AS is capable of processing incoming SIP 
session received from the IMS and able to originate SIP requests. The SIP Execution 
Environment (SIPSEE) developed within Open IMS Testbed at FOKUS Fraunhofer 
[87], is equipped with both SIP Servlet container and HTTP Servlet container and it 
fulfils the requirements of AS. The SIP Servlet API is developed to standardize the 
platform for development and deployment of SIP based services. It is one of the 
several possible technologies suggested by 3GPP to build a SIP Application Server 
(AS) which is an important part of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [1] because 
applications providing value added services are deployed on the application server.  
The IMS Application Servers like other web-servers are ubiquitous, remotely 
accessible and open based architecture. They could be subjected to different kinds of 
intrusions, vulnerabilities and threats. These attacks could cause collapse of services 
e.g. flooding attacks could keep the IMS AS busy and exhaust its resources, and the 
SQL Injection could delete, or modify the database of IMS AS etc. To mitigate the 
security exposure associated with the AS, an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) 
is needed to analyze and screen incoming and outgoing messages. The goal is to 
perform early detection of malicious activity and prevent them before major damage 
to the AS services and to protect IMS Application Environment, which is based on 
SIP Servlet Container integrated with the existing HTTP Servlet Container Jetty.  
The chapter starts with Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system motivation 
and its placement within IMS Application Server. Next, IMS AS architecture is 
presented. The next section explains the IDP-AS design architecture, attacks detection 
methodologies and algorithms, different development object interaction scenarios.  
12.2 IDP-AS Movitation and Objective   
The objective of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-AS) is to protect IMS 
Application Servers (ASs) and to secure SIP signalling on IP Multimedia Service 
Control (ISC) interface [7]. The ISC interface connects AS with IMS core. The 3GPP 
has not standardized specific security solution to secure this ISC. We concentrate the 
security threats that IMS ASs have challenged, especially the SIP signalling attacks on 
this interface and general on the whole.  The lower level attacks could be prevented 
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by using low-level security mechanisms, e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) and IP 
security (IPsec) to secure the communication channel by encryption. But the higher 
level attacks, like SQL injection at application level, are not mitigated by low-level 
security mechanisms. Hence, the task of IDP-AS is to detect and block such higher 
level attacks.  
The IDP-AS is deployed within IMS AS. The IMS Application Server could be 
divided in two modules: SIP stack and SIP server. The SIP stack exchanges the SIP 
messages with S-CSCF via the ISC interface. The SIP server processes the incoming 
SIP messages and generates SIP responses. To protect IMS AS from time-dependent 
(TD) and time-independent (TI) attacks, all incoming and outgoing SIP messages 
must process by the IDP-AS, therefore it is placed between SIP stack and SIP server 
as depicted in figure 12.1.  
 
Figure 12.1 Location of IDP-AS 
The proposed security mechanisms focus on protecting the IMS Application Server 
from attacks contained in SIP messages. Intruder could use two approaches to launch 
attacks relying on SIP messages. The first one is to intercept and fake the SIP 
messages exchanged between legitimate UAs and the Application Server. The other 
approach is to send malicious SIP messages directly to AS e.g. the intruder transmits a 
SIP message, which contains SQL-Injection. Therefore, we introduce a two tiers 
security mechanism shown in figure 12.2 to safeguard IMS-AS. 
The first tier utilizes the TLS (Transport Layer Security) [45] mechanism to secure the 
communication channel. The TLS mechanism can exclude the intruder from 
intercepting and forging the exchanged SIP messages. It should be noted that the SIP 
signalling path is hop-by-hop and from security point of view this means that the 
whole signalling path between the UA and the AS must be secured by the TLS [45]. 
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TLS has many advantages over IPsec and successful introduction of the protocol in 
the Internet has proved its usability and effectiveness.  
The major difficulty with TLS deployment is that it does not run over UDP which is 
usually used by SIP entities. In the future, it could be possible that TLS may be 
utilized for UDP traffic.  
 
Figure 12.2 Two-Tier Security Mechanisms 
The second tier is to deploy an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system for 
IMS Application Server. The task of the IDP is to detect and prevent attacks which 
can not debarred by the first tier technique e.g. the Bob is a legitimate and he is 
performing malicious activity. As a legitimate user, he is qualified to use the TLS 
communication channels to send SIP messages [89] to the AS. As a malicious user, 
Bob intends to launch SQL-Injection attack to drop a table in the database of AS. SIP 
provides a challenge-based mechanism for authentication that is based on 
authentication in HTTP and simple challenge-based authentication as illustrated in 
figure 12.3. 
At the end of authentication, Bob can inject SQL statement into the Request with 
Credentials. The authorization Header of the injected Request may look like: 
Authorization: 
Digest username="Bob’; drop table films;’ ", 
realm="example.com", 
... ... 
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Figure 12.3 Example of Challenge-based Authentication 
If the Application Server is not equipped with additional security protection like 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system, the above Request can cause loss of 
data, namely drop table “films” in AS. 
12.3 IMS Application Server Architecture 
The IMS Application Server as shown in figure 12.4 consists of SIP Servlet Execution, 
SIP Message Handling, Application Deployment Environment, SIP Servlet API 
Compliance and Bridge components [88]. The IMS Application Server is triggered by 
the Serving Call State Control Function (S-CSCF) which redirects certain sessions to 
the SIP AS based on internal filters and criteria or by requesting filter information 
from the Home Subscriber Server (HSS). The SIP AS comprises filter rules to decide 
which applications should be selected for handling the session. During execution of 
service logic it is also possible for the SIP AS to communicate with the HSS to get 
additional information about a subscriber or to be notified about changes in subscriber 
profile [7]. In SIP Servlet Execution, the queue of the servlets being executed will be 
observed by a thread which creates separate threads for execution. SIP Message 
Handling component receives the SIP messages and converts them into the SIP-
Servlet-Request (respectly SIP-Servlet-Response), then dispatches the SIP-Servlet-
Request or SIP-Servlet-Response to the corresponding SIP Servlet. Application 
Deployment Environment provides approach for the deployed applications to make 
known to AS. Using the deployment descriptors of applications, the AS decides which 
servlet of specific application should handle a SIP message.  
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The SIP Servlet API Compliance provides the possibility for application developer to 
develop the applications independent of the SIP Servlet container. The SIP Servlet 
API is basis for creating of communication services and provides benefits to clients 
with applications having web into the communication process features. The AS 
merges with Jetty [53] -HTTP Servlet container- and Bridge component is responsible 
for bridging SIP servlet execution environment to the HTTP Servlet execution 
environment. As every specification contains its own session instance, the SIP Servlet 
specification introduces the concept of a spanning session, the SIP-Application-
Session. The converged applications should be able to access a common SIP-
Application-Session from the Http Session as well from the SIP Session.  
 
Figure 12.4 IMS-AS Architecture 
12.4 Architecture of IDP-AS 
This section provides top level architecture, functionality and components of IDP-AS.  
All the incoming SIP messages either from SIP stack or from SIP server are passed 
through the IDP centre that maintains a list of partners. Each partner represents a 
communication entity that exchanges SIP messages with the IMS AS. A partner is 
identified with SIP URI (Uniform Resource Identifier). For example, user Alice sends 
an INVITE request to the IMS-AS as shown in figure 12.5 representing a partner with 
identity pc33.atlanta.com. 
 
Figure 12.5 Example of INVITE Request 
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Figure 12.6 Architecture of IDP-AS 
Each partner has state and number of sends or receives messages etc. When IDP-AS 
receives SIP message, it updates the state of corresponding partner or creates a new 
partner if it does not exist. After that IDP Filter compares it with the rules loaded in 
the Rule Collection. If a partner matches with any attack rule, the IDP Centre inserts 
the malicious partner into the Blacklist that contains the list of URIs of all the 
malicious communication partners. The reference architecture is provided in figure 
12.6. Different components of the IDP-AS are as follows: 
IDP Centre is the communication interface which receives SIP messages either from 
SIP stack or SIP server and process them against attacks. If an attack is detected, the 
IDP Centre makes a decision to generate alerts or stops further processing of 
malicious messages.   
Partner is an Interior Agent that represents user agent (UA) or user equipment (UE) 
being communicating with IMS-Application Server. The partner is created during 
runtime and it is removed at the end of session. 
Rule Collection contains and loads the defined attacks descriptions at runtime. The 
attacks covered the time-independent and time-dependent attacks. 
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IDP Filter compares both SIP messages and state of the partner with attacks 
descriptions stored in the Rule Collection. Through these comparisons, the IDP 
achieves stateless and state-based detection characteristics.   
Blacklist contains a list of malicious SIP URI of illegitimate users or partners. The 
malicious users are identified if the state of the partner or SIP message matches with 
an attack rules.  
12.5 IDP-AS Attacks Detection Methodology 
The IDP Centre is the core of IDP-AS responsible for exchanging instances of SIP 
request event and SIP response event with SIP stack and SIP server. The Partner, IDP 
Filter and Rule Collection are entities. The object Rule represents attacks patterns 
described in XML.   
 
Figure 12.7 IDP-AS Attacks Detection Methodology   
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If IDP Centre detects an attack from malicious partner, the URI of this user is inserted 
into the Blacklist. Simultaneously, two actions are trigged as depicted in figure 12.7: 
first, the Attack Logger alerts the detected attack and second IDP Centre creates a new 
instance Blacklist timer task for deleting the corresponding URI from the Blacklist 
within defined time interval so that the partner is not always blocked. For example the 
URI bob@example.com is inserted into the Blacklist for one hour. During this time 
all SIP messages from or to the bob@example.com are not allowed to process. After 
the expiry of time interval, the URI “bob@example.com” is deleted from the Blacklist 
and this user is allowed to exchange SIP messages. 
The attacks detection algorithm based on following two methodologies as described in 
flow control of figure 12.8:  
 
Figure 12.8 Attacks Detection Algorithm     
a) To detect time-independent (TI) attack, the IDP-AS compares the message 
with defined attack rules, if matches, it turns the procedure attack detected, 
and announces the detection and block the message, otherwise the message is 
regarded as secure and is forwarded to the SIP Server.  
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b) To detect time-dependent (TD) attacks, the partner has a timer to perform 
periodic checking the state of user. As timer is triggered, a comparison 
between the current state of partner & the defined attack rules will be carried 
out: if matches, the procedure attack detected takes over the control. The 
further messages to or from the UE will be blocked. 
12.6 IDP-AS Attacks Description 
The attacks descriptions for INVITE Flooding, INVITE Response Flooding and SQL 
Injection attacks are provided in the following tables. The table 12.1 presents INVITE 
flooding attack description. 
 Value Description 
Type Flood The attack describes Flooding attack which is time-
dependent attack. 
Name INVITE Flooding This rule is called INVITE flooding. 
Method INVITE The attack is launched via using SIP INVITE Request. 
Status - The status is null because only INVITE Request is 
utilized to launch the attack. 
Number 100 The maximal amount of INVITE request permitted by 
the IDS within specified time interval which is set in the 
property Interval, e.g., the number is 100 and the interval 
is 60 (s). It mean if UA sends 201 INVITE requests 
within 60 seconds to IMS AS, then the UA will be 
treated as an attacker. 
Interval 60 Explained above. 
Alert INVITE Message 
Flood 
If rule is matched, the IDP-AS alerts IMS AS with this 
message. 
Whitelist 158.88.0.1 The UA whose IP is 158.88.0.1 will always be treated as 
secure communication partner, even though the UA 
matches with this rule. 
Table 11.1 Description for INVITE Flooding Attack 
The table 12.2 describes the INVITE Response flood. This type of attack aims to 
guess the password of a legitimate user. 
 Value Description 
Type Flood The attack describes Flooding attack which is time-
dependent attack. 
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Method  The value is null. It means this rule is applied only to 
the Response. 
Name INVITE Response 
Flooding 
This rule is called INVITE response flooding. 
Status 407 The characteristic of attack is a lot of outgoing 407 
messages. 
Number 100 The maximal amount of 407 message permitted by IDS 
within specified time interval, which is set for the 
property Interval, e.g., the number is 100 and the 
interval is 60 (s). If IMS AS sends 201 “407” response 
within 60 seconds to a UA, then the UA will be treated 
as an intruder. 
Interval 60 Explained above. 
Alert SIP/2.0 407 
unauthenticated 
If rule is matched, the IDS will alert IMS AS with this 
message. 
Whitelist 158.88.0.1 The UA whose IP is 158.88.0.1 will always be treated as 
secure communication partner, even though the UA 
matches this rule. 
Table 11.2 Description for INVITE Response Flooding 
The third rule provided in table 12.3 describes the SQL Injection attack. 
 Value Description 
Type Sql-injection This rule describes SQL Injection attack which 
time-independent attack. 
Name Drop statement This rule is called Drop Statement. 
Statement Drop The SQL statement Drop is used to launch this 
attack. 
Alert Drop SQL 
Injection Attack is 
detected. 
If rule is matched, the IDS will alert IMS AS with 
this message. 
Table 11.3 Description for SQL Injection Attack 
12.7 IDP-AS Design Scenarios   
In this section we describes time line diagrams and object interaction models to show 
how a system fulfils the task of user requirements. The following four possible design 
scenarios are presented to check the security and reliability of each SIP message 
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communicating with IMS AS. Each system operation defines an object interaction 
graph specifying the context of a system operation and the communication flow 
between objects to realize a system operation.  
12.7.1 Incoming Request Scenario  
 In this scenario, the IDP-AS receives incoming SIP request from SIP stack and IDP 
Centre performs check-in-request action against any attack which consists of 
following steps. First, if the URI of the request is contained in the Blacklist, alert the 
attack and reject the request.  
 
Figure 12.9 Incoming SIP Request Scenario 
If the URI is not contained in the Blacklist then partner is created or updated. Second, 
the IDP Filter compares the request with time-independent attack rules to check SQL-
injection attack. The partner has also timer task to check state of partner repeatedly in 
lifecycle against any attack. The scheduled task compares the partner’s state with 
time-dependent attacks rules. If it matches, the URI of the partner is inserted in the 
Blacklist. Simultaneously, an instance of the Blacklist timer task is created and it is 
scheduled for deleting the specified URI from the Blacklist in defined time interval, in 
order to avoid the blocking of URI forever. If the partner is proved to be secure, the 
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IDP-AS forwards the request to SIP server for processing. The related time line 
diagram and object-interaction model is shown in figures 12.9 & 12.10 respectively. 
 
Figure 12.10 Incoming Request Object-Interaction Graph 
12.7.2 Incoming SIP Response Scenario  
Similar to the first scenario, only the secure incoming responses are permitted to pass 
through the IDP-AS. In this scenario, the IDP Centre checks that if the URI of the 
response is contained in the Blacklist, the response is treated an attack and it is 
rejected. If the URI of response is not contained in the Blacklist, it is assumed that the 
response is secure. The IDP centre will not create or update the partner to compare 
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with attack rules or with the state of the partner of incoming response. The time line 
diagram and object-interaction graph is provided in figure 12.11 & 12.12 respectively. 
 
Figure 12.11 Incoming SIP Response Scenario  
 
Figure 12.12 Incoming Response Object-Interaction Graph 
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12.7.3 Outgoing SIP Request Scenario 
In the third scenario, the IDP-AS checks the outgoing SIP requests received from SIP 
Server. These outgoing SIP requests may be the result of any previously incoming 
request or response. Therefore, it is necessary to check these requests against any 
attack. If any attack is detected, the SIP server is informed about the attack, and SIP 
server will cease to process the request.  
 
Figure 12.13 Outgoing SIP Request Scenario 
Similar to the previous graphs it is always verified whether the URI of the response 
has been already contained in the Blacklist. If yes, the SIP server is informed about 
the outgoing response is from the attacker. Otherwise, IDP Centre updates the state of 
corresponding partner and IDP Filter compares the response with the defined rules of 
time-independent attack, in order to detect any time-independent attack. The time line 
diagram and object-interaction model is shown in figure 12.13 & 12.14 respectively. 
The partner is scheduled to repeatedly compare with the rules of time-dependent 
attack in order to detect time-dependent attacks. If it matches, in both cases IDP 
Centre is trigged to update the Blacklist, namely to insert the URI of the partner into 
the Blacklist. The IDP Centre creates the corresponding Blacklist timer task for the 
new insertion into the Blacklist. Finally, in the fifth and sixth operations, IDP Centre 
will inform the SIP server with the checking results. 
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Figure 12.14 Outgoing Request Object-Interaction Graph 
12.7.4 Outgoing SIP Response Scenario 
In the last scenario, the IDP-AS checks the outgoing SIP responses against any attack. 
If attack is detected, it informs the Application Server about the attack. Only secure 
SIP responses are sent to SIP stack. In this case no attack has been identified; 
therefore all the outgoing SIP responses are treated as secure. The sequence diagram 
of this scenario is shown in figure 12.15.  
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Figure 12.15 Outgoing SIP Response Scenario 
12.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the functionality and architectural design of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system for IMS Application Servers are presented. All the 
communication messages between IMS core and Application Server are processed by 
the IDP-AS. Four types of design scenarios are explained with time-line diagrams and 
object-interaction models.  
Chapter  13  IDP-AS Implementation     
13.1 Introduction   
The SIP Servlet Execution Environment (SIPSEE) - IMS Application Server-is 
developed in Java, within Open IMS FOKUS Testbed. The Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system is deployed within SIPSEE and implemented in Java. 
The signalling flow for secure IMS Application Server is provided in figure 13.1. 
 
Figure 13.1 Secure IMS Application Server 
The implementation of IDP-AS is divided into three parts:  
(i) IDP Centre implementation 
(ii) Partner, IDP Filter and Rules Collection implementation  
(iii) Rules Parser and IDP Configuration implementation 
These parts are briefly explained in this chapter. 
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13.2 The IDP Centre 
The implementation procedure is explained with the properties and the operations of 
IDP Centre. 
13.2.1 Properties of IDP Centre  
The IDP Centre is composed of four properties Blacklist, SIP server, list of partner 
and timer as depicted in figure 13.2.  If SIP server property is set with null, then IMS 
AS works without IDP-AS. Therefore it is feasible to mount or demount the IDP-AS.  
The blacklist property is a hash set which stores URI of the malicious communication 
partners. In start, both the blacklist and list of partner are empty. On the reception of 
SIP request or SIP response from new UE, IDP Centre creates new partner and inserts 
into the list of partner. The timer property is responsible for scheduling timer tasks 
created for elements in the blacklist. 
 
Figure 13.2 Property Structure of IDP Centre 
13.2.2 Operations of IDP Centre 
The property structure provides the static features but the dynamic features of IDP 
Centre are described with the operation structure as depicted in figure 13.3. The 
methods forward-in-request(), forward-in-response(), check-out-request() and check-
out-response() are the interfaces of IDP centre for exchanging messages. The “in” and 
“out” represent the direction of messages. The method forward-in-request() forwards 
the request to the method check-in-request(), in order to verify whether the incoming 
request is secure. On the basis of the result of method check-in-request(), the method 
forward-in-request() decides to forward the request to the SIP server or blocks the 
request. The method forward-in-response() checks the incoming response.  
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Figure 13.3 Operation Structure of IDP Centre 
We have assumed that the outgoing request initiated by the SIP server never contains 
any attack, the method check-out-request() in the current implementation always 
returns true. The check-out-response() is similar to the check-in-response(). Both 
utilize the update-partner() to create new instance of the partner or to update the 
existed instance. The method update-blacklist() can be invoked by a partner to insert 
the URI of the partner into the blacklist, if the partner noticed that the partner itself is 
no more secure. Simultaneously this method update-blacklist() creates a new instance 
of the blacklist timer task for the new inserted record in the blacklist.  In the 
preconfigured time interval, the new created instance of blacklist timer task calls 
method delete-from-blacklist() to delete the URI from the blacklist. It is also 
noticeable that the IDP Centre is a singleton. 
In order to understand the check-XXX() operation in more detail, a control flow graph 
of check-out-response() is provided as an example. As shown in figure 13.4, the 
method at first initiate the private method get-originator() to obtain the URI of the 
response. Then it verifies whether the URI was contained in the blacklist check-in-
response(). If it contained, it means that the target of the outgoing response is a 
malicious UE, and the method returns a false and terminates. Otherwise the update-
partner() is invoked to create a new partner or to update the existed partner. Finally, 
the partner should be reviewed for its state of security. 
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Figure 13.4 Control Flow Graph of Check-Out-Response() Operation 
13.3 Partner, IDP Filter and Rule Collection 
The relationships among the Partner, IDP Filter and Rule Collection are explained in 
design section. The task of IDP Filter is to compare the partner or message with the 
rules stored in Rule Collection.  
13.3.1 The Partner 
The primary objective of development of partner is how to represent the state of a 
communication entity. The class partner contains a counter for each SIP method, 
num-INVITE counts how much INVITE messages are received. In addition, the class 
partner has counters for 401-Response and 407-Response, namely num-status 401 and 
num-status 407 as depicted in figure 13.5. The flooding attack is time based; the state 
of a partner must be evaluated with regard to time interval. The attributes duration and 
time recorder serve for the time interval. The partner is a timer task and each time 
interval is defined in the duration, the partner checks its state to detect time-dependent 
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attack. If no attack is detected and value of the time recorder is equal to or greater 
than the pre-defined time interval, the state of the partner will return back to the 
initialized state.  
 
Figure 13.5 The Class Model of Partner 
The state chart provided in figure 13.6 describes the states of partner for INVITE 
request [4]. The life cycle of a partner begins when the first SIP message is received 
from a new UE. The partner is removed from system, if it has not been updated since 
a pre-defined time interval. 
 
Figure 13.6 Partner State Chart for INVITE Request 
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13.3.2 The IDP Filter 
The IDP Filter performs the comparison with two methods: first check-
PWithoutRTTime() which compares the message with time-independent attack rules. 
A private method check-SQL-Injection() is invoked by check-PWithoutRTTime() 
operation to detect any SQL-injection contained in the message. The tasks of check-
SQL-Injection() are parsing the message to get the username and compare it with the 
attack rules describing SQL-injection. For example username is “bob; drop table 
subscriber”, a statement of a rule is “drop”; that matches with username. The second 
check-PWithRTTime() which checks partner to detect time-dependent attacks by 
comparing the corresponding states of the partner with the number defined in the rules 
as given in figure 13.7. The corresponding state of partner is num-status 407 whose 
value is compared with element Number. If the value of the num-status 407 exceeds 
50 and the partner's URI is not included in the element white-list, an INVITE 
response flooding is detected. 
13.3.3 The Rule Collection  
The task of Rule Collection is to store rules defined in the rules.xml as provided in 
figure 13.7. In order to accelerate the processing of the IDP, the Rule Collection 
contains two searching lists: first “rules-time-based” stores only the time-dependent 
attack rules and the second list “rules-no-time-based” stores the time-independent 
attack rules. It must be noted that the Rule Collection loads the rules at the start of the 
IDP-AS. If any rule is inserted into or deleted from the “rules.xml” during the runtime, 
it is recommended to start the IDP-AS system to load the current rule. These rules 
contain four types of SIP flooding and four types of SQL injection attacks. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Rules> 
  <Rule type="flood"> 
        <Name>INVITE flooding</Name> 
        <Method>INVITE</Method> 
        <Status></Status> 
        <Number>100</Number> 
        <Interval>60</Interval> 
        <Alert>INVITE message flood</Alert> 
        <Whitelist>158.88.0.1</Whitelist> 
   </Rule> 
   <Rule type="flood"> 
             <Name>REGISTER flooding</Name> 
             <Method>REGISTER</Method> 
             <Status></Status> 
             <Number>100</Number> 
             <Interval>60</Interval> 
             <Alert>REGISTER message flood</Alert> 
             <Whitelist>158.88.0.1</Whitelist> 
    </Rule> 
     <Rule type="flood"> 
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        <Name>INVITE response flooding</Name> 
        <Method></Method> 
        <Status>407</Status> 
        <Number>100</Number> 
        <Interval>60</Interval> 
        <Alert>SIP/2.0 407 unauthenticated</Alert> 
        <Whitelist>158.88.0.1</Whitelist> 
     </Rule> 
     <Rule type="flood"> 
             <Name>REGISTER response flooding</Name> 
             <Method></Method> 
             <Status>401</Status> 
             <Number>50</Number> 
             <Interval>60</Interval> 
             <Alert>SIP/2.0 401 unauthenticated</Alert> 
             <Whitelist>158.88.0.1</Whitelist> 
      </Rule>     
      <Rule type="sqlinject"> 
             <Name>Drop statement</Name> 
             <Statement>drop</Statement> 
             <Alert>a drop injection attack launched</Alert> 
      </Rule> 
      <Rule type="sqlinject"> 
             <Name>Delete statement</Name> 
             <Statement>delete</Statement> 
             <Alert>a delete injection attack launched</Alert> 
       </Rule> 
       <Rule type="sqlinject"> 
             <Name>Insert statement</Name> 
             <Statement>insert</Statement> 
             <Alert>a insert injection attack launched</Alert> 
        </Rule> 
        <Rule type="sqlinject"> 
             <Name>Update statement</Name> 
             <Statement>update</Statement> 
             <Alert>a update injection attack launched</Alert> 
        </Rule> 
        <Rule type="sqlinject"> 
             <Name>Union statement</Name> 
             <Statement>union</Statement> 
             <Alert>a union injection attack launched</Alert> 
        </Rule> 
</Rules> 
Figure 13.7 IDP-AS Attacks Rules   
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13.4 The Rule Parser and IDP Configuration 
The implementations of these two modules are explained below: 
13.4.1 The Rule Parser 
The Rule Parser is a XML parser which utilizes the Document Object Model (DOM) 
which is a standard API for XML parsers. The exploited parser is Xerces which 
supports XML 1.0 recommendation and contains advanced parser functionality, such 
as support for W3C’s XML Schema recommendation version 1.0, DOM Level 2 
version 1.0, and SAX Version2, in addition to supporting the industry standard DOM 
Level 1 and SAX version 1 APIs. In brief, the task of Rule Parser is to read the file 
“rules.xml” into a Document and extract a list of Rule from the Document. The code 
fragment of Rule Parser is given in figure 13.8 
public Hashtable<String,Rule> getRules(){ 
       Hashtable<String,Rule> rules = null; 
       Document docu = parseXMLFile(IDSConstant.RULEFILE); 
       rules = parseDocument(docu); 
       return rules; 
   } 
   ... 
   private Document parseXMLFile(String xmlFile){ 
        Document dom = null; 
        DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance(); 
        try { 
            //Using factory get an instance of document builder 
            DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder(); 
             URL url = RulesParser.class.getClassLoader().getResource(xmlFile); 
            //parse using builder to get DOM representation of the XML file 
            dom = db.parse(new File(url.getFile())); 
        }catch(ParserConfigurationException pce) { 
            pce.printStackTrace(); 
        }catch(SAXException se) { 
            se.printStackTrace(); 
        }catch(IOException ioe) { 
            ioe.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return dom; 
    } 
    ... 
Implementation of IDP-AS                                                                                 SSP Framework for IMS 
 
159 
    private Hashtable<String,Rule> parseDocument(Document dom){ 
        //get the root elememt 
         Element docEle = dom.getDocumentElement(); 
         Hashtable<String,Rule> rules = new Hashtable<String,Rule>(); 
         //get a nodelist of <employee> elements 
        NodeList nl = docEle.getElementsByTagName("Rule"); 
        if(nl != null && nl.getLength() > 0) { 
            for(int i = 0 ; i < nl.getLength();i++) { 
                //get the employee element 
                Element el = (Element)nl.item(i); 
                //get the Employee object 
                Rule e = getRule(el); 
                //add it to list 
                rules.put(e.getName(),e); 
            } 
        } 
        return rules; 
} 
Figure 13.8 Rule Parser Code Fragment   
13.4.2 IDS-Configuration 
The IDSConfig is used to read the properties configured in the file “ids.config”. We 
utilized Java 1.5 enum to realize the IDSConfig. The Java 1.5 enums are references to 
a fixed set of objects to represent various possible choices. Enum and the enum 
constants are just classes. In our implementation, there is always a constant 
corresponding to each property in the “ids.config”. The code fragment of the 
IDSConfig is provided in figure 13.9. 
public enum IDSConfig { 
      ATTACKTYPE_TIME, 
      ATTACKTYPE_WITHOUTTIME, 
      BLACKLIST_UPDATE_TIME, 
      MOUNT_IPTABLE, 
      IPTABLE, 
      TIME_INTERVAL; 
      ... … 
} 
The file “ids.config” is: 
attacktype.time=flood 
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attacktype.withouttime=sqlinject 
##################################################### 
#the life cycle of a IP Address in the blacklist. The unit is hour  # 
#################################################### 
blacklist.update.time=1 
###################################################### 
# Time interval for time dependent attack. The unit is second       # 
##################################################### 
time.interval=60 
########################################################## 
#if the IP table was mounted, the IDS will filter only the messages       # 
# which are proxied or sent by the IPs or URI specified in the IP table  # 
########################################################## 
mount.iptable=false 
iptable=10.0.1.100,198.32.22.111   
Figure 13.9 IDSConfig Code Fragment   
13.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the implementation of stateful misuse Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system for IMS Application Servers. The implementation is 
based on SIPSEE developed within Open IMS FOKUS Testbed. The attacks rules are 
developed in XML and are loaded during runtime. The implementation work is 
performed in three phases (a) IDP Centre implementation; (b) Partner, IDP Filter and 
Rules Collection implementation; (c) Rules Parser and IDP Configuration 
implementation.  
Chapter  14  IDP-AS Testing and 
Evaluation     
14.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, we present test execution and performance results of developed IDP-
AS prototype. First we focus on testing environment and tool, and then describe the 
test cases and performance evaluation. The performance results should help to deploy 
the IDP-AS in real world environment at the Open IMS Fraunhofer Testbed. They 
also facilitate to further improve the developed prototype. The testing environment is 
comprised of SIPSEE (SIP Servlet Execution Environment) IMS Application Server 
integrated with IDP-AS and SIP Forum Test Framework (SFTF) [90] acts as a client 
to launch the attacks as depicted in figure 14.1.  
 
Figure 14.1  IDP-AS Testing Environment 
The approach for executing functional tests is to launch simulated attacks against the 
IMS AS. Each attack pattern defined by IDP-AS in Rule Collection should be 
checked with the corresponding attack simulated by a test case of SFTF. If IDP-AS 
detects all of simulated attacks, it fulfils the functionality requirements. The tests 
procedure is illustrated in figure 14.2. In each test the malicious client (SFTF) sends 
multiple SIP messages. The IDP-AS should detect the simulated attacks and should 
stop the further messages sent by the SFTF.   
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Figure 14.2 Test Procedure  
14.2 Test Case for INVITE Flooding – “caseinviteflood” 
In order to test the INVITE flooding rule, this test case generates 200 INVITE 
Request and then sends to IMS AS with is equipped Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system. The code fragment of the test case is given as: 
class caseinviteflood (TestCase): 
def config(self): 
    self.name = "Case invite flood" 
    self.description = "Testcase for IDS" 
    self.isClient = True 
    self.transport = "UDP"  
def run(self): 
   self.neh = NEH.NetworkEventHandler(self.transport) 
  #generate an Invite Request 
   inv = self.createRequest("INVITE") 
               inv.rUri.params.append("unknownparam") 
inv.setHeaderValue("NewFangledHeader    ", "   newfangled value\r\n continued    newfangled 
value\r\n") 
                                      fo = inv.getParsedHeaderValue("From") 
                                     fo.params.append("   unknownparam  =   unknowvalue  ") 
    fo.displayname = "SIP Cert \\\\\\\"   " 
    inv.setHeaderValue("From", fo.create()) 
    via = inv.getParsedHeaderValue("Via") 
   via.host = via.host + "\r\n   " 
         ... … 
   #send the Request for 200 times 
   for i in range(200): 
           self.writeMessageToNetwork(self.neh, inv) 
  self.neh.closeSock() 
Figure 14.3 Test Case for INVITE Flooding   
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The IDP-AS declared after 133rd INVITE Request that the attack is detected as 
depicted in figure 14.4. Why does the prototype not detect the attack after 100th 
INVITE request as defined in the attack rules? The reason is that the partner’s state is 
verified up to 133rd Request and then declares it as a malicious user. Once the attack is 
detected, the IP address 127.0.0.1 is inserted into the blacklist and further messages 
from 127.0.0.1 are blocked. The test result of INVITE flooding is presented in figure 
14.5. 
 
Figure 14.4 Process of INVITE Flooding Test 
 
Figure 14.5 Test Result for INVITE Flooding 
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14.3 Test Case for REGISTER Flooding – 
“caseregisterflood” 
Similar to the previous test case, the REGISTER flooding test case 
“caseregisterflood” also generates 200 REGISTER SIP Requests in 60 seconds and 
then sends to secure IMS Application Server as provided in the following code:  
class caseregisterflood (TestCase): 
 def config(self): 
  self.name = "Case register flood" 
  self.description = "simulation of register flood" 
  self.isClient = True 
  self.transport = "UDP" 
 def run(self): 
  self.neh = NEH.NetworkEventHandler(self.transport) 
  reg = self.createRequest("REGISTER") 
  reg.rUri.params.append("unknownparam") 
  reg.setHeaderValue("NewFangledHeader    ", "   newfangled value\r\n continued 
newfangled value\r\n") 
  fo = reg.getParsedHeaderValue("From") 
  fo.params.append("   unknownparam  =   unknowvalue  ") 
  fo.displayname = "SIP Cert \\\\\\\"   " 
  reg.setHeaderValue("From", fo.create()) 
  via = reg.getParsedHeaderValue("Via") 
  #via.host = via.host + "\r\n   " 
                via.host = "pc33.here.com\r\n " 
  reg.setHeaderValue("Via", via.create()) 
  co = reg.getParsedHeaderValue("Contact") 
  co.displayname = "Quoted String \\\"\\\"" 
  co.params.append("newparam =\r\n  newvalue") 
                # set value for Expire header 
  #ex = reg.getParsedHeaderValue("Expire") 
  #reg.setHeaderValue("Expire", 7200) 
  reg.setHeaderValue("Contact", co.create()) 
  reg.removeHeaderField("Contact") 
  #Note: explicitly removed Contact because the m with the spaces below 
  # will not replace the original Contact header 
  reg.setHeaderValue("m    ", co.create()) 
                for i in range(200): 
             self.writeMessageToNetwork(self.neh, reg) 
  self.neh.closeSock() 
Figure 14.6 Test Case for REGISTER Flooding  
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The IDP-AS detected the REGISTER flooding attack and it blocked the IP address of 
malicious user to stop further communication from this user for defined time period. 
The test result of REGISTER flooding attack as dipected in figure 14.7. 
 
Figure 14.7 Test Result for REGISTER Flooding\ 
14.4 Test Cases for INVITE Response and REGISTER 
Response Flooding 
The objective of these two attacks is that the malicious user or attacker continuously 
sends SIP Requests with random username and password until the network 
authenticate the attacker. To detect these attacks we have to compare 401 and 407 SIP 
Responses [7] with the attacks rules. In order to generate 407 or 401 Response we 
perform a mandatory modification of status-code on every outgoing Response, 
namely the status-code of outgoing Response being always set with 401 or 407. For 
example, to test the INVITE Response flooding, the mandatory modification locating 
in the method send-Container-Response() of class SIPSee-Util is as follows: 
public void sendContainerResponse(Request req, int status, ServerTransaction strans,String reason){ 
        if(!req.getMethod().equalsIgnoreCase(Request.ACK)) { 
            try { 
                Response resp = _server.getMessageFactory().createResponse(status,req); 
                /* for testing password guessing*/ 
                if(resp.getStatusCode()!=407) 
                     resp.setStatusCode(407); 
                if(!SIPSeeUtil.isStringNull(reason)) { 
                    resp.setReasonPhrase(reason); 
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                } 
                boolean secure = IDSCenter.getInstance().checkOutResponse(resp); 
                if(strans!=null) { 
                    // Response not sent yet 
                    if(strans.getState().getValue()<=TransactionState.PROCEEDING.getValue()) { 
                       if(secure){ 
                        strans.sendResponse(resp); 
                       } 
                    } 
                } else { 
                    // send response statlessly 
                   if(secure) { 
                    _server.getSIPConnector().sendStatelessResponse(resp); 
                   } 
                } 
                LOGGER.debug("Sent Container created Response:"+responseToShortString(resp)); 
            } catch (Throwable e) { 
                LOGGER.error("SIPSee Exception -> ", e); 
            } 
        } 
} 
Figure 14.8 Test Cases for INVITE/REGISTER Responses   
To test the REGISTER response flooding, we need to modify the status-code of 
outgoing Responses with 401 instead of 407. 
14.5 Test Cases for SQL Injection 
The task of test cases for the SQL Injection attacks are to build such Requests which 
contain an Authorization header injected with SQL, and then send it to IMS 
Application Server. The position of SIP Request, where the SQL commands could be 
injected, is the username in “Authorization” header. The feature of injected username 
is that it always contains a semicolon followed by the SQL commands. The test case 
for the SQL “drop” Injection is given as an example with following code fragment: 
class casesqldrop (TestCase): 
     def config(self): 
        self.name = "Case sql injection drop" 
        self.description = "simulation of drop sqlinjection attack" 
        self.isClient = True 
        self.transport = "UDP" 
    def run(self): 
        self.neh = NEH.NetworkEventHandler(self.transport) 
        inv = self.createRequest("INVITE") 
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        ... 
        inv.setHeaderValue("Authorization","Digest username=\"bob';drop table 
subscriber\" ") 
        ... 
        self.writeMessageToNetwork(self.neh, inv) 
        self.neh.closeSock() 
Figure 14.9 Test Case for SQL Injection  
This test case dropped the table called subscriber via setting the username with “bob'; 
drop table subscriber”. The Request sent by the test case is matched with the rule 
“Drop statement”. The result depicted in figure 14.10 shows that IDP-AS is capable to 
detect the SQL Injection attack. 
 
Figure 14.10 Test Result for Drop SQL Injection 
Test cases for other SQL Injection are similar to the drop SQL Injection. The only 
modification in these test cases is the username of the Authorization header should be 
replaced by other corresponding SQL statements. To test the delete SQL Injection, for 
example, we could set the username with “bob'; Delete From subscriber where 
username='bob'”. Thus from this test it is proved that the prototype is able to detect 
the SQL Injection attacks. 
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14.6 Performance Evaluation 
The performance matrix of developed IDP-AS based on measuring system signalling 
cost and processing delay for attacks detection. We have utilized SIP Forum Test 
Framework (SFTF) [90] to perform the evaluation and performance tests. In the 
development process, it has been considered that the IDP-AS should meet the 
requirements of processing delay as mentioned in RFC3261 [4].  The state machine 
for SIP INVITE client transaction is provided in figure 14.11. As mentioned in the 
specification, the timer A is set with a value of T1 with default value 500 ms. When 
timer A expires, the client transaction must retransmit the request, and must reset the 
timer with value of 2xT1. When timer A expires again from 2*T1 seconds, the request 
must be retransmitted again. This process must continue to retransmit the request with 
intervals that double after each transmission. These retransmissions should only be 
done while the client transaction is in the “calling” state [4]. 
 
Figure 14.11 SIP INVITE Client Transaction State Diagram 
To avoid this retransmission of INVITE Request, it is required that the processing 
delay time or overhead of IDP-AS should be minimum. It means that the delay in 
“INVITE client transaction” introduced by the prototype should be very small as 
compared to the initial value of timer A (T1 = 500ms). The total delay (Dt) shown in 
figure 14.12 consists of the request processing delay (DRq) and response processing 
(DRes) i.e. 
sRqt DDD Re+=        (14.1) 
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Figure 14.12 IDP-AS Processing Delay 
Now we present the performance of test cases for INVITE, REGISTER, INVITE 
Response and REGISTER Response flooding and SQL Injection within IMS Testbed 
to evaluate the practical performance of IDP-AS.  
14.6.1   Performance Test for INVITE Flooding  
To calculate the INVITE flooding detection performance, the client sends number of 
requests to IMS Application Server. We start the test from 10 INVITE Requests and 
increase the number by 10 up to 150 INVITE messages.  We note the time interval for 
every incoming request when it arrives to the IDP-AS and is forwarded to the SIP 
Server. Similarly we record the time interval for each outgoing response when it 
arrives to IDP-AS and is forwarded to the SIP Stack.  
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Figure 14.13 Performance Test for INVITE Flooding 
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The average processing delay for each INVITE Request is given equation 14.2: 
n
T
n
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1Re =∑
=
+
=
    (14.2) 
Where, Tk is the time interval for both incoming request and outgoing response, K is 
the index of message, and n is the sum of messages received by IDP-AS. The 
maximum value of n should be less than the Number Value (200) defined in the rule 
of INVITE Request flooding, so that no message will be blocked.  
From performance test, we have obtained the chart shown in figure 14.13. The curve 
marked () represents the total delay (D) which varies from 3.28 ms to 9.32 ms. This 
delay is very small as compared to round-trip time (T1) and the placement of IDP-AS 
within IMS AS does not cause the retransmission of SIP messages. 
14.6.2 Performance Test for REGISTER Flooding 
Similar to the INVITE flooding, the performance for REGISTER flooding is depicted 
in figure 14.14. The processing overhead varies 1.88 ms to 9.12 ms for maximum of 
150 REGISTER requests. The total delay is calculated using the equation 14.3. 
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Figure 14.14 Performance Tests for REGISTER Flooding 
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14.6.3 Performance Test for INVITE Response Flooding 
The performance results for detecting INVITE Response flooding are provided in 
figure 14.15. The curve marked (□) represents the total delay (D) as calculated from 
equation 14.4, varies in the range of 1.97 to 8.98 ms.  
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Figure 14.15 Performance Tests for INVITE Response Flooding 
14.6.4 Performance Test for SQL Injection 
The practical performance results for the drop SQL injection are provided in figure 
14.16. The delay is between 2.63 ms and 10.34 ms for 10 to 150 SIP requests and 
responses. The total delay is expressed with equation 14.5. 
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Figure 14.16 Performance Test for SQL Injection 
14.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the testing and performance results of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system for IMS Application Servers are presented. The 
performance evaluation is performed at Open IMS Testbed. The attacks detection 
procedure is on-line and real-time. Therefore, the IDP-AS performance is very critical 
and should not affect the communication flow between client and IMS Application 
Server. The performance results showed that the total delay introduced by IDP-AS to 
process the SIP messages is about 10 ms.  
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Chapter  15  Comparison with Related 
Work     
15.1 Introduction    
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is new and emerging technology providing 
Fixed-Mobile Convergence (FMC) platform. It is passing through evolutionary and 
development phase. The 3GPP and TISPAN have not provided any solution for 
Denial-of-Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and abuse of 
IMS-based applications from malicious and legitimate users. The research community 
has concerns about the emerging security threats facing to emerging IP-based IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), Web 2.0, VoIP technologies. For example some of the 
comments and concerns are summarized as follows: 
• The 3GPP in TSG SA WG3 Security meeting [91] in 2003 have discussed and 
considered that Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are serious threats to IMS 
Core and IMS Application Servers.  
• The University of Southern California and VeriSign has published a white 
paper “Building a Security Framework for Delivery of Next Generation 
Network Services” in 2005 [92]. This report explores that the emerging 
security challenge are identity theft, services vulnerability and Internet based 
flooding attacks for NGN/IMS networks.  
• The INRIA Nancy Universités Centre de Recherché Grand Est., France, has 
published “New Frontier in VoIP Security, 2007” [93]. This study says that 
most of the VoIP Devices (e.g. Cisco IP/SIP Phone 7940/7960 & ASTERISK) 
are vulnerable to DoS and SQL-Injection. The research work is conducted in 
Madynes project. 
• The Georgia Technology Information Security Center (GTISC), USA, has 
published “Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2008” in October 2007 [94]. 
This report explores the alarming and emerging threats like Denial-of-Service 
(DoS), flooding attacks, SQL-Injection for emerging technologies e.g. IMS, 
VoIP, Web2.0 and Mobile Converged Networks.  
• The Sipera VIPER™ (Voice over IP Exploitation Research) Lab [95]has 
identified over 90 major classes of unique vulnerabilities and over 20 000 
attacks in the last 3 years that can be launched against IMS networks. These 
threats includes IMS framework-related vulnerabilities, SIP protocol 
vulnerabilities, VoIP, video, PoC, Messaging, Presence, Conferencing 
applications vulnerabilities and voice spam. 
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Only few researchers and communications organisations are working for the 
development on Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) for IMS. The well known 
research organizations working for the protection of IMS against Denial-of-Service 
(DoS)/Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks includes Verizon Advance IMS 
(A-IMS), Juniper Networks IDP, Acme Packet DoS Protector,  Fokus Fraunhofer 
VoIP Defender and Sipera IPCS (Internet Protocol Communications Security) etc. 
Their brief description of their work is as follows: 
15.2 Verizon –Advance IMS (A-IMS) Solution  
The Verizon is working on the Advances to IP Multimedia Subsystem (A-IMS) with 
its partners Cisco Systems, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nortel and QuelComm. 
The A-IMS is being developed to improve the shortcoming and deficiencies with the 
existing 3GPP2 MMD (Mobile Multimedia Domain) [3] standards. This new 
architecture has many new features like support of SIP and non SIP services, packet 
flow optimization and integrated end-to-end security etc [96].  
The security enhancements that A-IMS provides are substantial. The A-IMS 
integrates intrusion detection/prevention (IDS/IPS) and anti-malware into the network, 
and provides a separate Security Operations Center (SOC) [96] for real-time response 
to security threats.  
The development of IDP for IP Multimedia Subsystem is yet in proposal phase and it 
will be developed for 3GPP 2 IMS Architecture. It provides protection against 
DoS/DDoS attacks. Our solution is developed for 3GPP IMS Architecture and it focus 
on protecting against DoS/DDoS attacks as well as securing IMS services and 
applications from malicious and non-malicious users. 
15.3 Juniper IMS-IDP Solution 
Juniper Networks has developed T-Series, M-Series and E-Series routers and 
Integrated Security Gateways (ISGs). Theses routers and security gateways provide 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) solutions and resource and admission 
control policy to extend capabilities to further meet the needs of service providers 
while conforming to 3GPP and TISPAN standards [97].  
From security point of view, Juniper claims that their security gateways protect IMS 
services and applications by the Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system. 
They claim that their products protect SIP-based application servers and users from 
attacks, including SIP anomaly protection for zero-day attacks.  
This security solution is specific vendor based product and not open based. Our IDP is 
developed for research purpose as a part of Open IMS Playground [80]. 
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15.4 Acme Packet Solution 
The Acme Packet is working with IMS Enterprise (IMS-E) to develop IMS wirleline 
enterprise services. On security side, Acme Packet working on developing solution 
against Denial-of-service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) protection from both 
malicious attacks and non-malicious users. The solution will provide IMS core DoS 
prevention [98]. It focuses on SIP flooding and RTP attacks.  
This solution is like a firewall and deployed as session border control. It is not 
mentioned that the solution is real time. This security solution is also vendor specific 
and not available for open IMS research community. Our IMS Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention prototype is developed for IMS research and educational community to be 
extended for IMS security research work. 
15.5 VoIP Defender 
The VoIP Defender [99] is research project developed by Fraunhofer FOKUS Open 
Communication Institute Berlin [100] for VoIP infrastructure. It will officially release 
in 2007. This research work is the continuation of VoIP security project SNOCER 
(Low Cost Tool for Secure and Highly Available VoIP Communication Services). 
The VoIP Defender is generic security architecture to monitor, detect, analyze and 
counter attacks relevant for a SIP-based VoIP infrastructure. The architecture is 
scalable and can be easily extended with new detection algorithms. Analysis and 
traffic control can be performed from the SIP layer down to the transport, network and 
MAC layers. The VoIP Defender is designed to work fully transparent to clients and 
SIP servers. It performs attacks detection and analysis off-line.  
The project is not designed for IMS but in future there is possibility that it could be 
used for IMS infrastructure for detecting unknown attacks by using anomaly detection 
approach. As compared to VoIP Defender, the IMS-IDP approach is stateless and 
state-full misuse detection and prevention.  
15.6 Siemens Nokia IMS 5 Solution 
Siemens has released IMS 5 commercial product in 2007 [101] providing efficient 
Voice over IP (VoIP) services. The IMS 5.0 system consisting of the CFX-5000 and 
the CMS-8200, is integrated as the controlling core element of the IMS 5.0 mobile 
voice over IP solution. Related to IMS DoS attacks protection and prevention, 
Siemens claims that the P-CSCF supports a mechanism to detect attacks from a 
specific terminal identified by its IP address and port number based on pre-configured 
observation data. When a terminal has been identified as malicious, it is blocked from 
communicating with the P-CSCF for a configurable period of time. All active sessions 
of this UE shall be terminated by a network initiated deregistration. When at least one 
terminal has been blocked, the security center generates an alarm notifying the actual 
number of blocked endpoints. The blocking and unblocking of a terminal is logged in 
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a file. If it is a registered user, the IMPU is logged so that the operator can find out the 
identity of the malicious user [101]. This approach is applied at network layer but the 
performance results of adopted approach are yet not available. The provided solution 
is vendor specific and not available as open source for IMS research community as 
compared to our solution.  
15.7 Sipera IPCS (Internet Protocol Comm Security)  
The Sipera Voice over IP Exploitation Research (VIPER) Lab [95] is working over 
VoIP and IMS for the last three years to identify the new threats and to propose 
solutions to secure these technologies. They say “with the advent of new access 
technologies and devices, the probability of malicious attacks and service abuse of 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and other real-time, IP communications 
applications has increased significantly together with the increase in attack 
sophistication. All these developments are creating a new level of security 
requirements for the operator that go beyond anything they have deployed thus far and 
well beyond standard authentication and encryption mechanisms”. Their products are 
also Vendor Specified (IPCS 520 & IPCS 620). 
15.8 Open Source SNORT Intrusion Detection System 
Snort is open source, IP-based network IDS capable of performing packet logging and 
real-time traffic analysis. For intrusion prevention and detection, it utilizes rule-driven 
language, which combines signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods 
[102]. We have utilized Snort in IMS testbed environment but due to heavy weight 
protocol based architecture, it is not suitable for IMS. 
 
 
 
Chapter  16  Conclusion and Outlook 
16.1 Summary    
This chapter summarizes the research domain, solution and the results of this thesis. 
The objective of this work is to develop a “Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) 
framework for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)”. The SSP framework comprises two 
security levels. The level 1 integrated all the security solutions developed and 
recommended by IETF, 3GPP and TISPAN for IMS and IMS based Service Delivery 
Platform (SDP). The level 2 security focused on IMS security extension for Denial-of-
Service (DoS)/Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and misuse of IMS 
services. The first module of level 2 security solution presented the design and 
implementation of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) system for IMS 
core protection against DoS attacks. The second module of level 2 security solution 
presented the design, implementation and deployment of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system for IMS Application Server (AS) against misuses and 
fraud protection.  
The challenging aspect of this work has been the study and solution for the protection 
and securing the emerging IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS). The IMS is developed by 
3GPP for mobile domain and extended by TISPAN for fixed networks with a 
motivation of seamless Service Delivery Platform (SDP) for Fixed-Mobile 
Convergence (FMC). The IMS is an overlay technology on top of different access 
networking and emerging as the All-IP Network. On one side, IMS is fascinating 
approach to merge the fixed and mobile communication as well as voice and data 
networks on single platform. But on the other hand side with integration of different 
protocols, access networks and technologies, there are new security threats and 
vulnerabilities. The potential IMS security threats and challenges are from application 
layers protocols like Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), IP and transport layers 
protocols, and access networks. 
The IMS is SIP based architecture; therefore it is facing the same threats which any 
SIP based communication platform like Voice-over-IP (VoIP) has faced. The well-
known threats are the denial-of-service attacks on IMS core networks. The SIP 
REGISTER and SIP INVITE methods could be used to launch flooding attacks in 
IMS. The objectives of these attacks are to fall-down the IMS core entities especially 
P-CSCF. The Part-B described the procedures to launch these flooding attacks in IMS. 
The IMS Application Servers are service enabler providing value added services. 
These entities are loosely attached with IMS through ISC (IMS Service Control) 
interface. The IMS applications are managed and handled by these servers. Therefore, 
IMS AS security is a vital issue. The potential threats facing to IMS AS includes 
hacking of applications, accessing value added services without charges and 
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launching of DoS attacks to crumple the IMS enablers. The IMS potential security 
challenges and threats are presented in requirement analysis of this thesis.  
With the rapid development and innovation in IT filed, the new methods and 
techniques have been developed for easy development and efficient use of modern IT 
technologies. Now-a-days a person needs only know-how to use complex and 
sophisticated tools, devices and systems. Similarly most of the software and tools are 
available as open source for developing innovative and next generation applications. 
These easy and open based IT architectures are beneficial for hackers to launch 
complex nature of attacks even with limited knowledge of these technologies. The 
curves presented in figure 16.1 indicate that the new range of attacks and their 
complexities have increased with the passage of time and on the other side the 
attacker’s acquired knowledge to launch these sophisticated attacks has decreased 
sharply.  
 
Figure 16.1 Attacks Complexities verses Attacker Knowledge  
With increasing the complexity of these attacks, the old and existing security solutions 
are not enough to provide secure communication to users, protection of network 
resources and value added services. The research is going for developing new, 
efficient and reliable security mechanisms for the protection of data systems and 
information networks. Depending upon the nature of security attacks and 
vulnerabilities threats, the security protection solutions could be deployed at different 
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layers as depicted in figure 16.2. The IMS security solutions has also been deployed at 
different layers and levels to provide secure signalling and data flow among users and 
in different IMS domains for roaming traffic protection.      
 
Figure 16.2 Deployment of Security Mechanisms 
During the development and standardization of IMS, the 3GPP has challenged from 
different domains i.e. security, quality of service (QoS) and mobility management etc. 
For IMS security, the 3GPP focused to standardize the access security mechanisms 
and encryption algorithms. In this thesis our focus is to explore all possible IMS 
security mechanisms and propose a comprehensive security architecture that can be 
used to secure Open IMS Fraunhofer Testbed.  This IMS level 1 security solutions 
focused on user’s authentication before accessing the IMS resources, key generation 
and management, confidentiality and integrity protection which are achieved by 
utilizing IPsec ESP ( IP Security – Encapsulated Security Payload). This procedure is 
explained in chapter 5.  
The Network Domain Security (NDS) is the next objective of IMS security 
architecture. The NDS is achieved by security gateways which are responsible to 
implement PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) Authentication Framework (AF) as 
explained in chapter 6, to implement security when user is roaming. 
The IMS HTTP-based applications are addressed by IMS Application Server (AS) 
through Ut interface. The Authentication Proxy (AP) is responsible to secure these 
services. This security is achieved by implementing Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA) as an extension to Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) to 
authorize users to access services and implementing TLS (Transport Layer Security) 
to provide secure communication channel. The use of GBA is explained in Part-C. 
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The major contribution of this thesis has been the IMS security extension as level 2 
security solution. This level 2 security extension focused on the detection and 
mitigation of those threats and vulnerabilities which are not addressed by the standard 
bodies. These threats are the denial-of-service attacks and fraud control in IMS. The 
development of level 2 security extension has been divided into two modules; one is 
focusing the IMS core protection from flooding attacks and the second is protecting 
the IMS services against misuses. 
The Part-D of the dissertation focused on the protection of IMS core entities from SIP 
REGISTER and SIP INVITE flooding attacks. The security solution based on the 
development of Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) system within P-
CSCF to detect and mitigate the DoS flooding attacks. The prototype is implemented 
in C/C++ and the results are validated and verified at Open IMS FOKUS Testbed. 
The IDP-Core performs real time and online detection and prevention processing in 
two modes i.e. normal and overload. In normal mode, it checks the SIP message 
tampering attacks like SQL-injection, and in overload, it detects and mitigates the SIP 
flooding attacks. To block the address of an attacker for a defined time interval, the 
IPtable is utilized. The IDP-Core is a stateless module. The processing delay and 
overhead of developed prototype is very small (in the range of 1-2 ms). This proves 
that IDP-Core is light weight component and does not affect the communication flow. 
Therefore, it could be utilized and deployed in real world IMS scenarios. After the 
deployment of this module, the Open IMS core is considered a secure from DoS 
flooding attacks. The IDP-Core design, attacks detection algorithm, implementation 
and performance evaluation are presented in Part-D.        
In the context of IMS security extension, the next module focused on the protection of 
misuses of IMS applications form legitimate as well as illegitimate users. These 
applications could be secured with the deployment of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention (IDP-AS) system. The IDP-AS prototype based on SIPSEE (SIP Servlet 
Execution Environment); an IMS Application Server developed by Fraunhofer 
FOKUS Institute. The IDP-AS is developed in Java within IMS AS. It provides 
stateful misuses of IMS applications and services. It processes all SIP messages that 
flow between S-CSCF and IMS AS to secure ISC interface. It performs real time and 
online processing. The attacks rules are developed in XML and loaded runtime. The 
IDP-AS compares both the SIP messages and state of partner against defined attacks 
rules. The performance evaluations showed that the total delay introduced by IDP-AS 
is less than 10 ms.   
This Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) framework is developed for IMS research 
community, working for the development of secure, reliable and efficient next 
generation applications and services. This work is validated at Open IMS Fraunhofer 
NGNI Testbed which is a well-know research activity platform for multi-national 
research community through out the world. The academia, scientists, engineers and IT 
industrial community could get benefit from this research work by developing new 
and innovative IMS based applications like IPTV, push-to-talk, conferencing and 
presence etc. in a secure and protected environment.    
This research work could be justified with a successful track of publications that are 
achieved during the development of SSP framework for IMS. From the start to the last 
stage of this work different security issues and ideas are raised and a step wise state of 
the art approach is adopted. At every step in carrying this research, the state of the art 
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solution is presented and justified in particular article or paper in a reputed and 
refereed journal and/or well-known IEEE/IFIP/ACM international IT security and 
communication conferences. The list of publications is attached at the end of this 
dissertation under “Own Related Publications”. 
16.2   Outlook   
This section explores those issues that have not been addressed in detail within this 
work and/or have been raised during this work. These issues have been declared to be 
out of the scope of this thesis, outlining the basis for future work. The significant 
contribution of Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) framework was the protection of 
IMS from SIP flooding attacks and fraud protection of misuses of IMS applications. 
For that purposes, two modules – IDP-Core and IDP-AS – have been developed. In 
the following the future enhancements and directions are explained separately for 
each module.  
16.2.1 IDP-Core Future Recommendations  
The future recommendations for Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP-Core) for 
IMS core are the following: 
• In the development process of IDP-Core, the blacklist approach is used to 
block the attacker for launching the SIP flooding attacks. This approach is 
suitable for preventing DoS attacks. The use of blacklist approach is not 
considered an efficient approach for the protection of distributed DoS attacks 
due to increase of fake and spoofed addresses list. The future enhancement of 
this module is to extend the blocking procedure with additional approach for 
efficient protection of distributed DoS and reflected distributed DoS attacks. 
• The IDP-Core does not provide protection against flooding attack at normal 
CPU load. In normal CPU load, it only checks the SIP message flow attacks 
like SQL-injection. The flooding attacks prevention in normal load condition 
could be extended in future. But this problem is not very serious because at 
normal load there are no serious threats of DoS. 
• At present, the flooding detection algorithm of IDP-Core based on CPU load 
monitoring of P-CSCF. The other flooding resources are not addressed. In 
future, the detection procedure could be extended to monitor flooding other 
IMS resources like memory, buffers and bandwidth.  
• The IDP-Core has been deployed as a module of P-CSCF, but in future, it 
could be separated from P-CSCF and could be developed as independent and 
stand alone IMS component with new interface with P-CSCF.  
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16.2.2   IDP-AS Future Recommendations  
The future recommendations and enhancements of Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
(IDP-AS) for IMS Application Server are the following:  
• The IDP-AS compares each SIP message (from and to the Application Server) 
and state of the partner with attacks rules contained in Rule Collection. At 
present, only SQL-injection attacks are developed in the category of time-
independent attacks. In future, more attacks patterns and rules could be 
developed to cover SIP message flow attacks and complex fraud scenarios.  
• If there is any change in the definition of rule or new rule is developed, this 
leads to change the source code of IDP-AS. The future enhancement of IDP-
AS in this context is that the system should adapt the new attacks description 
without modifying the source code.  
• The current IDP-AS is not portable. It is developed within IMS Application 
Server. The final goal is to make the IDP-AS separate from the source code of 
AS to make it portable. 
• The developed prototype only maintains and monitors communication 
partner’s states. The relationships or dependencies among partners are not 
developed, therefore the IDP-AS may not be able to effectively detect the 
distributed DoS attacks. The future extension of IDP-AS could be the 
implementation of dependencies among partners for effective control of 
distributed DoS attacks.   
The Secure Service Provisioning (SSP) framework for IMS is a first initiative and 
state-of-the-art solution to provide secure and protected IMS environment against SIP 
REGISTER and INVITE flooding attacks and fraud control. This work is an initiative 
for the standardization of DoS attacks protection in IP Multimedia Subsystem. This 
developed prototype is available as open source as a part of Open Source IMS 
FOKUS Testbed for IMS research community for the development of fancy and 
innovative next generation IMS secure applications.    
 
 
Acronyms  
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project  
3GPP2 Third Generation Partnership Project 2 
AAA Authentication, Authorisation, and Accounting  
AES Advanced Encryption Standard 
AH Authentication Header 
A-IMS Advances in IP Multimedia Subsystem 
AIN Advanced Intelligent Network  
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
AP Authentication Proxy 
APIs Application Programming Interfaces  
AS Application Server  
AuC Authentication Centre 
AUTN Authentication Token 
AV Authentication Function 
B2BUAs Back To Back User Agents 
BGCF Border Gateway Control Function  
BSF Bootstrapping Server Function 
B-TID Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier 
CA Certification Authority  
CAMEL Customized Applications for Mobile Enhanced Logic  
CAP CAMEL Application Protocol 
CBC Cipher Block Code 
CGI Common Gateway Interface 
CK Cipher Key 
COPS Common Open Policy Service 
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
CPL Call Programming Language  
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CRLs Certificate Revocation Lists  
CS Circuit Switched 
CSCFs Call State Control Functions  
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                            Acronyms 
 
186 
CSE CAMEL Support Environment 
DCA Domain Certificate Authority 
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks 
DES Data Encryption Standard 
DNS Domain Name Server 
DOM Document Object Model 
DoS Denial of Service 
DSS1 Digital Subscriber Signalling #1 
EAI Enterprise Application Integration  
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload 
FMC  Fixed Mobile Convergence  
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name 
GAA Generic Authentication Architecture 
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
GGSN GPRS Serving Node  
GPRS General Packet Radio System  
GSM Global System for Mobile 
GUSS GBA User Security Settings 
HE Home Environment 
HLR Home Location Register 
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code 
HSS Home Subscriber Server  
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS HTTP – Secure ( HTTP over TLS) 
ICMP  Internet Control Message Protocol  
ICSCF Interrogating Call State Control Function  
I-CSCF Interrogating Call State Control Function  
ICV Integrity Check Value 
ID Identity 
IDP Intrusion Detection and Prevention  
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IK Integrity Key 
IKE Internet Key Exchange 
IM Instant Messaging/IP Multimedia  
Acronyms                                                                                                             SSP Framework for IMS 
 
187 
IMPI IP Multimedia Private Identity  
IMPU IP Multimedia Public Identity  
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem  
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
IN Intelligent Network  
INAP IN Application Protocol 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPsec IP Security 
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
ISC IP Multimedia Service Control 
ISG Integrated Security Gateway 
ISIM IP Multimedia Services Identity Module 
ISIM IM Service Identity Module 
ISPs Internet Service Providers  
ISUP ISDN User Part  
IT Information Technology 
ITU-T International Telecommunications Union 
J2EE Java 2 Enterprise Edition  
JAIN Java APIs for Integrated Networks  
JCP Java Community Process 
Ks Session Key 
LAI Location Area Identification 
LCA Local Certificate Authority 
MAP Mobile Application Protocol  
MCSF Microsoft Connected Service Framework 
MD Message Digest 
ME Mobile Equipment 
MG Media Gate 
MMD Mobile Multimedia Domain 
MRF Media Resource Function  
MRFC Media Resource Function Controller 
MRFP Media Resource Function Processor 
NAF Network Authentication Function 
NDS/AF Network Domain Security / Authentication Framework 
NDS/IP Network Domain Security / IP network layer security 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                            Acronyms 
 
188 
NGN Next Generation Network 
NGNI Next Generation Network Integration  
OMA Open Mobile Alliance 
OSA Open Service Access  
OSE Open Service Environment 
P-CSCF Proxy Call State Control Function  
PDP Packet Data Protocol  
PDP Policy Decision Point 
PEP Policy Enforcement Point 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
PoC PPT over Cellular 
POTS Plain Old Telephony Service 
PS Packet Switched 
PSK Pre-Shared Key 
PTT Push To Talk  
QoS Quality of Service 
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service 
RAN Radio Access Network 
RAND Random number 
RDDOS Reflected Distributed Denial-of-Service 
RES Response 
RFC Request For Comments 
RNC Radio Network Controller 
RPC Remote Procedure Call 
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol  
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol  
SA Security Association 
SAD Security Associations Database 
SBLP Service Based Local Policy 
SCPs Service Control Points  
S-CSCF Serving Call State Control Function  
SDP Service Delivery Platform  
SEG Security Gateway 
SER SIP Express Router 
SFTF SIP Forum Test Framework 
Acronyms                                                                                                             SSP Framework for IMS 
 
189 
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node 
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm 
SIBs Service Building Blocks  
SIP Session Initiation Protocol  
SIP-Sec-Agree SIP Security Agreement 
SIPSEE SIP Servlet Execution Environment 
SLEE Service Logic Execution Environment 
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol 
SOC Security Operation Centre 
SPA Service Provider Access  
SPAN Service Provider Access Networks 
SPD Security Policy Database 
SPI Security Parameter Index 
SS7 Signalling System Number 7  
SSP  Secure Service Provisioning 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TD Time Dependent 
TI Time Independent 
TINA  Telecommunications Information Networking Architecture 
TISPAN Telecoms & Internet converged Services & Protocols for 
Advanced Networks 
TLS  Transport Layer Security 
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
UAC User Agent Client 
UAs User Agents 
UAS User Agent Server 
UDP User Datagram Protocol 
UE User Equipment 
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication Standard  
URI Uniform Resource Locator  
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module  
VHE Virtual Home Environment  
VLR Visited Location Register 
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol  
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                            Acronyms 
 
190 
WAP Wireless Application Protocol 
WIN Wireless Intelligent Networks  
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
WSDL Web Service Description Language  
XML eXtensible Markup Language  
XRES Expected Response 
References and Bibliography 
 
[1] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects, 3GPP, TS 23.228 V6.7.0 (2004-09), “IP Multimedia Subsystems 
(IMS)”. 
[2] Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). www.3gpp.org/ 
[3] Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2).  www.3gpp2.org/ 
[4] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson, R. Sparks, M. 
Handley, E. Schooler, “SIP: Session Initiation Protocol”, IETF RFC 3261 (June 2002). 
[5] P. Calhoun, J. Loughney, E. Guttman, G. Zorn, J. Arkko, “Diameter Base Protocol”, 
IETF RFC 3588 (Sep. 2003). 
[6] Angelo Morelli, “The Role of a Service Delivery Platform in the Battle for New 
Communication Revenues”, Outlook Point of View, March 2006. 
[7] M. Poikselkae, G. Mayer, H. Khartabil, A. Niemi, “The IMS, IP Multimedia Concepts 
and Services in the Mobile Domain” ISBN 0-470-87133-X, John Willey & Sons Ltd. 
West Sussex, England, 2004. 
[8] M. Sher, F. Gouveia, T. Magedanz, “IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for Emerging 
All-IP Networks”, Encyclopaedia of Internet Technologies and Applications” Pub. IGI 
Global, formerly Idea Group Inc. 701 East Chocolate Avenue, Suite 100, Hershey,  PA 
17033-1240, USA, 2007.   
[9] ETSI TISPAN (Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for 
Advanced Networking) WG. http://portal.etsi.org/tispan/ 
[10] UMTS Forum, http://www.umts-forum.org/ 
[11] DSL Forum, http://www.dslforum.org/ 
[12] Fixed-Mobile Convergence (FMC) Alliance, http://www.thefmca.com/ 
[13] ETSI Mobile Competence Centre, “Overview of 3GPP Release 5, Summary of all 
Release 5 Features”, 2003. http://www.3gpp.org/specs/releases-
contents.htm#3GRelease5 
[14] ETSI Mobile Competence Centre, “Overview of 3GPP Release 6, Summary of all 
Release 6 Features”, 2006. http://www.3gpp.org/specs/releases-
contents.htm#3GRelease6. 
[15] D. Geneiatakis, T. Dagiuklas, G. Kambourakis, C. Lambbrinoudakis, S. Gritizalis, S. 
Ehlert, D. Sisalem, “Survey of Security Vulnerabilities in SIP Protocol”, IEEE 
Communication Surveys Volume 8, No.3 ISBN 1553-877X, pp 68-81, 2006. 
[16] T. Magedanz, K. Knüttel, D. Witszek: “The IMS Playground @ Fokus – an Open 
Testbed for Next Generation Network Multimedia Services”,  1st Int. IFIP Conference 
on Testbeds and Research Infrastructures for the Development of Networks and 
Communities (Tridentcom), Trento, Italian, February 23 - 25, 2005, Proceedings pp. 2 
– 11, IBSN 0-7695-2219-x, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, California.  
[17] H. Schulzrinne, S. Casner, R. Frederick, V. Jacobson, “RFC 3550 RTP -A Transport 
Protocol for Real-Time Applications”, July 2003. 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                           References 
 
192 
[18] E. Rescorla, “HTTP over TLS, IEFT RFC 2818” May 2000. 
[19] J. Klensin, Ed., “Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, IETF RFC 2821”, April 2001. 
[20] IETF AAA Working Group, “IETF Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA) Working Group”, (Accessed 2007), http://ch.tudelft.nl/~arthur/aaa/links.html. 
[21] C. Rigney, S. Willens, A. Rubens, W. Simpson, “Remote Authentication Dial In User 
Service (RADIUS), IETF RFC 2865, June 2000. 
[22] J. Loughney - “Diameter Command Codes for Third Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP) Release 5", RFC 3589, September 2003.  
[23] S. Bellovin, J. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, R. Stewart, “On the Use of Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPSec”, IETF, RFC 3554, July 2003.  
[24] T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic 
Syntax, IETF RFC 3986” January 2005.   
[25] Third Generation Partnership Project, Technical Specification, “3GPP, TS 29.208, End-
to-end Quality of Service (QoS) Signalling Flows”, March 2006. 
[26] Gonzalo Camarillo, Miguel A. Garcia-Martin, “The 3G IP Multimedia Subsystem 
(IMS) – Merging the Internet and the Cellular Worlds”, 2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. ISBN-13: 978-0-470-01818-7, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West 
Sussex, England, 2006.  
[27] T. Magedanz, M. Sher, “IT-based Open Service Delivery Platforms for Mobile 
Networks -From CAMEL to the IP Multimedia System”, chapter of “Mobile 
Middleware” book, ISBN: 0849338336, edited by P. Bellavista and A. Corradi 
published by Chapman & Hall/CRC Press, 2006.  
[28] OSA/Parlay “Parlay Open Service Architecture”, http://www.parlay.org/en/index.asp. 
[29] Magedanz, T., Popescu-Zeletin, R., "Intelligent Networks - Basic Technology, 
Standards and Evolution", International Thomson Computer Press, ISBN: 1-85032-
293-7, London, UK, June 1996. 
[30] Open Mobile Alliance “OMA the leading industry forum for developing market driven, 
interoperable mobile service enablers”, http://www.openmobilealliance.org/ 
[31] Third Generation Partnership Project, “Presence Service, Architecture and Functional 
Description (Release 6)”, 3GPP TR 23.841, V6.0.0. (2002-07). 
[32] N. Blum, T. Magedanz: “'Push-To-Video as a platform for NGN Services”, 11th 
European Wireless 2005 - "Next Generation Wireless and Mobile Communications and 
Services", Nicosia, Cyprus, April 10-13, 2005.  
[33] K. Knuettel, T. Magedanz, L. Xie, “SIP Servlet Execution Environment (SIPSEE) - An 
IMS / NGN SIP AS for Converged Applications”, ICIN07 Conference, Bordeaux, 
France, 2006.  
[34] Thomas Magedanz, “Tutorial IEEE ISCC, IEEE Symposium on Computer and 
Communications”, Spain, 27 June 2005.  
[35] Ravi Jain, John-Luc Bakker, Farooq Anjum, “Programming Converged Networks – 
Call Control in Java, XML, and Parlay/OSA”, ISBN 0-471-26801-1, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA, 2005. 
[36] R. Bonica, D. Gan, D. Tappan, C. Pignataro, “Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part 
Messages, IETF RFC 4884”, 2007. 
[37] Yu-Sung Wu, Saurabh Bagchi, Schin Garg, Navjot Singh, Tim Tsai, SCIDIVE: A 
References                                                                                                            SSP Framework for IMS 
 
193 
Stateful and Cross Protocol Intrusion Detection Architecture for Voice-over-IP 
Environments, 2004. 
[38] M. Zhang, Y. Fang, “Security Analysis and Enhancement of 3GPP Authentication and 
Key Agreement Protocol”, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communication Vol. 4, No. 
2, ISBN 1536-1276, March 2005. 
[39] “Low Cost Tools for Secure and Highly Available VoIP Communication Services 
(SNOCER)”, A research project supported within the Sixth Framework Programme of 
the EU Commission” 2005, http://www.snocer.org. 
[40] A. Niemi, J. Arkko, V. Torvinen, "HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA", 
IETF RFC 3310 (2002). 
[41] Chen, E.Y., “Detecting DoS attacks on SIP systems,” IEEE Workshop on VoIP 
Management and Security, Page(s):53 – 58, April 2006. 
[42] M. Sher, S. Wu, T. Magedanz, “Security Threats and Solutions for Application Server 
of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS-AS)”, IEEE/IST Workshop on Monitoring, Attack 
Detection and Mitigation. MonAM06 Proc. IEEE/IST, ISBN: 3-937201-02-5, ISSN: 
1862-7803, Diadem Firewall Project (FP6 IST-2002-002154), pp 38-44, Tuebingen, 
Germany, September 28-29, 2006. http://www.diadem-firewall.org/workshop06/ 
[43] R. Sparks, “The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Referred-By Mechanism”, IETF RFC 
3892, September 2004. 
[44] Third Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture (Release 6); 3GPP, TS 33.102 V6 
(2004).  
[45] V. Gurbani, A. Jeffrey, draft-gurbani-sip-tls-use-00: The Use of Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), February 2006. 
[46] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, “Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol”, IETF RFC 
2401, (Nov 1998). 
[47] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Development of IMS Privacy & Security Management 
Framework for FOKUS Open IMS Testbed”, Journal of Mobile Multimedia, Vol. 2, 
No.3 (2006) 225-258, ISSN: 1550-4646 © Rinton Press. 
http://www.rintonpress.com/journals/jmm/ 
[48] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects, 3GPP, TS 33.210, Network Domain Security (NDS); IP Network 
Layer Security V6.5.0 (2004-06).  
[49] Third Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping 
Architecture (GBA) (Release 7), 3GPP TS 33.220 V7 (2005).  
[50] Third Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to Network 
Application Functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security 
(HTTPS) (Release 7), 3GPP TS 33.222 V7 (2005).  
[51] Vignal Giovanni et al, A Stateful Intrusion Detection System for World-Wide Web 
Servers (WEBSTAT), 2003. 
[52] SIPSEE (SIP Servlet Execution Environment) is the FOKUS development of a SIP 
Application Server (SIP AS) based on SIP Servlet Technology, 2006, 
http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/bereichsseiten/testbeds/ims_playground/components/si
psee.php 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                           References 
 
194 
[53] Jetty, an Open Source, Standards-based, Full-featured Web Server, 
http://jetty.mortbay.org/jetty/index.html. 
[54] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects, 3G Security; “Access Security for IP-based services (Release 6)”, 
3GPP, TS 33.203 V6.4.0 (2004-09). 
[55] S. Kent, K. Seo, “Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol”, IETF RFC 4301, 
December 2005. 
[56] J. Arkko, V. Torvinen, G. Camarillo, A. Niemi, T. Haukka, “Security Mechanism 
Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)”, IETF RFC 3329, January 2003. 
[57] S. Kent, “IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)”, IETF RFC 4303, December 2005. 
[58] C. Madson, R. Glenn, “The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH”, 
IETF RFC 2403 (1998). 
[59] C. Madson, R. Glenn, “The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH”, 
IETF RFC 2404 (1998). 
[60] V. Niemi, K. Nyberg, “UMTS Security” ISBN 0-470-85314-X, John Willey & Sons 
Ltd. West Sussex, England, 2003.  
[61] R. Pereira, R. Adams, “The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms” IETF RFC 2451, 
November, 1998. 
[62] S. Frankel, R. Glenn, S. Kelly, “The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with 
IPSec” IETF RFC 3602, September, 2003.  
[63] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and 
System Aspects, 3GPP, TS 33.210, Network Domain Security (NDS); IP Network 
Layer Security V6.5.0 (2004-06).  
[64] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, W.T. Walter, "Inter-Domains Security Management (IDSM) 
Model for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)", IEEE 1st Int. Conference on Availability, 
Reliability & Security, Vienna, Austria, 20th-22nd April 2006. IEEE/ARES2006 
Proceeding ISBN 978-0-7695-2567-9, pp. 502-509, April 2006.   
[65] C. Kaufman, Ed. “Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, IETF, RFC 4306”, 
December 2005. 
[66] D. Maughan, M. Schertler, M. Schneider, J. Turner, IETF, RFC 2408, “ISAKMP: 
Internet Security Associations and Key Management Protocol”.  
[67] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Developing Network Domain Security (NDS) Model for IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)”, Journal of Networks, Vol.1, No.6, 
November/December 2006, pp.10-17,  ISSN: 1796-2056 © Academy Publisher, Oulu, 
Finland, 2006. 
[68] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification, “Network Domain 
Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) Release 7” TS 33.310 V7.1.0 (2006-
09).  
[69] P. Karn, P. Metzger, W. Simpson, “The ESP Triple DES (3DES) Transform, IETF, 
RFC 1851”, 1995.  
[70] William Stallings, “Cryptography and Network Security”, 4th Edition, ISBN 
0131873164, Prentice Hall, 2005.  
[71] R. Rivest, IETF RFC 1321, “MD5: Message Digest Algorithm”, April 1992.  
[72] D. Piper, IETF RFC 2407, “The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for 
References                                                                                                            SSP Framework for IMS 
 
195 
ISAKMP” November 1998.  
[73] S. Kiran, P. Lareau, S. Lloyad, “PKI Basics – A Technical Perspective”, November 
2002. http://www.oasis-pki.org/pdfs/PKI_Basics-A_technical_perspective.pdf. 
[74] S. Santesson, R. Housley, IETF RFC 4325, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
Authority Information Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extension” 2005.  
[75] R. Housley, W. Polk, W. Ford, D. Solo, IETF RFC 3280, “Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile”, April 2002.  
[76] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification, “Generic Authentication 
Architecture (GAA); Early Implementation of HTTPS Connection between a Universal 
Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) and Network Application Function (NAF) (Release 7)”, 
3GPP TR 33.918 V7 (2005).  
[77] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification, “Universal Subscriber 
Identity Module (USIM) Application Toolkit (USAT) (Release 7)”, 3GPP TS 31.111 
V7 (2005).  
[78] Third Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification, “3G Security; 
Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: An example algorithm set for the 
3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; 
Document 2: Algorithm specification", 3GPP TS 35.206 V 6.0.0, 2004. 
[79] Open Source IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Core, official released in 2006. 
http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/ngni/topics/ims_core.php 
[80] Open IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Playground, 2003-2007,  
http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/ims/index.php?lang=en 
[81] SIP Express Router (SER), 2001-2007,  http://www.iptel.org/ser/ 
[82] Linux Overall System Resources Utilization, http://www.linuxjournal.com/ 
[83] Firewall Protection Using IPtables, “The Netfilter Webmaster”, 1999-2007. 
http://www.netfilter.org/ 
[84] IMS Client Developed by UCT/FOKUS, 2006, http://uctimsclient.berlios.de/ 
[85] Open Source SIP Test Tool, http://sipp.sourceforge.net/ 
[86] Third Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification, “Sh Interface based on 
the Diameter Protocol (Release 7)”, 3GPP TS 29.329 V 7.3.0. (2006-09).  
[87] 3Gb National Host “Third Generation and beyond Testbed”, 2003. 
http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/bereichsseiten/testbeds/national_host/testbed/testbed.p
hp?lang=en 
[88] K. Knuttel, T. Magedanz, L. Xie, “SIP Servlet Execution Environment (SIPSEE) – An 
IMS / NGN SIP AS for Converged Application”, International Conference on 
Intelligence in Networks, ICIN, Bordeaux, France, 2006. 
[89] Yu-Sung Wu, Saurabh Bagchi, Schin Garg, Navjot Singh, Tim Tsai, SCIDIVE: A 
Stateful and Cross Protocol Intrusion Detection Architecture for Voice-over-IP 
Environments, 2004. 
[90] SIP Forum Test Framework (SFTF), “A Testing Software for SIP”, January 2007. 
http://www.sipfoundry.org/sip-forum-test-framework/sip-forum-test-framework-
sftf.html 
[91] The 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security, “Proposed Confidentiality for IMS” Sophia-
Antipolis, France, 2003. 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                                           References 
 
196 
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/TSGS3_27_Sophia_Antipolis/Docs/PD
F/S3-030149.pdf 
[92] The University of Southern California and VeriSign “Building a Security Framework 
for Delivery of Next Generation Network Services” 2005. 
http://www.verisign.com/static/035478.pdf 
[93] Radu State, “New Frontier in VoIP Security” and “Building Management and Security 
Solutions of Tomorrow’s Internet” Madynes Research Project, INRIA Nancy 
Universités Centre de Recherché Grand Est., France, 2007. http://madynes.loria.fr/ 
[94] The Georgia Technology Information Security Center (GTISC), “Emerging Cyber 
Threats Report for 2008” USA, October 2007.  
http://www.gtisc.gatech.edu/pdf/GTISC%20Cyber%20Threats%20Report.pdf 
[95] Sipera Technical Security Report, “Protecting IMS Netwroks from Attacks: Operators 
Need More than Encryption and Authentication” 2007. http://www.sipera.com. 
[96] Verizon and Cisco, “Advances to IP Multimedia Subsystem (A-IMS) Architecture, 
White Paper”, June 2006. http://www.voip-magazine.com/content/view/4212/ 
[97] Juniper Networks, “ Solution Brief – How Juniper Networks Enables Intelligent, 
Secure, and Open IMS-FMC Networks”, September 2006, 
http://www.juniper.net/solutions/literature/solutionbriefs/351218.pdf 
[98] Aceme Packet, “DoS/DDoS Protection for IMS Core Elements”, June 2007. 
http://www.acmepacket.com/html/page.asp?PageID=%7B51CB22C4-7243-43D1-
9847-6253984B1671%7D 
[99] J. Fiedler, T. Kupka, S. Ehlert, T. Magedanz, D. Sisalem, “VoIP Defender: Highly 
Scalable SIP-based Security Architecture”, IPComm, New York, USA, 2007. 
http://iptcomm.org/ 
[100] Fraunhofer FOKUS Open Research Communication Institute, Berlin, 
http://www.fokus.fraunhofer.de/home/index.php?lang=en 
[101] Nokia Siemens Networks, “IMS Technical Description and Information” A50016-
D3605-X20-1-7618, Id: 0900d80580129f8e, 2007. 
[102] Open Source Network and IP Based Intrusion Detection System, SNORT 2005-2006. 
www.snort.org 
Own Related Publications 
 
A. Books Chapters and Encyclopedia Contribution 
[1] M. Sher, T. Magedanz “IMS – A Secure Architecture for All IP Networks”, IMS 
Handbook: Concepts, Technologies, and Services (Chapter 1), Editors: Syed Ahson, 
iDEN Mobile Devices and Emerging Standards Motorola Inc. Plantation, Florida, 
33322 and Mohammad Ilyas, College of Engineering & Computer Science, Florida 
Atlantic University Boca Rato, Florida 33431, © Taylor & Francis CRC Press, NW, 
FL 33487, USA, (Accepted) 2008. 
[2] M. Sher, F. C. Gouveia, T. Magedanz, “IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for 
Emerging All-IP Networks”, Encyclopedia of Internet Technologies and Applications, 
ISBN: 978-1-59140-993-9, pp 249-256, Mário Freire and Manuela Pereira (editors), 
IGI Global - Information Science Reference (publisher), Hershey, New York, USA, 
August 2007. http://www.igi-global.com/reference/details.asp?id=6925 
[3] T. Magedanz, M. Sher, “IT-Based Open Service Delivery Platforms for Mobile 
Networks: From CAMEL to the IP Multimedia System”, The Handbook of Mobile 
Middleware (chapter 37), Paolo Bellavista and Antonio Corradi (editors), Cat. # 
AU3833, ISBN: 0849338336, pp 1001-1037, October 2006, © Taylor & Francis CRC 
Press, NW, FL 33487, USA, 2006. 
http://www.crcpress.com/shopping_cart/products/product_detail.asp?id=&parent_id=
&sku=AU3833&pc= 
A. Journals Publications 
[4] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Developing Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) System 
for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Application Servers”, Journal of Information 
Assurance and Security (JIAS), ISSN: 1554-1010, © Dynamic Publisher Inc. Atlanta, 
GA 30362-0654, USA (Accepted), 2008. http://www.softcomputing.net/jias/ 
[5] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “A Vulnerabilities Analysis and Corresponding Middleware 
Security Extensions for Securing NGN Applications”, Elsevier Journal of Computer 
Network, Special Issue on (1) Innovation in Web Communication Infrastructure; (2) 
Middleware Challenges for Next Generation Networks and Services, ISSN: 1389-
1286, Volume 51, Issue 16, pp 4697-4709, Science Direct and Elsevier Publishers, 14 
November 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2007.06.011 
[6] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Secure Access to IMS Services Based on Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) for Next Generation Networks”, International 
Engineering Consortium (IEC) Comprehensive Technical Report on “Business 
Models and Drivers for Next Generation IMS Services”, ISBN: 978-1-931695-55-8, 
pp 249-260, Senior editor: André Sulluchuco, @ IEC, Chicago, USA, May 2007. 
http://www.iec.org/pubs/ 
[7] M. Sher, T. Magedanz: "Security Associations Management (SAM) Model for IP 
Multimedia System", in IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, 
Volume 229, Network Control and Engineering for QoS, Security and Mobility, IV, 
ed. D. Gaiiti, ISSN: 1571-5736 / 1861-2288 (Internet), ISBN: 10: 0-387-49689-0, 
ISBN: 13: 978-0-387-49689-4, pp. 311-325, Springer-Boston, March 2007.  
http://www.springerlink.com/content/pm825g412684pg85/ 
SSP Framework for IMS                                                                                    Own Related Publications 
 
198 
[8] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Developing Network Domain Security (NDS) Model for IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)”, Journal of Networks, ISSN: 1796-2056, Vol.1, No.6, 
pp.10-17, © Academy Publisher, Oulu, Finland, November/December 2006. 
http://www.academypublisher.com/jnw/index.html 
[9] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Development of IMS Privacy & Security Management 
Framework for FOKUS Open IMS Testbed”, Journal of Mobile Multimedia, IP 
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), Vol. 2, No.3, 225-258, ISSN: 1550-4646 © Rinton 
Press, Inc., New Jersey, USA, September 2006. 
http://www.rintonpress.com/journals/jmm/ 
B. International Conferences, Symposiums and Workshops Proceedings   
[10] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “SQL Injection and Password Guessing Detection and 
Mitigation for Next Generation IMS”, IEEE Workshop on Monitoring, Attack 
Detection and Mitigation, MonAM07 Proc. IEEE, ISBN: 978-1-4244-1842-8, ISSN: 
1862-7803, pp 59-64, LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, France, 5-6 November 2007. 
http://www.laas.fr/MonAM2007/ 
[11] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Mobile Multimedia Broadcasting Vulnerability Threats, 
Attacks and Security Solutions”, IFIP/IEEE 9th International Conference on Mobile  
and Wireless Communications Networks, MWCN07 Proc. IEEE, ISBN: 978-1-4244-
1719-3, pp 56-60, Cork, Ireland, 19-21 September 2007.  http://www.mwcn2007.org/ 
[12] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Protecting IP Multimedia Subsystem Service Delivery 
Platform from Time Independent Attacks”, IEEE Third International Symposium on 
Information Assurance and Security, IAS 2007 Proc. IEEE, ISBN: 0-7695-2876-7, pp 
171-176, Manchester, United Kingdom, 29-31 August 2007. http://www.ias07.org/ 
[13] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, "3G-WLAN Convergence: Vulnerability, Attacks Possibilities 
and Security Management Model”, IEEE/International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability & Security organized by Dexa Association & ENISA (European Network 
and Information Security). ARES 2007 Proc. IEEE, ISBN: 0-7695-2775-2, pp 198-
205, Vienna, Austria, April 10-13, 2007.  http://www.ares-conf.org. 
[14] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, “Secure Access to IP Multimedia Services Using Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) for 3G & Beyond Mobile Networks”, 2nd ACM 
International Workshop on QoS and Security for Wireless and Mobile Networks 
(Q2SWinet 2006), in conjunction with 9th ACM/IEEE International Symposium on 
Modeling, Analysis, Simulation of Wireless and Mobile System. Q2SWinet06 Proc. 
ACM, ISBN: 1-59593-486-3 pp 17-24, Torremolinos, Malaga, Spain, October 2-6, 
2006.  http://www.cs.unibo.it/mswim2006/ 
[15] M. Sher, S. Wu, T. Magedanz, “Security Threats and Solutions for Application Server 
of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS-AS)”, IEEE/IST Workshop on Monitoring, Attack 
Detection and Mitigation. MonAM06 Proc. IEEE/IST, ISBN: 3-937201-02-5, ISSN: 
1862-7803, Diadem Firewall Project (FP6 IST-2002-002154), pp 38-44, Tuebingen, 
Germany, September 28-29, 2006. http://www.diadem-firewall.org/workshop06/ 
[16] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, W.T. Walter, "Enhanced SIP Security for Air Interface (Gm) 
between IMS Core and Client", IST/IEEE-Africa 2006 Conference (Information 
Society Technologies in Africa) supported by the European Commission under IST 
Program of FP6. IST-Africa Proc. ISBN: 1-905 824-01-7, Proc. on CD, Pretoria, 
South Africa, 03 - 05 May 2006. http://www.ist-africa.org/Conference2006.  
[17] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, W.T. Walter, "Inter-Domains Security Management (IDSM) 
Model for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)", IEEE/International Symposium on 
Frontiers in Availability, Reliability & Security (FARES 2006) in conjunction with 1st 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability & Security. ARES06 Proc. IEEE, 
Own Related Publications                                                                                    SSP Framework for IMS 
 
199 
ISBN: 978-0-7695-2567-9, pp. 502-509, Vienna, Austria, April 20-22, 2006.  
http://www.ares-conf.org. 
[18] M. Sher, T. Magedanz: "Security Management Model for IP Multimedia System 
(IMS)", IFIP TC6 International Conference on Network Control and Engineering for 
QoS, Security and Mobility (NetCon05), Working Groups WG6.2, WG6.6, WG6.7 & 
WG6.8 and France Telecom, Conference Proc. on CD, Lannion, France, November 
14-18, 2005. 
[19] M. Sher, T. Magedanz: "Network Access Security Management (NASM) Model for 
Next Generation Mobile Telecommunication Networks", IFIP/IEEE 2nd Workshop on 
Mobility Aware Technologies and Applications - Service Delivery Platforms for Next 
Generation Networks. MATA05 Proc. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, LNCS 
3744-0263, ISSN 0302-9743, ISBN: 3-540-29410-4 (pp. 263-272), Montreal, Canada, 
October 17-19, 2005. http://www.congresbcu.com/mata2005 
[20] F. C. Gouveia, T. Magedanz, M. Sher, “Understanding the Issues of Providing IMS 
Capabilities on Different Access Networks – The Use of Policies for QoS Provision”, 
Proc. 9th WSEAS International Conference on Communications, ISBN: 960-8457-29-
7, WSEAS Press, July 2005. 
[21] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, "Secure Service Provisioning Framework (SSPF) for 
Multimedia Systems and Next Generation Mobile Networks", 3rd International 
Workshop in Wireless Security Technologies 2005 organized by Wireless Information 
Technology Research Centre(WITRC). IWWST05 Proc. ISSN: 1746-904X, (pp. 101-
106), London, UK April 4-5, 2005.  
 
  
Annex A 
Installation Guide for IDP-Core 
The following instructions and guidelines are important to run the IDP-Core: 
1. Check whether the DNS runs correctly. Test the DNS with command: 
“ping pcscf.open-ims.test” 
If it is not running, then check the file “/etc/bind/open-ims.dnszone”, which is 
the configuration file for the DNS server (bind9). How to do this? 
Use command: “ifconfig” to get the current IP address.  
Use the current IP address to replace the old one in the file open-ims.dnszone.  
In order to edit this file, you should require the super user privilege.  
Command: “sudo vi open-ims.dnszone” 
2. Check the /etc/resolv.conf file  
Command: “sudo cp resolv.conf.ims resolv.conf” 
3. Restart the DNS server 
Commands: “sudo bind” then “sudo rndc reload” 
4. Now “ping pcscf.open-ims.test” should work. 
5. Check the configuration file of the PCSCF (/opt/OpenIMSCore/pcscf.cfg). 
In the line for listening “listen=10.147.66.182”, this IP address must be the 
current IP of the system. 
6. Start the open ims core with super user in the folder /opt/OpenIMSCore. 
To start the pcscf using command “sudo ./pcscf.sh”;  
Start the scscf “sudo ./scscf.sh” ;  
Start the icscf “sudo ./icscf.sh”.  
Change the current folder to /opt/OpenIMSCore/FHoSS/deploy,  
Run the HSS using “./startup.sh” 
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7. On the client computer, use the SIPp to simulate the flooding attack. 
The test client is under c:\temp\sipp 
a. Use a low rate to test the IDP, the command is “sipp 
10.147.66.182:4060 -r 10 -rp 10s -sf bob_register.xml” 
b. Use a high rate to test the IDP, command is “sipp 10.147.66.182:4060 
-r 10 -rp 10 -sf bob_register.xml” 
8. To start the UCT client, change the folder 
/home/swu/downloads/uctimsclient1.0.3.tar.gz_FILES/src 
Use command “sudo./uctimsclient”. 
 
 
Annex B 
User Guide for IDP-AS 
 
The following instructions are important to use IDP-AS: 
1. The prerequisite to start IDP-AS, the "rules.xml" and "ids.con_g" should be 
under the directory "etc" of the IMS AS. 
2. The IDP-AS is integrated with IMS AS. Therefore it starts automatically, 
when IMS AS is started.  
3. Note that the IDP Centre must have the reference of the started SIPSeeServer 
in order to protect the IMS AS. The following main method of the 
SIPSeeServer shows the action. 
public static void main(String[] arg) { 
// Create Server with properties file 
SIPSeeServer server = new SIPSeeServer((arg.length>0)?arg[0]:null,false); 
IDSCenter.getInstance().set_server(server); 
try { 
// start server 
server.start(); 
} catch (Exception e) { 
LOGGER.debug("SIPSee Exception -> ", e); 
} 
} 
 
